

HOW THEY DO IT IN ENGLAND

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by
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PREFACE

WHEN this book came out in Germany, many friends put this question to me: "Well, how do they manage their affairs, these English people?" Not one of them asked me, "What is the leading thought of the book?" "What is this certain 'IT' of the British which appears to you of such great importance?" In brief: We are so depressed by the gigantic task which public life demands of us since the world-war that we can fairly guess that only one thing can be meant, i.e., how do the English people find their orientation in this new world? What have been the consequences in England of this almost revolutionary "high water" in the democratising of our whole public life, of our politics, our social structure, our national economy, our whole spiritual outlook? We people of the European Continent look upon England as a country of perseverance, as a country in which the Conservative powers have become again and again strong enough to tie up, to paralyse, the inevitable influences of progress, or, at any rate, to reduce them to a bearable minimum. The British people are rather fond of being called a Conservative nation! Yet, thus prejudices and self-deceit are easily created. As for myself, I believe that there can be nothing more useful to protect oneself and others than by taking an inventory; to produce a sober list of the most

important tendencies which show themselves in the era of democracy, which has followed the era of liberalism, and which now dominates public life. Such an inventory, taken by a foreigner, may also give English readers something of interest which might have escaped their own observation in the stress of work, or of which they become only dimly conscious in their leisure moments. In any case, such a contemplation will show up clearly the world-wide problems of our times; the great necessity of examining anew our politics, our economic affairs, and our spiritual accomplishments in the giant upheavals which have taken place before our eyes, and to reform them to such an extent as to make them conform with our rapidly advancing times; ergo, let us have a look at how the English manage their affairs, what their tasks are, what mistakes they have made, and towards which goal their social and spiritual endeavours were made and have developed in recent years.

RUDOLF KIRCHER.

Berlin,

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HOW THEY DO IT IN ENGLAND

WHAT IS THE GOOD OF DEMOCRACY?

ABOUT POLITICS, FOOLS AND CULTURE

“POLITICS, politics?” he cried. “What do I care for your politics? When I have time, I would rather play billiards or tennis.”

“Politics? Democracy?” said another. “But, my dear friend, don’t you know that I am an artist?”

I could easily cite a dozen similar stupidities coming from England, the motherland of Parliamentary democracy. Have we not been told that an Englishman is a bred-and-born politician, and is not England the strongest bulwark of modern democracy? Does not England pour out her democratic spirit far over five continents?

In Greece of old, people who took no interest in public life, and who rendered no public service, were called *idiōtai* and one can guess that our word “idiots” is derived from this expression of the Hellenes. Of course there was no parliamentarianism in the old Greek democracy. It is far easier to possess a democratic mind than to feel enthusiastic about up-to-date parliamentarianism. It is the same in

England, as we shall see presently. But our dislike for existing forms of political life (forms which exist, perhaps, only by chance) does not give us the right to be an "idiot". There are, however, plenty of such idiots to be found in the British Isles. It could not be helped, because the progress of a formal democracy was far quicker in England than the winning through of each individual of the twenty-nine millions of electors, with a democratic spirit and political power of judgment.

After all, democracy is nothing but the mastering of the *ιδιωται*—nothing but the gradual doing away with a class of unconcerned, or indifferent people. It is desirable that as large a percentage as possible of the people should take part in public affairs, and feel interested in the problems of the community. The mastering of the egocentric and egoistic inclination with which we are all born is the aim of English democracy. Out of a horde of British individuals an organised alliance is aimed at—a democratic nation.

POLITICS SPELL LIFE

He who believes in life believes in politics, because politics are life—conscious life, "lived" life: politics are the organising of social life. Politics are restricted like the individual, but at the same time as wide as the universe. Politics start in the parlour, and end in Geneva, or somewhere else on the Hindenburg line. Where does private life cease to *be* private life, and where do politics begin? The correct attitude to a neighbour—especially if that neighbour rattles off twenty gramophone records automatically

one after the other—the polite treatment of Miss Secretary, of the chauffeur, the servant; the boring discretion adhered to in everyday life; fair play on the sports ground; intercourse with other good-for-nothings at the public school—all this looks like English private life, yet it is English “politics”: an organised social life. Who will deny that the price of bread is a piece of politics, the gas bill, or the receipt for taxes paid? The table at the Inn, for the constant visitor, has no less a right of political existence than a faction meeting, or a debate in Parliament.

The politician may try for a while to ignore real life, the original substance of his politics, but he will repent of it soon enough. The “non-political” contemporary may imagine that he has got nothing to do with politics, yet he is bound up with it in reality. He who considers that his art, his science, or his billiard-balls are of greater importance than politics is only proving that the attacks of politicians into his private life thus far have been passably bearable—because the “idiots” would jump up angrily if the spikes of the politicians had penetrated to their skins!

My friend the billiard-player, and my friend the artist, would soon discover their “political” heart if the blessings coming from the politicians had given them a thorough good shaking-up. First of all, they differ in no way whatever from the millions of Britishers who are entitled to the vote, but do not consider it worth their while to enter a polling-station. In this way, millions of working people prove that, no matter how miserable their type of life may be, it is bearable enough—so bearable, indeed,

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that they do not yearn for a socialistic Messiah. The socialistic credo was wrecked in England on this rock of life's realities. Politics are earth-bound, like life itself, but both would wither without the dew of idealism with which we start the morning.

AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS

There are professionals in politics, as there are in sport. We cannot do without them, but they are a nuisance, often doing mischief, here as well as there. We admire any outstanding achievement, but the real "spade work" will always be defined more closely by the spirit and the work of the amateur. A Nurmi or a Tunney is a rare bird in sport; a Cromwell or a Bismarck is still rarer in politics. We democratic amateurs have to look out for ourselves. Luckily, there are not always wars or revolutions to be won, or new empires to establish. To arrive at an understanding between man and man is just as important as the performance of an occasional miracle. No war won, no charter of the constitution, can ever make up for the fundamental work of everyday democracy: the understanding between man and man. The billiard-player does not notice it; he just gazes at his balls. My friend the artist holds a different opinion: he despises the amateur, in every department. He does not fit in with democracy, though there have always been great artists who lived with the people and among the people.

Stanley Baldwin was an amateur, in spite of his £5,000 ministerial portfolio. He is not a man who would give himself up entirely to his political work.

That was a weakness, but it is at the same time the very strength of many English statesmen and politicians: they do not allow themselves to become worn out by their political activities! Although life and politics are inseparable, life is, after all, more far-reaching—it stretches right into the sphere where my friend the artist dwells, and still far beyond that. The further a formal democracy spread in England, the more the people entered into active politics—people who, neither by their own original inclinations nor by virtue of their education or traditions, were able to feed their minds and rest their souls in that wider sphere—the sphere *beyond* politics. Thus it happened that professionalism entered further into British politics, and the scholar-politician became rarer.

But in principle, government in England is an amateur business; they have no ministers by vocation. Their ministers are merely the heads of their respective departments; they have no “experts”. Even the War Office, and the Admiralty are controlled (on the political summit) by amateurs. But professionals are looked upon with suspicion in England. One does not like to see them in realms where the common sense of the amateur is quite good enough. The common sense of the great masses is valued far more in England than the leadership of a few individuals, though even to-day they would not despise a first-class Minister of State, if they could get one. All the same, one thing is clear to all: even the greatest statesman will never be a substitute for the human (and the political) common sense of the millions who dwell together on this island.

DEMOCRACY AND CULTURE

The Artist is quite out of sympathy with the "dabbler", and many others agree with him; they cannot find a kind word to say for the amateur. Whether we call our stage England or Germany, it is the same play. Democracy has multiplied the actors, and has supplied them with rôles which they have not yet mastered, or only very imperfectly.

The problems of our civilisation have become incomparably more actual than they have ever been before—more actual also than the problems of our culture. When more artistically-inclined natures, eager to develop culture, meet with disappointments to-day, when they see themselves facing a powerful torrent that is of no use to them, and when, for this reason, they flee from politics, growling and disdainful—when they flee from politics to which their new rights and their new democratic duty calls them—it may often be merely a half-unconscious conviction that the task of our era appears to be one of civilisation. It does not look as if the present time will live in history as a period of great advancement in cultural values. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that civilisation, the whole of our circumstances of life, will experience a mighty lift-up if we seize the opportunity given to us.

We are remarkably poor in high-cultured *new* creative work. The mountain of culture-value which accumulated in England through the centuries, does not appear to grow higher at all in our times, while this huge mass on the other hand widens out on

every side: somehow democracy managed to penetrate also into the sphere of culture—to the great terror of my friend the artist. But, surely, he need not be afraid, because democracy means education, and a rising up. Democracy means a pouring out of the Spirit. The rights of voting are simply a Locarno—a very poor beginning. There must follow the building up, the penetration and the spreading of civilisation, and even these are only the preliminary studies for a new cultural soaring up, on a broader route.

My friend has learnt that art is only the concern of a few selected people: democracy means for him the loss of benefit. He does not understand, at any rate not yet, that “democracy”, which grieves him so much, will be able to create also a new and broader foundation, and a more hopeful one into the bargain, for all cultured life, upon which the creative minds of future generations will be enabled to build up new and valuable work, provided they have the strength left to do it. He thinks of himself, and is upset!

A DUTY DUE TO POLITICS

Culture and civilisation have become estranged from each other—democracy may be able to reconcile the two. At the worst, we can feed from the cultural storage of earlier eras for a little while; but since a horrible war, and since the awful social upheaval through which we have lived, our state of inherited civilisation has become disgracefully compromised.

Before there can be any sense in standing enraptured in front of a costly, wonderful picture, even

before there is any sense in seeking the Eternal and yielding to Him in loving confidence, it would be very advisable to fulfil a few primary civilising conditions for a reasonable, peaceful living together. This means again: politics!

There have always been some social reformers and apostles of peace; but never have these problems—and with them, the very foundations of our existence—stood before the people with such merciless distinctness, or been so unavoidable as they are to-day: never before was the possibility given to the people to build up anew the foundations of their lives merely by the legitimate fulfilment of a simple political duty.

THE BURDEN OF DEMOCRACY—AND HOW IT BECOMES BEARABLE

Democracy is an inconvenient burden. It is easy enough to put it in power, but it is often rather difficult to govern a country with the results of a democratic election. The English people did not invent their democratic institutions; English life developed, somehow or other, into democracy. The English hold certain ideas as to familiarising their intercourse with their fellow-men. While transferring these habits from their private life into public life, democracy was born in England. The “upper ten thousand” laid down their sovereignty quite voluntarily into the fetters of democracy. England’s democracy developed itself in the same measure as the self-education of the nation progressed.

Democracy is for an Englishman the doctrine of national intercourse, the teaching of political etiquette. There will always be people who like to rule, but there are also many people who prefer to be ruled. One must only understand how it is to be managed. Democracy possesses this recipe. The fundamental idea will always and everywhere be the same, but the outward form is subject to a continual change. That is why the system cannot be transferred fundamentally.

The England of to-day is democratic only to such a point as it was thought unavoidable by the ruling party. Political pressure, issuing from educated people, has driven formal democracy to her highest point (very clearly shown in the voting rights, and in the dominating House of Commons); but materially there was far less advancement in democratic example. Politics made the tempo slow down. This *ritardando* had for reason some *ideal* conviction, but to a far greater extent it was due to *practical* reasons. Politics knew how to protect the inherited material things.

Money is an undemocratic element; it cannot help itself accumulating, and does not question right or wrong. It creates an uncontrolled, unbalanced power; it ill-treats body and soul. The democratic spirit—in England, it is directly incorporated into the “gentleman-definition”—frequently loses effect in such a sphere. It is only quite lately that democracy began to grasp also the most material of material things. Society’s adaptibility to new social surroundings, and the development of the famous British sense of sport, as applied to this most important sphere of life, is the present task for English democracy.

There exists no longer one single discussed problem of English politics which has not in some measure or other—but mostly incommunicable—an economical or financial-political background.

THE NECESSITY FOR LEADERSHIP

In such "capitalistic" realms, democracy means an obligation to heavy sacrifices. But does not democratic life always spell sacrifice wherever democracy is found? The upper classes have to give up a large part of their inherited traditions and privileges, while their bondmen, up in revolt, have to surrender a considerable amount of their rebellious instincts. Sacrifice must be learned. Sacrifice is an action, a deed; democracy nowise excludes the heroic out of our life, only the valuta are different. The hero does away with his armour. The hero serves no longer a King greedy for more power; he ranges himself with the multitudes, with people who never existed in history, or ever before meant what they mean now.

But if courage, character, and the desire to lead are the attributes of a heroic spirit, then there was also never so great a need for heroes as in our times! English democracy tries to build up characters, while forcing the people to control themselves and others, and not to shirk the responsibility for doing so. The right to vote simply means that an adult person must acknowledge his obligation to be a citizen among citizens: he must possess colour and he must show colour. But democratic England never demands or expects that the masses should govern, nor that their will should be accepted blindly.

THE LEADER'S MISSION

Nowhere else is so much freedom allowed to the individual as in democracy, but nowhere else is so much self-conquest demanded of him as here. English democracy levels political rights, but it does not suppress individuality; it favours the rising up of leaders—of leaders who understand how to lead, whether they have once been masters or servants. Of these leaders, democracy demands self-conquest, and the desire to serve the community.

But there are limits even to this, because in democratic England the demagogue is well distinguished from the statesman by the latter's ability to lead the gigantic stream of public opinion with sovereignty. Here lies the stumbling-block for the majority of people. English education tries to conquer the difficulty. In no other political system is the problem of leadership so important as in democracy—but also in no other system is leadership so difficult and sacrificial as in democracy. The leader is obliged to listen to his own conscience, but also to the voices of those whom he is leading. He must educate himself, yet he must teach the others. He is not allowed to dictate arbitrarily. In what now consists the famous instinct of the English people for politics? In the knowledge and in the recognition of this elementary mechanism of democracy.

The English are not more gifted than other people, but they have more fully learnt the art of fellowship, and they have been better taught. For these reasons they have a far better political chance than other

nations. The understanding of politics—that is to say, the understanding needed for working with the state—*can* be taught, and *can* be learnt, just as well as the proper behaviour of young people in mother's drawing-room can be learnt, or as the living together of the peoples in Geneva can be *taught* and can be *learnt*! The English people are given to make astonishing blunders, but they have learnt to move about so dexterously and cleverly in life, that they are always able to find a way that leads to good results.

A statesman of the democracy has got to learn how to draw the whole nation, or at any rate her overpowering majority, to his side, and to make himself adaptable to them. The crowd must understand that their leader is not working for groups or classes, but that he must speak and act for the majority. In true democracy, the welfare of the *whole* nation is everything, special party interests are absolutely nothing.

Here is a task to be performed by artists—but very few are able to reach higher than the average. It is the same in England, but it must be admitted that the English have reached what is of the greatest importance, namely the knowledge that everything is dependent upon the *national* furthering of politics: an understanding which has penetrated deeply into the ranks of the working-classes.

English leaders have been successful in their work of education as far as that goes. But in the positive part of their task—i.e., the marking out of new national goals, and following them up, also, against the resistance of a lazy Party-crowd—they have been less fortunate. Lloyd George was overthrown after

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the Great War, because he did not possess sufficient moral energy and greatness to act according to his convictions, and to swim against the stream which he himself had unchained. Mr. Baldwin fell, because he thought it to be of greater importance to stick to Conservative principles, than to listen to the call for more progress and activity, which arose from all sections of the people. Ramsay MacDonald will fall, too, if he is not victorious in the wrestlings with the "Party-fighters" of his party.

THE ART OF DEBATING

The methods of democracy are exceedingly toilsome, not to say rather boring. They work on your nerves, and overburden the brain of a good leader to the utmost. Democracy demands constant debates, endless speeches, and an eternal explaining. Indeed, democracy is a heavy burden! How simple it is just to dictate! No talk needed, no discussions. But democracy demands to come to an understanding with the dunces. A Party-man calls often enough on the stupid, because he is unable to get the votes of the intellectuals. The counter-action for such demagogism in England is that the British politician, who, with very few minor exceptions, is by tradition and schooling a democrat, has learnt since his school-days the art of explaining himself, and how to solicit support for his opinions.

Debating is included in the English school syllabus. It is taught in the schools, goes on in the universities, in debating societies of every type, and continues in the genuine. and in the numberless imitation

parliaments all over the country. An Englishman plays at politics, where they play in other countries at soldiers. Everywhere local "parliaments" are to be found—that is, debating clubs, which are precise imitations of the genuine Parliament in Westminster, and where even elderly gentlemen and ladies practise weekly the art of having a good political talk. Much humour is displayed at such meetings, so that it is quite interesting to listen.

But not everybody and every nation possesses this gift; nor does everybody care to wipe out the boundaries between the serious and the earnest, between play and politics; but nobody can deny, nobody who knows England, that these very characteristics have made a democratic nation of the British. The burden of democracy, i.e., to explain and to defend everything, becomes thus a thing to be understood by itself. One does not any longer look upon Parliamentary discussion as a loss of time, and it really cannot be called a loss of time when it is done in the right spirit. What gets lost in time, is won in power of life and in philosophical understanding of the nation.

DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP

THE MEANING OF PARLIAMENT

IT is quite possible to govern a modern country without a Parliament, but it is impossible to have a Parliament and no Government. If sometimes it has looked as if, in the motherland of parliamentarism, Parliament is considered of greater importance than the Cabinet, it is only the fault of the observer, or of the usual over-estimation of the visible and audible world at the expense of the less outwardly noticeable powers which move the world.

The purpose of Parliament is to make the hidden visible, to draw the secret Cabinet into the public light. It is to be made accessible to a democratic control. But it has never been the meaning of English parliamentarism that Parliament should govern alone, or even take a part in governing. Only for the narrow border of local administration have the British accepted a parliamentary system, where the local "parliament" is self-governing, while it concerns itself with local affairs only. In the Palace of Westminster, where the House of Commons and the House of Lords sit, the opposite principle is worked out; Parliament has the political power, but it does not govern.

The system of local administration has been thought out by clever people for aims of their own.

The system of state-democracy, however, has grown up quite naturally; nobody has invented it, and it has also not been copied from any other country. It is a pure British product, full of absurd ill-logic for anyone who is stupid enough to approach it theoretically, and overloaded with practical nonsense, which has become such a habit that it may nearly be granted eternal life.

But it is, all the same, a system with a deep meaning, and one with which people who understand it know how to do quite a lot. The absurdities of Parliamentarism are explained by the fact that the up-to-date Government system has developed out of a circuit of the strangest development phases. What came out of it is just as incomplete as other things into which a man lets himself be driven by a mixture of chances, or strokes of genius, which we like to call political developments. Its up-to-date shape is so very different from what originally was intended by a Parliament, and it can do with such a lot of improvement that nobody would dream of calling it absolutely correct for all times. If we take a closer look, we shall find that democratic formulæ, in these modern days, experience very vital changes, which are passed by carelessly, as a rule, as they appear to be of no particular importance as compared with the elementary fundamental facts of democracy.

BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

The fundamental principle of democracy, as they term it in England, is "Government by consent of the governed". One can obtain the consent of the

people in many ways. In England, it is done by getting a group of people elected for Parliament by folk who have the right to vote. Things have reached such a climax that this group of elected people can form Governments, control Governments, and smash Governments. They are the law-givers. This surely is a complicated and ambitious programme. In its earlier days, tasks that the English Parliament wanted to tackle were simpler, and more definite. Parliament had been squeezed out of an absolute Kingdom, in order to safeguard certain fundamental principles and to restore original rights: i.e., personal freedom, and the capital of the citizen. Government itself remained a privilege of the Crown. Deputies of the people did not dream of snatching away the right to govern from the King. Not before the nineteenth century, did England's Parliament establish her right of "Government-making"—i.e., to form a Government.

William IV discovered, in 1834, that his Ministers could not govern, because the majority of the House of Commons were in opposition. The realisation that a Government is only possible on the basis of consent by the ruled people, "this grand platitude [so the late C. F. G. Masterman wrote] which it takes the world thousands of years to comprehend, and which man in his stupidity forgets again and again, and which must be learned anew by fire and by blood"—this recognisance had won through at last. The victory of the Parliamentary was so complete that the victors met with the same fate as the Allies at Versailles: they left the path of commonsense. They intended to put into too tight fetters the Government of the country which they had snatched from

the Crown, in order to free themselves from absolutism.

What followed was a high-flora of parliamentarism—but we know that not all the blossoms of a tree become fruit. The wind that carries off the blossoms in their hundreds, does a good work: it frees the tree of a task that it cannot perform by itself. The Parliamentarian has not yet experienced this early summer storm, but he is in need of it most urgently!

A CHANGE IN PARLIAMENTARISM

What has become of those fundamental rights for whose sake Parliament had been created hundreds of years ago? In the Palace of Westminster, they get busy with such important things as (perhaps) a water-supply for Brighton or Brixton, or with some lamp-posts to be put along the Embankment. Out of a revolutionary institution, where life or death sentences were at stake, has by now been established a huge sponge, which is over-full, due to the absorption of mere trifles. The sense for realities was lost in many politicians: what is of real importance runs the risk of being lost to sight in a rubbish-heap of Party-political petty concerns.

Parliament has stretched the principle of "government by consent of the people" to its utmost capacity, quite wiping out the dividing line between Government and Parliament, between the executive and the control. The English find that the gain has been greater than the loss. Their argument is of importance: a Parliament, which is only good enough for talk, but shrinks from action, spoils the character,

because power without responsibility lacks its highest quality: its educational value.

We Germans know how to appreciate this, because our pre-war Parliament was a political mass-grave, but no political educational institution. Who would like to deny that even a land like England, which has had at least a hundred years to solve the problem of Party-Government, is still labouring with the question: how can one work a Party-Government, or a Parliamentary Government of the country, in such a way that the Government of the country, and not the Party or the Parliament, becomes the principal thing?

In times of old, the separation was over-sharp; the suspicion against the servants of the King was so great that none of them was admitted to the House of Commons, this institution of the people's confidence. Even to-day, "Black Rod", the King's messenger, has to knock thrice at the door of the House of Commons, and to wait for a "come in", when he has to bring a message from the King, while the Commoners do not mind the trouble of marching into the meeting-hall of the Lords, to receive the King's speech from the throne, though it is written by the Premier.

THE POWER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

The Commoners have made incessant use of their victory, and the power of the Parliament is nearly boundless. If a majority could be found to-day, Parliament would be enabled to condemn to death Mr. MacDonald, or even the quintessence of all

English honesty, Sir William Joynson Hicks—who is now called Lord Brentford—or at any rate put them in prison. There would not even be any necessity to explain why. If it should please a majority in Parliament that the House of Commons elections should hold good for the duration of fifty, instead of for five years, the unwritten constitution of England would afford no protection against it. A judgment in the High Court of Justice is, however, binding for the House of Commons, yet a majority could bring about the dismissal of the Judge. The English Parliament—so one could vary an old adage—“can never be wrong”. The power lies exclusively with the House of Commons, since (before the War) the right had been given to the Commoners to make a law without the consent of the Lords, if, in three successive sessions, a majority was voting for it.

The King promulgates the law, but the zeal with which many Conservatives are trying to reform the House of Lords (namely the re-institution of the political power of the Lords) shows clearly enough that they do not think particularly much in England nowadays of this legislative protection. How would it be if the Commons were to pass a resolution to do away with the monarchy? They are not going to do it, but the possibility is here right enough. Parliament *has* this power! The only barrier is “the consent of the governed”. The mightiest institution of England breaks down helplessly in itself if it is the will of the people; yet the English Parliament can only come to shipwreck on the rocks of resistance by the people.

If there had been no World War, one would have lived to see in these latest days a test of power be-

tween the Parliamentary will-power, and a resisting portion of the people—an armed resistance of the Ulster League against the planned Ireland Act of the Liberal Government. Very prominent English statesmen threatened quite openly to take up arms. The test of might between the power of the State and of the mining companies, called the General Strike, was of a different kind, though indirectly it was also aimed at an exclusion—it was rather a self-exclusion for the greater part—of Parliament in a decision of great national importance.

THEORY AND EXAMPLE

The omnipotence of Parliament exists only in theory. Between what the House of Commons might do, and what it actually does, lies a mighty, yea, even a tragic difference. We shall dwell on this point when we talk of the sins of the Parliamentarians. A difference between theory and example is decisive for the whole democratic life of England. The democratic principle (consent by the governed) and “party government” became, after all, only bearable by the fact that these principles must not be taken verbally, nor understood formally. What is the meaning of consent by the governed? What is understood by government under a party executive? Who has to agree? Certainly not all the governed, and just as certainly not the followers of the Government party! Why is consent necessary at all? Certainly not for all acts of Parliament.

THE SYSTEM OF CONFIDENCE

English example has shown that the answer to these questions, and with it the handling of the democratic institutions, is not always to be understood by itself. Democratic example is a high-art, and for the mastery of it a whole political life-time is hardly sufficient. Parliamentarism is a method for the delegation of power, and with it a system of confidence, connected with a plan of self-help when confidence is destroyed. The people choose their representatives, and they depend upon them to understand correctly the meaning of the elections. The delegates in turn entrust the Government with the interpretation of the election decisions, and smash the Cabinet if it deviates from the dictated way.

DEMOCRACY AND PARTY-DOCTRINE

The meaning of the elections, that is to say the tendency of the people, cannot as a rule be read from Parliamentary programmes. The "programmes" play no rôle in the election fight, for English electors pay hardly any notice to them. There is, therefore, no possibility for the Government to look up the Party-programme and to study Party-politics after the electoral victory of her party.

The British have a Party-Government, but the meaning of the Parliamentary method of England is the independence of the Government from the Party-programme. English people often sin against

this rule, but it wins through again and again, and becomes more important with every decennium. Each English Government—if looked upon as a political party—has only a small portion of the people at its back; if it were to read from its vocation the right to force pure party-demands, there would soon arise an opportunity for the people to decide at an election about this constitutional principle.

The most substantial characteristic of English parliamentarism is the tendency to conduct Government politics in such a manner that they appear bearable, not only to their own party, but to the whole nation, or at any rate to the overpowering majority. This is understandable in the case of a "Minority-Government"; but for a Cabinet which has a Parliamentary majority for its support, it will be found just as necessary.

THE MINORITY AS A CREATIVE ELEMENT

The minority is a creative element in British democracy, since it has the power to govern by itself, while the governing majority is bound to pay regard to its demands. This system—which reaches its culminating point in the duo-play of two principal currents, and in the principle of the alternative Government—forces the minority to a restricted attitude, because fanatics will never have a chance to get the "consent of the governed", either formally or on the quiet. Therefore Minority-Governments are no particular rarity in England, either in a verbal sense, or in the more hidden form in which the last Cabinet of Stanley Baldwin, in spite of its enormous

election majority in the House of Commons, was only a Minority-Government, because the combined votes of the electors of the two other parties exceeded those of the Conservatives by thousands.

A Minority-Government breaks down automatically when it tries to *force* its Party programme, or its Party interests, upon the nation. The Minority-Government represents, therefore, the most complete form of political education—it forces the adoption of a true democratic example. It protects the country from an over-estimation of the Party, and shows Parliament the way to its real tasks. “Consent of the governed” is not meant to imply that everybody must agree with it—neither the party’s political opponents, nor their own party friends. Democracy means very often nothing else than opposing one’s own friends for the benefit of the opponent, and the welfare of the whole.

THE ENTRANCE OF THE MASSES

Here the enormous importance of the extension of the voting-rights becomes very evident; only twenty or thirty years ago the circle of those who owned the right to vote was so small that it was not particularly difficult to work out common politics for these few millions. Nowadays, since Mr. Baldwin’s reform of 1929, nearly thirty millions out of less than forty millions have the right to vote, and, indeed, not a few only, out of a politically dominating realm, but the whole nation, with its millions and millions of workers and proletarians, has a word to say, where the whole misery of modern existence

re-echoes. It becomes, indeed, a work of art to get a clear picture about the nation's individual desires, and to bridle them, as, without restriction, no democracy is possible.

This task is so tedious, and the demands on the renouncement of self so great, that many now bitterly regret these electoral reforms that have made England, only after the Great War, a democracy. Of course, without the reform of Lloyd George in 1918, there would be no large Labour Party in the House of Commons. But the widening of the electoral rights was only a natural consequence, and certainly not a cause of the proletarianizing and industrializing of England. There would have been the possibility of withholding the voting rights from the fifteen millions of workers for a little while; but for how long, and with what consequences? Explosion was bound to happen earlier or later. Instead of this, English politics had to swallow, for a few years, one disagreeable thing, namely, the fact that the consent of those "governed" will be very difficult to get for some time, as the difference between what the parties pretend to wish, and what they actually desire, is far greater than ever. The greatness of this tension has shown itself very clearly during the last years—as it is the cause that made an enterprising Liberal party not merely possible, but necessary.

The incorporation of the huge crowds of Labour into the Parliamentary system was the historical achievement of the socialistic leaders. England was not exactly the first and only country, but the English development, whose culminating point falls in the very recent years, was especially important, because it happened at a time when one seemed to despair

of parliamentarism, or when one had destroyed it completely, as in Russia and Italy.

PERSPECTIVE

Anxious minds look, of course, upon this growing of Labour numbers with great anxiety, because, since the realisation of formal democracy, there remains this perspective to be faced:—that Parliament might decide upon certain things, in comparison with which a political revolution would be child's play! An overpowering majority of the socialists in the House of Commons, supported by the consent of a majority of the people's votes, might smash up England fundamentally. The loss of the Crown would mean nothing in comparison with the loss of milliards which capitalism would have to face. One must be a very naïve man, and have a (very improbable) good conscience, not to see the threatening danger? Are not the rich in an absolutely ridiculous minority, while all, all, all the millions of the poor, and of the poorest, possess the right to vote? Parliament could do all this if it wished.

But England has more than a mere formal democracy—it has politics; it has education; it has true democracy: England is going to overcome class contrasts gradually. England opened the sluices of formal democracy only after she had tackled already, for a long time, the great task of all democracy: the education of the masses for co-work with the State. This has been done very successfully, though her task is far from being finished. The crowds have not entered Parliament unprepared.

THE STUPIDITY OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS

The ill-use to which Parliamentarism can be put, since the Government is at the mercy of the House of Commons, is so great that one speaks to-day in England of a Parliamentary crisis of democracy. Of course, only a very few begin to think that it is possible to do without a Parliament, which has existed for centuries. England has only a few thousand Fascists—just as there are only a minimum number of Bolsheviks. Trotsky must have been mistaken when he prophesied, for the English, their going over to Bolshevism.

As far as parliamentarism is in danger in England, this danger arises nearly exclusively out of the midst of Parliamentarians themselves. Those who talk of a crisis, do not doubt, as a rule, the commonsense of Parliament, but they protest against the stupidity of some Parliamentarians. The historical development of Parliament was on far broader lines than the development of the people, who try to play at this instrument! In their endeavour to overpower the Crown, and later the aristocracy, the Commons imagined themselves in possession of a formal omnipotence, which made them forget that Parliament can never be anything else but the uniting link between the people and the Government. The Parliamentarian is only an agent. But imagining himself to be omnipotent, and under the impression that nowadays everyone who sits long enough in Parliament is a Cabinet Minister *in spe*, the Parliamentarian works

himself up into a sort of political trance, into a fairy-tale mood, in which he imagines himself to be living in a world set apart for his, and his followers', own special use; a higher world, of course! Thus the agent lives for his own aims, and all sorts of Parliamentary tittle-tattle is the consequence.

HOW CONTROL WAS LOST

The meaning of Parliament is so unequivocal, and its importance is so great, that nothing would be lost if the Parliamentarians would take the resolution to keep what is of real *importance*, and to leave all minor matters to others. But also the English Parliamentarian is so afraid of losing his rights that he cannot take the risk of delegating any power to others. He wants to hold all in his own hand; he wants to co-govern, and by such ways, Parliament splits up into a hundred thousand tit-bits.

Of course, it must be admitted that, with the enormous extension of Parliamentary competence, the tasks have become so numerous and complicated that a great amount of practical power has slipped from their hands quite unaware; so the Government got into possession of the inheritance with a stable Civil Service.

Bureaucracy, kept up by a capable, experienced, and party-free Civil Service, has made rapid progress. "Nowadays there are a greater number of Orders in Council than Acts of Parliament in existence," said Mr. Baldwin a little while ago. The War, of course, has quickened this development, because at that time the Government had no time for parleys. The most

commonsense policy would be for Parliament to *face facts*, and to live no longer in opposition with the Government. The more the Parliamentary wastes his time over trifles, the less power and time is left to him for the working out of the great leading thoughts, and for the task of seeing that the Government keeps to these foundation-lines. The incorporation of many of the Parliamentarians dates from a time when Parliamentary work was only a kind of sport, an amusement for good society. The Opposition are in need still of a Parliamentary education, which is absolutely necessary for the exercising of any serious control of a Government Party, which is determined not to let itself be controlled. The Press has therefore become a far more important control-apparatus than Parliament; but it is well known that the British Press is, to a great part, an organ of the upper classes. Besides, experience has proved that, in really serious moments, great outside concerns—organisations like the mining industry and the Unions—prefer to address themselves to the Government, rather than to Parliament.

WHEN 615 TALK

Faced with such a development, Parliament has only one means left to make itself popular: the speeches that are made, and read, must be heart-to-heart talks. The "politics" of Parliament, and their visible products, will generally be condemned as unpopular, because the compromise that comes out of it leaves all more or less dissatisfied. Unfortunately, not everybody is a fascinating speaker, and the

fact that Parliament, in many questions, in spite of its omnipotence, is restricted to theoretical criticism, does not exactly raise the level of the speeches!

A debate by people of rank will, of course, retain its value, if its influence is moralising; the House of Lords has only a minimum formal power, but the quality of their principal speakers is so considerable that the debates of the Lords possess political power and weight. The level of the debates in the House of Commons is, probably, not lower than that of any other democratically elected deputy; but the oratory—and moral performances—of the leading speakers is far too often drowned by the silly talk of the average speakers. Thus it happened that the democratising of the House of Commons, by the electoral reforms, was no great political victory. In spite of the political education of the British, there are in the House of Commons far more people who possess good will than those who are able to express their will convincingly.

The worst of it all is that nowadays everyone wants to talk. When 615 delegates are elected to Parliament, it is impossible to pretend that the object was that these 615 should all give their opinions in great detail.

The permanently increasing widening of voting rights, and especially modern publicity, have resulted in the fact that there are very few people in the House of Commons who know how to be silent! Parliamentary reports have gained nowadays a publicity as never before. They penetrate into the remotest election realms, and this is the foremost reason why the M.P.'s think that they must bring before their electors this constant proof of their ability. Every

M.P. is anxious to see himself "in print", because he knows that the electors themselves like to see "*their*" M.P. in print, as often as possible.

This imaginary obligation to oratorical activity is one of the most unpleasant minor products of modern democracy. It is a product of mere imagination, because this eternal wish-to-make-a-speech desire has absolutely nothing to do with the real meaning of a Parliament. The result is nothing but aimless, or even senselessly stupid, speeches. Of course, the well-trained British representative of the people knows how to throw out suitable, high-sounding phrases. Stupidity has, in England, not the same disastrous effects as elsewhere, because training helps to hide the lack of substance.

The tendency to impress his indispensability upon himself and others shows itself also very clearly at the question-hour, with which the House of Commons meetings start four times per week. The system of putting short questions is a valuable one in itself, but in nearly ninety per cent of cases it would be possible to settle the questions without any Parliamentary publicity—then they need not have been asked at all.

This question-hour is shamelessly misused by those who like to show their imaginary importance, while, on the other hand, the Government knows how to wriggle out of inconvenient but important questions.

That leads us to the important point: when the Government possesses a strong and safe majority, it is possible for her to get out of serious administration-control, and, even on legislative ground, the work of the Opposition will be hindered, or condemned to fruitlessness. A speaker who is aware

that he cannot alter the attitude of the Government, and their resolutions (because he is a back-bencher on the Government side, or a member of the Opposition) has no reason for that inner excitement without which no good speech is possible. The "Whip", or party-manager, will know how to get, at the right time, the necessary number of delegates into the proper lobby—i.e. the voting chambers—sleepers, dreamers, the not quite sober, and the sober.

PLANS FOR REFORM

Many of these embarrassing positions could be abolished without much ado, if the Parliamentarians themselves would be ready to yield to reforms. The Speaker, the President of the House of Commons, who has to see to the business part, should have the power to alter things on his own behalf, but he will not take the initiative so long as the general mood does not force him to do so. Parliamentarians have, of course, a strong inclination to let things go on as they are!

There are so few people who realise when and where they are out of place! They cannot come to the resolution to own up honestly that a great part of their work is useless. They do not like to admit to themselves that the way by which Parliamentary law is "made", is often scandalously unpractical; that frequently some business is not worth the attention of a whole Parliament, and that the making of law has already become to a great extent a matter for Government departments. The Parliamentarians refuse to see that 615 M.P.'s would not be necessary, if Parliament would only keep to what is of real

necessity. They act as if they did not understand that those who demand reforms do not wish to weaken Parliament, but to raise its dignity.

BUDGET-CONTROL

The reformers are of opinion that all the talk about Government control is of no value, so long as the Commons leave the central territory of every administration—the Budget—to the Government departments to be a free ground for them. The English Parliament has, as everybody remembers from his school-days, fought real battles to secure finance-sovereignty, but it did not understand how to keep the acquisitions of the victory when won!

The Budget-control of the Commons is incredibly superficial; they are quite satisfied with a three weeks general debate, at which the longing to talk finds full satisfaction. The Budget itself is a very minor concern! The Government is quite satisfied that it should be so. About their proposition, some voting (*en bloc*) does take place, and—conformably with the historical importance of the event—the Government makes it a question of confidence.

The reformers demand that an experienced, and not too-many-headed, committee should thoroughly investigate the Budget proposals for the separate Departments and cut down where necessary before the proposals are accepted by the Government, and thus become a part of the official Cabinet-politics—i.e. before the Budget has become sacrosanct for the supporters of the Government, through the confidence question.

But what good would all these reforms do, so long as they did not reach the most important point: the restoration of a reasonable proportion in the division of power, and in the functions, between the three great factors of democracy: People, Parliament, and Government? As the by-the-people-chosen Parliament is not supposed to govern itself, and cannot govern itself, and as no creative work is possible, if those who are called upon to take action have no absolute freedom of movement, the necessity arises for a strong and competent Government, which is able to take the leadership. This brings us to the central problem of all democracy.

THE PREMIER AS LEADER

At the head of English democracy stands a man whom the history of the English Parliamentary system has destined to be the leader of the British nation: the Prime Minister.

Like every other politician, he is in the chains of democracy and of party concerns; but the whole democratic and Parliamentary system of England would be unthinkable, if, in English practice, an office and a person could not be pushed into the foreground as a safeguard that the people will not become suffocated in their own democracy. English experience has taught that the governing central power must be all the stronger, the wider the circle of those upon whose consent the Government de-

pend. So long as Government and Parliament had been strictly separated from each other, the preponderance of the Government was a thing to be understood by itself. The more the Government sank into the party-waves of Parliament, the more urgent became the need for a ministerial leadership.

NECESSITY FOR SUBORDINATION

Nowadays one can well say that: the future of Parliament depends upon whether or not the *system* allows the *leadership* of those who govern. For England the answer is given that the Premier must not seize any power for which he has no right, but must play a rôle which is historic—he has become a principal character of the Constitution, when he makes himself the leader of the nation.

If the right sort of man gets this post, then he will be nothing less than a sort of democratic dictator—the governing head, who exercises a decisive influence upon administration and law, but who will be criticised constantly by Parliament, and dethroned in a moment if he acts against the will of the majority in a really serious question. How far the Premier in office makes use of his chances, is a minor affair. Of no importance, also, is how far the Premier consults his principal co-workers (or even his whole Cabinet) in the most vital decisions!

In British experience it has been found that parliamentarism is only workable when the sovereign organ (the representation of the people) keeps strictly to the principle that democracy is a matter of confidence, and that this means subordination under the leaders.

The people choose those whom they trust, and these trusted representatives of the people delegate their power to the principal man of confidence of the democracy, the Premier. The Premier, in turn, elects confidential people to work with him in the Cabinet. The freedom of choice for him is not an unlimited one, but the English are not narrow-minded, where, in other Parliamentary countries, narrow-minded considerations so often expose the formation of a Government to public ridicule. It is nothing unusual for a Premier to call upon a few co-workers who stand nearer to the opposition than to the Government Party.

GENESIS OF A PREMIERSHIP

The appointment of a Premier is the result of a long development. The desire for clearness, and a responsibility that cannot be mistaken, was most likely one of the motives which led gradually to the fact that, out of the "Cabinet", a head grew up which was far visible—the man who is, in the first place, responsible to Parliament and to the people. One can easily follow this by watching the development of the Cabinet in itself.

Originally the Cabinet was nothing but the tool of the absolute monarch, a more or less "advising" board from the Privy Council, the secret state-adviser of the Crown. Nominally, the Cabinet is still to-day a board of the Privy Council; but, in the meantime, Parliament had won for itself the right to form a Government. Originally, the antagonism between "His Majesty's Servants" (the Cabinet) and the

House of Commons was so great that all possessors of Crown appointments were excluded from a seat in the House of Commons. The "Cabinet" meant, for the Commoners, a group of conspirators who acted in the dark, and could not be controlled. There were fights against encroachments, but the principle that administration was a matter for the King and his Ministers remained unchallenged right into the nineteenth century. The Commoners seemed to be satisfied when the King was willing to appoint responsible Ministers with whom the representatives of the people could argue points, instead of that untouchable and dark "Cabinet Council".

In a certain sense, it is the merit of us Germans (not all Englishmen are inclined to call it a merit) that the Commoners took the Government out of the hands of the English Crown. With the Hanoverians, we presented the Britishers with a dynasty whose first two representatives could not speak a word of English, and whose minds were occupied with other things than the capability to govern their newly-acquired kingdom.

No matter whether the Commoners would have aimed, in any case, for governmental power or not, surely the incapacity of the first two Hanoverians to fulfil the duties of the head of a Government was the direct cause for a mighty strengthening of the Ministry, and led to the forming of a principal ministerial office.

The King was unable to lead the Cabinet, but in those times of incalculable possibilities, the right man was found: Sir Robert Walpole became the first Prime Minister of Great Britain. The English monarchy gradually began to lose her power to govern, but it

took, all the same, nearly another hundred years before the Commons became Cabinet-builders.

In the meantime, George III made a desperate attempt to re-win the former power of the monarchy. He was the first Hanoverian who was sufficiently English to govern his country by himself, but he was too late. The House of Commons, led by the younger Pitt, did not intend to let slip that which had been gained. Pitt was unique and greater than all the others. He was a Premier and a leader in the fullest sense.

THE POWER OF PERSONALITY

With the greatness of the *personæ* who give their interest, rises or falls the importance of English institutions. After the death of Pitt, the newly-created Premiership lost itself without any glory in the administrative assembly of the Cabinet—there was now nobody who would have been able to manage the great office in a large style. For years the Prime Minister was only the nominal head of the Government. Parliament overshadowed the Ministry; the extreme of parliamentarism became visible.

Disraeli was again a Premier and a leader. When he came into office, the restoration of the leader's rôle was considerably lightened, as the sphere of work of the Government had so extended—with the larger population; the extension of its interests; the manifold desires for inner cultivation, and last, but not least by any way, by the widening of voting rights—that the number of members of the Cabinet had meanwhile doubled. Pitt had been able to

manage with five, but now twelve men were necessary to govern England.

This tendency grew upon itself: the more work the Ministries took over, the more the Ministers had to become chiefs of administrations; while, in the same measure, the necessity became clear that there must be a head of the Government, a man who reserved to himself the right of building up the whole of politics.

WAVERINGS AND RETROGRESSION

English politics did not improve when, in the days following, no personalities could be found who had the courage to fill central posts completely. When weaknesses showed in consequence, one felt often inclined to put the fault on the democratic system. The English Government seemed to split up frequently in an inharmonious heap of single Ministries, whose number (until the World-War) grew constantly, until Herbert Asquith arrived at the record of 23 Ministers—added to this, what a mixture of temperaments and intellects they were! All the disadvantages of parliamentarism must have been felt doubly.

Parliament lost itself in viewless *cul-de-sacs*, while the lack of strict leadership made the bureaucracy of the Government still more distinct. The *laissez-faire* of Liberalism could only lead to a false blossom of the Parliament and of the Parliamentary Government. The old Liberals shone in formal "parliamentarism," but England's principal problem, the social problem, was left quite untouched. Two

dozen Ministers were necessary to out-balance the diverging powers of the reigning Liberal Party in the Cabinet.

PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET

Just then, for the first time in English history, the title of Prime Minister was given officially to the First Lord of the Treasury, the conductor of this multi-voiced choir! Since then the title has remained—embarrassment arose, and exists, only with regard to the man who is to fill this office.

Formerly things were just the opposite: Walpole had to put up with the remark: "Our Constitution knows of no *only*, or *first* Minister!" In 1878, in the Berlin Treaty, the title had already appeared once on an official document, probably, however, only in order to level the high titles of the other signatories.

Arthur Balfour saw that a registered trade-mark was made of it—not to his own benefit, however, but for the welfare of his successor.

But of a quite new date is the title "Cabinet Minister." It appeared for the first time upon a Parliamentary document in 1900. The word "Cabinet" retained a bad sound, which vibrated still in the ears of Englishmen, after the Ministry had become long ago a party-product of the House of Commons. "Cabinet" awoke the idea of something uncontrollable and mysterious. Now the notion has thoroughly changed, since England has set her Ministry into the brightest political light; since the principle of collective responsibility has been intro-

duced. "Mitgefangen, mitgehungen!" ("Caught together, hung together!")

Of course, the Premier is the leader of the Government, and has the principal responsibility for everything, but to none of his Minister-colleagues is the possibility left to plead that he has been, in this or in that matter, of a "different opinion". The English people like to get hold of the collar of all evil-doers.

THE RESULT

Whatever may have happened during the last generations, since Walpole and Pitt, the English Premier is a potential, democratically controlled dictator—if he chooses to be one, and if he possesses the talent for it!

How different is this from the caricature of a Parliamentary-system which well-meaning connoisseurs love to sketch. Of course, even Englishmen themselves appear to define democracy differently sometimes. Among the voices which agree with the opinion shown herewith is Sir Sidney Low, who has written: "The exact measure of authority which the Premier may exercise must depend upon circumstances, and upon his character . . . he can nearly become a dictator."

THE EXAMPLE OF TO-DAY

Lloyd George has shown distinctly, during the war and afterwards, to his colleagues, and to the whole world, the over-towering position which a British

Premier can own, if he *wishes* to have it. He was, indeed, nearly a democratic dictator. He dictated things during the War whose correctness and justification was clear to the whole nation. After the War, he placed himself in contradiction to the tendency which moved the great masses of England. By outward appearance, he fell over his conflict with Conservative party-interests, but, in the widest sense, he fell, and was not able to get up again, because he tried to govern with a party which was in opposition to the central stream of the nation.

England was already in need of politics such as MacDonald is trying to get through in his second Labour Government—radical-liberal politics. A democratic dictator can only dictate what appears bearable to the people.

Mr. Baldwin looked upon the rôle of a Premier as it is meant to be. He felt himself as the head of the Government, and he avoided losing himself in party-political tittle-tattle. He wished to lead, and he recognised the tasks; but he has two heavy weights to carry through political life—his own lethargic temperament, and the brake which calls itself the Unionist Party.

Mr. Baldwin was not strong enough to dictate the way to his own party. He was not strong enough in the opinion of his party, but, above all, he was not strong enough to face his own self! He reserved to himself the decision, but what he decided upon was incompleteness. Sometimes he did not seem to be aware of his own weakness: *on dit* that he has said: "What I think, the Conservative Party thinks." "I," with a big capital letter. "L'Etat c'est moi!"

That was a mistake—or was it an unintended self-accusation? Did he really desire no more than his party? His self-conceit as Premier showed itself often very drastically, especially when he had occasion to call to order publicly one or other of his ministerial colleagues. When Winston Churchill (on the occasion of the Irish indemnity-money) got into serious conflict with the majority of his own Conservative Party, Mr. Baldwin intervened, with an air of superiority, and forced the mighty one to retreat. Triumph of the Premier! But what will such little braveries affect, compared with the incapacity to give to the nation the leadership which she demands?

Ramsay MacDonald does not stand behind any other Englishman when it is desirable to show whether the first minister of the country is to be a leading Premier, or only a “*primus inter pares*”. MacDonald has no lesser conception of his office than a Pitt. This goes so far that many of his friends and co-workers complained bitterly about the egoistic attitude of the Labour Premier, when he was first in office. A Labour Premier has to face greater hindrances than the head of any other party, if he wants to be a leader. It may be painful for Mr. Baldwin to demand a sacrifice from the capitalists, but a Conservative Premier knows that he would have the whole nation behind himself if he were to refuse to the industrialists a separate present, or if he were to force upon the most backward among them a “rationalising”. Ramsay MacDonald, however, knows just as well that a serious conflict with the Labour Unions would make any Labour Government automatically impossible, so one-sided is the technical

structure of the Party. We shall come back to this point in the next chapter.

As before him, Asquith, Lloyd George and Baldwin, so also Mr. MacDonald saw himself obliged to raise, into a sort of "inner circle", the politically important among the great number of Cabinet Ministers, but this need not be a limitation of the preponderance of the Premier. It does not matter whether the leading power originates from a single man, or from a triumvirate; the principal thing is that the English pyramid should have a very clearly visible point.

THE SENSIBLE AIM

Whether one is satisfied by stating the present tendencies, or whether one may venture a judgment as to what would be of real advantage for the future of England, one will always find that the strengthening of the position of the Premier towards his Cabinet, and thus towards his Party and Parliament, is the most reasonable aim of English democracy. Who is going to tame the Admirals, or the secretaries of the Unions? Who shall protect a Minister of Commerce before too great an indulgence in a desire for Protection; who is to shield an Austen Chamberlain from secret treaties? Who is able to think beyond the horizon of the resorts and the wire-barriers of the parties and the interested ones? Who is to look out for more distant, and higher things, if not the Premier of the country? He alone has the authority to do it. He must also possess the talent to do it, but . . . well, the gods must see to this, and to the education of the generations to come.

THE FUNCTION OF THE PARTY

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY GOVERNMENT

HOW could one imagine to oneself a leading Government, and more so a Premier who can lead, if the word "Party Government" must be understood as it has been interpreted sometimes by doctrinal democrats? In England, the pressure exercised upon the Parties "from above"—from their leaders—is as a rule stronger than the pressure from below—from the rank and file of the Party. The inborn loyalty of the Englishman to his guides, the better education, and also the greater gifts of the leaders, work together with the natural tendency of many Englishmen not to burden themselves too much with work that can be avoided, and other inconvenient things.

PARTY-DISCIPLINE—AND ITS LIMITS

The readiness to obey a pressure from "above" is called Party-discipline. It cannot be avoided, but often it tends to no good. It is unavoidable, because democracy is a system of confidence and delegated power. But the feeling of Party-constraint frequently destroys, as we have seen, the value of a political debate, because the Whip (the uniting

officer between the Party-leader and his followers) dictates to the rank and file how they have to vote. Debates, which are not subjected to party-pressure, are moving as a rule on a considerably higher level. The dictum of the House of Commons about the revised Prayer-Book is the most famous example of modern times.

So long as no decisive things are concerned—that is to say, votes which decide the fate of the Government—party-pressure is not rigorously enacted in England. One can notice of late a distinct tendency for the granting of greater freedom of action for the Party representatives in the House of Commons. This came to pass quite naturally, the more the House of Commons was rejuvenated, and the larger the number of M.P.'s who busied themselves seriously with the problems of their country.

POLITICAL REALISM

English politics have become more true to life; people approach reality more and more, and speak up more frankly. This is the sign of the times—in every sphere of life. The entering of the Labour masses into the House of Commons, and the greater political realism since the Great War, have given to the British Parliament a new rise, which will be felt still more when the younger generations grow gradually to take up leading positions.

The political influence of the women of England acts in the same direction, but the entrance of woman into Parliament after the War, as voted and elected, has not considerably quickened the development of

political life, nor has it changed it. The British woman is not so eager to busy herself with party tittle-tattle as the British man does, and the women in Parliament distinguish themselves rather by keeping to what is really essential and practical. But it is astonishing how few serious opponents men have found, since women got the vote and were elected M.P.'s

It has been shown also in England how little the female voter really cares whether women are represented in Parliament by women, or by men. The great event of 1918 was decidedly not the political emancipation of woman, but the admittance of new masses of people to the polling stations, to the ballot-boxes. The explosive Radicalism, and the lack of manners of so many new-comers on the Labour benches, has caused resentment in the Opposition; one felt repulsed and unevenly matched.

But these very new spokesmen of the Labour Party have meanwhile learned so much that the heavy calibre of their social experience begins to show its power. This is an interesting point: England, which is not so lucky with her democratic institutions as foreign countries, consoles herself with the fact that the British own the advantage of an old, a century old Parliamentary tradition. This is not so with the young Labour Party. They had to gain by their own endeavours, and by their own experiences, the quiet political style and manner, without which a living together with those of a different Credo is impossible, though often under heavy provocation.

CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM

In all Parties is to be found what one commonly calls a "ginger group"—a group of hot-heads who do not easily bend to party-discipline. More important and more characteristic than this is the growing inclination of those whom one cannot exactly call hot-heads, but who want to speak out frankly that they are of a different opinion in this or that question from their leaders. A delegate who dares to make open opposition, needs courage and good arguments.

During recent years, there has been an ever growing unrest among the younger Conservatives towards their Government. They warned the Conservative Premier about too much "tranquillity"—and, as the events proved, this warning was justified. But at that time, as is always the case when there is revolt, many of the elders looked with disapproval upon the young gentlemen, and one even spoke of "disintegrating appearances". Whoever used this phrase, evidently overlooked that such "disintegrating", such dissolving, was a good sign for a healthy, sound-working democratic organism; such opponents in their own Party-camp are merely the leading spirits of a portion of the people, whose voice is not heard by the Party-heads, to their own disadvantage. Criticism stirs the mind—if the Premier lends a deaf ear, then disintegrating criticism achieves a constructive deed, while making the oscillations of politics ever so much easier for the results of the other Party. It is not of great importance, after all, *who* governs, but *how* the governing is done!

THE BOXING-UP OF THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION

The whole arrangement of the organisation of Party-political life in England ought to make freedom of speech, and freedom of criticism, something to be understood by itself. A Labour M.P. in the House of Commons has, of course, the same rights as every other to make audible the opinions of the election-circle from which he comes, if they differ from the opinion of his leaders. But on the whole he belongs, at the same time, to the 172 members of the Independent Labour Party, with whom MacDonald lives in open opposition. Perhaps he is a Fabian, may be a Communist, may be something else. Very frequently he is the functionary of a Union. All these Unions or organisations have their own programmes and aims, and probably these are very different from the official programme of the Labour Party.

The official Election policy of the Party differs again—and the actual programme of work of the Labour Government is more than anything else a matter for itself. At all the Party-days, Union congresses, or Committee-meetings, holy principles and requests are exposed. But the English organisations are so boxed-up, that only one thing really matters: namely what the Government thinks it can admit into its programme of action. Everything else has to stand back, though it is a fact that the money of the Labour Party comes from the Unions. It *does* stand back, but it must not be ignored! The representatives of the various policies rightly consider themselves forced to remind the Government, again

regime of the political Party-leaders, with regard to technical organisation and the nominating of candidates.

Very strong also is the influence of the Central Office of the Labour Party upon local Labour organisations, because only a few of the five hundred Labour candidates are able to bear the expense of an election, which costs the candidates about a thousand pounds each. The local branches of the Party are, as a rule, also dependent upon help from the Central Office.

The capitalistic element is known to have been considerable in English Party-organisations—often in the most corrupt form; but that the possession of the key to the safe did lead to a powerful position of Party-machinists, is a relatively new and not exactly edifying characteristic. English tradition, which left the selection of candidates entirely to the local organisations, had at any rate the advantage of bringing about a nearer personal relationship between constituency and the elected, than is possible when the Party-machinists—with cheque in hand—penetrate local realms, and put down their conditions, a thing that *has* been done now and then, and that is still frequently attempted. A financially independent election circle, or a well-to-do candidate, accepted by his local office, is, as a rule, safe from any interference by the Central Office.

In order to press back the plutocratic element, one has limited election-expenses by law, in England, though, all the same, many loopholes remain open. The task of the Parties is often in the first line not the spiritual conquering of an election area, but the victory of one kind of capitalistic election methods over another one.

THE PRIVATE MEMBERS

The real Party problem, the relationship between Government and Party, however, does not start till after the elections. The constituency, together with the election-machinery, moves automatically into the background. Parliament plays now the rôle of the sovereign people; the delegates come out of their local circle and enter the national arena. The province widens out to a nation; the Nation becomes bigger and more important than the Party.

The M.P. who enters the meeting-hall is expected to represent not merely his own electorate, not only his own Party, but England. He will now drive frequently into his constituency, in order to keep in touch with their mood, but he will look henceforth upon the world not only through his own Party-spectacles. Since his Party has become the supporter of the Government, theory has become practice.

When now the M.P. drives into his constituency, he does so, firstly, because he wants to make the difference clear to his electors between theory and practice. In the place of promises, there enters the feeding with hopes. "Higher up"—in the direction of the Government—the M.P. who has not become a Minister, sees his working possibilities rather limited. In spite of closer contact with the ventures of the Government-party, these private members see their possibility of helping to form Government politics rather limited.

With their leaders, they form the Parliamentary Party of *their* Party, but this union is a loose one, and

has not the object of relieving the work of the leaders, and dictating their way.

In England there exists no "fraction"¹, who, from early morn till late, crosses the path of the leaders, who controls them step by step, and tries to make them responsible for their movements. Least of all, if he is in a position to give out jobs there exists no "fraction" who would possess the right to interfere with their ministers. Instead of all this, England owns the leader and those who are led. The British M.P. notices already, on the first day, that a fine but very important line is drawn between a private member of the Government-party, and the governing Ministers.

THE TENDENCY OF THE LABOUR PARTY

Naturally all this does not arrange itself without an occasional fight, and not without vacillations. Conditions are also different with the single Parties. The principle of leadership by the Government is not so safeguarded in the Labour Party, as with the other Parties. Distrust of the leaders is frequently still very great among the Labour M.P.s

While the Parliamentary representatives of the other Parties rarely meet as a "fraction", the Parliamentary Labour Party, and especially their executive-committee, meets very often, and very regularly. When the members of the executive-committee which led the Parliamentary actions of the Party during the time of opposition, were received into the Government of 1929, the Party insisted that a special

¹ Small independent parties (*Translator*).

Committee should be formed, which might be called, without exaggeration, a watchdog meeting.

MacDonald, of course, is so much dependent upon the continual moral support of the diverse Labour organisations, that it can only be possible for him to explain, again and again, the difficulties of his position. But the tendency which speaks out of this is unusual for an English Parliament, and time will tell whether the possibility of leadership will not become limited.

The "watch-committee" cannot, of course, pass any decisions which bind the Premier, but MacDonald could not govern against it. Naturally this would not be the object of democracy. The fact that the Labour M.P.s consider a link between fraction and Government necessary—because the Whips are not enough for them—admits indirectly the acknowledgment of the principle that a "fraction" has no right to expect to be taken into confidence in all questions, and thus take part in the leadership of the Government.

PROBLEMS OF THE CONSERVATIVES

During the Baldwin era, some uncertainty made itself felt with regard to the position of the Party-machinery when facing the Government. Normally, the National Union of Conservatives (formed out of the delegates of the local election and propaganda spheres) has no more direct political influence than the Central Office which collects the Party-funds, and spends them.

During the revolt of the Party against the Conservative-Liberal coalition (after the War), the then President of the National Union played a fairly impor-

tant rôle; but that does not mean that the Union itself, and their yearly resolutions, ever had a decisive meaning for the political leaders.

Mr. Baldwin, however, placed one of his confidential supporters, Mr. Davidson, M.P., in the post of President of the Union, and thus made, so it is said, propaganda for his own politics and his own person in the Union, thus this election-machinery got into too close a touch with Parliament. It is significant that many Conservatives see the principal fault in the fact that the Party-organiser is a politician at all, one who has a seat in the House of Commons. It is said to be the task of the Premier, and the Parliamentary Secretary of the Treasury, to give the leaders of the election machinery their orders; but the political exchange of thought between Government and Party should only take place between the Ministers and the M.P.s, and only in the orthodox fashion, namely through the Government Whips. The Conservatives, as well as the Liberals, are determined opponents of a too close union between Government and Party—yet England has “Party Government”.

THE GREAT COALITION

When Party tittle-tattle is reduced to a minimum, and the idea of Party-government has been freed from all legendary rubbish, it ought not to be difficult to get used to the fact that, without Parties, no democracy, nor any political life, can exist. People who have the same interests will always keep together.

Originally, the House of Commons was nothing but a big Party; a fighting-Union to ward off absolutism. The individual Parties in England, in their present-day sense, have been created later by mutual ideas—people have not gone out to search for ideas, but have simply formed Parties. Still to-day, when the Liberal Party is looked upon by the two other Parties as a political luxury that one can easily do without, it is not Lloyd George's safe which sustains his Party, but the conviction that those citizens who are proud of their tradition and progressive, would be the most suitable to govern England, and prevent a dangerous splitting-up into a Party of enterprisers and a Party of workers.

Since social and economical problems have become the central point of all politics, more than ever it has become important to lay particular stress upon everything that stands higher, and is less selfish, than mere Parties—just the "It" which ought to dominate all true and democratic Politics, if it is to be of any moral value. According to British ideas, a Party must be more than a mere group of interested people.

The English have certainly not yet reached their ideal, but the tendency of their Party-development runs in the right direction. True, the Parties do not glide horizontally through the whole mass of the people, but they have developed in such a way that no vertical watertight partitions have originated. They all have a "national" character, or at least the ambition to widen out into national institutions. They have no intention of plucking the social organism to pieces; just the contrary—they wish to make unity possible. They possess ideals which reach far beyond

naked class-interests. They are to be guarantors for self-restriction, the social good manners of individuals, and for the single-minded.

POLITICS, OR AN ADVOCACY OF INTERESTS?

The prominent Interests speak through the political Parties, but they could express themselves without this medium far more freely, and less controlled. The much abused Politics act like smoothening oil upon the waves of private and collective egoism. If there were no organisation in private life which wraps up all these spikey, pricking, and cutting bodies into the cotton-wool of political idealism, life would become unbearable within a few hours in this de-politicized economical State.

For these reasons, the British will not hear of an economical Parliament, and of a government of the country by "Experts". The Englishman does not tend, as said before, to the expert-mania, certainly not in Politics. We all are experts, so to say, for life forces experience upon us. Reason enforces the sharing of work, so that experts come to their rights everywhere where they are of use, but above the expert-wisdom exists a something which all possess—i.e. sound human reason. There is a higher world above all executive-committees, all expert-commissions, and all offices—it rests only with the commonsense of the electors that this world becomes inhabited by suitable people. If we elect dunces, we have no right to complain!

In the sphere reserved to sound commonsense and public interest—a sphere where man must cease

to think only upon his own dear self and his private interest—in the sacred halls called Parliament, there walk about, as we have seen, no ideal astral bodies, but people of common flesh and blood. We are all sinners, but these M.P.'s are sinners with the obligation to "get there" for a few hours during the day, over the dictates of their own sinful natures.

THE PARTY AS A PRESERVATIVE

There are now sitting in the House of Commons two hundred directors of public companies, iron-works, spinning-mills, mining-works, machine factories, transport companies and over-sea settlements; of gold-mines, of business-houses and shipping concerns, of banks and investment trusts, of assurance and broker firms. They are sitting next to landed proprietors and brewers, generals and whisky manufacturers, near lawyers, and people who have nothing to do. Next to these, one sees scientists and book-worms. Then—whole benches full—corporation secretaries, as well as artisans and working men.

What mischief would be done, what a confusion would take place in a fairly orderly assembly, if all these good people could be sorted out according to their vocations and interests, and then let loose upon each other! It is already bad enough that the largest number of enterprisers have settled down in the camps of Labour representatives.

Party-leaders find it very difficult to wipe out this division-line. If they did not do it, then the Interests would be quickly at hand. Colonel "Frothblower", for instance, would quickly put in an appearance,

supported by a considerable dividend of brewery-shares, and call upon all beer-drinkers of England for the forming of a league for the protection of the brewery trade. He would meet with success, and a frolicsome mood would enter English Politics. Other "trades" would follow the example. This is not mere imagination, for this sort of thing has been tried, as it is, in England. Beer and patriotism are fast friends all over the world!

English industry is well organised for political purposes. For its up-to-date tendency, there is nothing more striking than the fact that the industry which formerly stood absolutely in the Liberal camp, because it had become great by Free Trade, has gone over to-day nearly completely to the Conservatives. It makes its influence known in many ways: by Unions, by their representatives in Parliament, and especially by the kind feelings which everybody who shares the dividends and rises in the quotations, likes to express for capitalistic enterprises!

This indirect interference of capitalism with Politics, is in England a most important phenomenon. For this purpose, industry is closely connected with the Press. Nobody sees any wrong in the fact that the enterprisers like to make their opinions known. Workers on the Left do the same, as far as they are able to do so. If one were to exclude the Interests from Parliament, one would meet them again far more frequently, and far more troublesome, as they are already in the ante-rooms of the Ministers.

There is only one preventative for back-stair Politics—from the right, from the left—against intrigues and corruption, and that is a political Party that shows colour openly, and that is ready to speak

and answer in public fight. But one must know how to conduct such a fight without the possibility of its degenerating into a wild scuffle. The English nation knows by instinct and teaching—last, and not least, by their training on the sporting-fields—much better than other nations how to control such fights.

COALITION POLITICS

This suggestion is optimistic, but surely not too optimistic. It presumes one thing, namely the progressive success of English Party-heads, and their co-workers, in their endeavour to develop their Parties into great national Institutions, and not to degrade them either to Class-Parties, nor to mere party interests. About the crisis in Labour-politics we will speak in another place; here let it be sufficient to fix the tendency. It is just as typical for England, as it is indispensable for the realisation of the democratic idea.

It is not sufficient to copy forms which sprang up in England—together with that which became deformed in the long run—because the most decisive point in the way in which the Nation handles her Institutions—Institutions which are, after all, nothing but the outward consequences of the inner development of the political spirit of the British.

Democratic Politics in England are, so to say, Coalition Politics. The historic Parties of England are, as it is, nothing but Coalition groups. The Conservative party is a Conservative-Liberal mixture, that is why her official name is the "Unionist Party".¹

¹This is not accurate. The name refers to the Union of England and Ireland as distinct from Home Rule. (*Translator.*)

The present Liberal Party is a coalition of the progressive Conservatives (conservative with regard to capitalism) and the more or less radical Liberals, who, to some extent, do not despise a moderate Socialism.

Finally, the Labour Party is a wonderful mixture of the many colours on the political palette of England, although her favourite shades are between pink and fire-red. The management of all these Parties is, by necessity, Coalition-work, a policy of compromise from dawn to night. This is her weakness, but it is also her strength. Just as the times demand, so can each of these Parties lend, in this or that direction, her influence to the Left or to the Right Wing. The Coalition-character makes the national link; in each of the three Parties are men who possess the fullest sympathy for certain of the interests of their neighbouring Parties. In this way, a political homogeneity is created.

ON COMPROMISE

There exists no higher political art than the art of compromise. Probably there are, nowadays, very few Englishmen who take the trouble to read Lord Morley's famous book *On Compromise*. They do not need to do so, for the inclination to compromise is in their blood. They are aware that a compromise has nothing to do with Ministerial arm-chairs, and that it must not be a dealing at the cost of a third person. One speaks also in England of a "do ut des", a "give and take"; but no reasonable man understands by this that, in the case of a Coalition, one party of the group, or of the block, is obliged to

drop a special Party-political point in order to secure another special point. The idea must remain that both accomplish practical work on the basis of a common foundational idea, concerning which they may expect that the minority, against which the coalition is directed, does not get the impression that their neck is going to be wrung!

The democratic system of parliamentarism presupposes, of course, a fight, so, as a rule, there must always be victors and defeated. But if misuse, or even only the continual taking advantage of a victory, was a part of the methods of democracy, the democratic idea would not have outlived the centuries! Whatever might have been won at times by the might of the strongest, is not of so great concern as the self-restriction; while the will to sacrifice, which this system demands from those who govern for the universal benefit, is characteristic and praiseworthy for Democracy.

The greatest reforms in the Parliamentary history of England have not been accomplished by the dictation of the Liberals, but by the conviction to which the Conservatives have been brought, that concessions can no longer be put off, in the interests of all, and in the interests of the *honour* of the system.

Such an expectation is in itself the meaning of what is called a compromise. There are things where a compromise is impossible, but a Nation, or a Party, who is again and again intimidated, or tied down by their principles, is not ripe for Democracy. He who is inclined to think about something disgraceful, or dishonest, does not understand what is of the greatest importance. True, if a Nation, on account of the deepest national fundamental questions, is at loggerheads with herself,

and fighting, then she will believe that her way to a compromise is cut off. In reality, it cannot be barricaded, because Politics are, as one knows, the very art of "making things possible". In the realms of impossibilities, one need not look for a compromise.

HE IS AN ENGLISHMAN . . .

Where is the boundary line between the compromise and the wretched exchange-business? Exactly where lies the difference between a loan and a usury business. Nobody can exactly define it, and say just here lies the difference, but every man can see that here the limit was over-stepped, without a doubt. The decision is not a matter of Party-opinion, but of personality, and experience of life.

The more Man raises himself above strict rules, the more his character is proved. Laws, statutes, and Party-programmes, are for many only a substitute for a moral spine! The man of doctrines is as a rule a coward; he is afraid of the freedom of thought. He clings to his programme, and a compromise is something terrible for him. There exist many such people in England, but they are not typical of the country.

England is not in need of programmes, but she owns a political character! This fact makes an Englishman *fit* for a compromise, and it allows—even nowadays, when the land of formal democracy has reached the highest possible point, and where the management of parliamentarism has to face an alarming degree of difficulty—the working of the Democratic-Parliamentary Government-apparatus to run fairly smoothly.

However high the waves of excitement may rise—and the English are often going in for real passionate fights—there seems to glide through the head of a Briton a soft sweet melody, a melody that Gilbert and Sullivan let ring out in the words: "*He is an Englishman . . .*"

THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM

Whatever may happen, Outer-Political decisions will put British Inner-Politics to the test in the shape of the Navy Budget. The inherited notion of the "continuity" of Outer-Politics will then get smashed, as such a break is bound to occur, if a true success, a real progress, is to be reached.

Navy-Politics and the Navy Budget have in reality already ceased to be sacrosanct—for the first time, they are exposed for serious discussion. For the first time the Navy question has come under the critical eye of modern democracy. For the first time, the nation has been forced to meditate about the "Ruling of the Waves", and the whole romance of the Navy. In the hearts of the people live the experiences and the exhortations of the Great War. That England is faced with this unheard-of question exactly at the moment when Political Democracy has become a fact for the first time, when the whole nation can go to the polling-stations, and when Labour Governments have become a fact, is probably a unique and fortunate decree of Fate!

Of course, we know that Labour Politics, with regard to the practical questions of an outer policy, are nowise differently placed from the politics of

the rest of England, in the valuation of Europe, and especially of Germany, in the valuation of the prospects of the Empire, and in all other practical considerations as to the position of England in the world.

But Labour Politics know how to give it all an honest, ideal and lofty strain, with the intention of translating the Peace ideas into Political examples. The Labour Party is, nevertheless, not the only Party that has such aims; the Radical-Liberals do not stand behind—nay, sometimes, they surpass Labour Politics. But it is an eminently valuable merit for the Labour leaders that they managed to win the huge masses of the people within only a few years for the Peace idea, and for a radical disarmament on land and sea.

England, looked upon as a whole, has left off thinking from an island's perspective. At the same time, English Politics no longer look out for treaties and back-protectors—the fundamental characteristic has become international. The new Internationalism is not a Party-concern; also Labour Politics are far from looking upon it as an Internationalism of a certain class. It does not create links from class to class, it does not aim at making the Socialists one huge world-brotherhood; but it has for its object the unity of nations. Any nation that is honestly out for peace, and for a friendly intercourse, is the friend of England.

The positive elements which favour an English-German approach have become comparatively few in number in Real-Politics; but we may say here that the idea of unity can, in the epoch which lies before us, create new and stronger bonds than ever

have existed before. How long they would last is difficult to say with any certainty, because, for the present, Peace, and the good-will for the keeping of this Peace, has become a categorical reality.

The formal organising of Peace, through perfecting the international machinery, can only be looked upon as the introduction to far greater work. One has only to be reminded of things like the distribution of raw material, the controlling of international usury that is worked with it, or the complex problems which became acute through the mandate theory, to give a hint as to the immeasurable perspective which is open to the new internationalism.

We shall be able to see what real value England, and the English friends of Peace, lay upon the idealism of Peace, by watching what zeal they devote to the Naval decisions of which we were speaking. It will come, though it cannot be hurried, and progress is only possible by degrees. But if England starts courageously to move away from her inherited place, then the whole world will profit by it. For the present, the Cousin smiles, and is polite.

PERSONALITY IS EVERYTHING

To their advantage, the English were always anxious to rear men, personalities and characters. The whole organisation of their political life is such as to lessen the levelling, and lack of character-building, which nowadays is the great danger for a democratic civilisation. The standard Englishman, the social snobs, the admirers of the golden calf, opened the door at the right moment to allow also people out

of a humbler sphere of life to appear upon the public stage, so long as they proved to be true men, fine characters.

English life is well cut to create personalities, and to raise them up. English people do not tear down personality from its pedestal, so long as this can possibly be avoided. The opponent is esteemed in England; his person is sacred; more than that, opposition remains constructive in the hottest fight, for an Englishman is not ashamed to give open approval to the opposing Party.

This fairness takes the poisoning sting out of political life. It is not painful to be a politician in England! The consequence is that England has the advantage of possessing a far larger number of popular and noticed men and women than any other nation. People do not grow all by themselves—one must take care of them, and help them on. Hot-house air (there is plenty of it in Fleet Street!) is not good for them, but poisonous lies spoil the most costly plants. The English people place their future leaders amidst the draughts of life. They harden their men; at first by a healthy college life and on the sport-grounds, afterwards on the political stage. There is a straight way from the football-ground to the House of Commons, and in my book, *Fair Play*, I have tried to describe it.

It would, indeed, not be difficult to smash the windows of the venerable Palace of Westminster; it would not be difficult to stamp out the Parliamentary system in England. But we have seen that only a very small minority exists to do it, to bring it into danger: namely, the very minority for whom the Palace stands—the Parliamentarians themselves!

The people are not enemies of the Parliament, nor of the English systems. Out of the crowd of mediocracies there rise up still to-day sufficient personalities who know how to play the costly instrument—yes, who are even virtuoso of parliamentarism. On the day when England ceases to produce such men (it does not matter from what class of society), on the day when they no longer see, on the other side of the garden-walls of their Party, this great national building, the vision of a better future for whose sake millions drag themselves tenaciously through life—on that day, it would be shown that the present system was only a passing arena to forms of human unity, which appear dark to us to-day, dark and intangible as our fate.

THE CROWN AS SYMBOL OF EMPIRE

THE MONARCH OF THE EMPIRE

IF an Englishman speaks nowadays of "His Majesty's Government" or of "His Majesty's Opposition", he is not using an antiquated formula. These expressions have, however, no longer quite the same meaning as when the King was an autocrat. To-day, the Crown is still the symbol for the unity of the nation. "His Majesty's Government" means: Government for the welfare of the whole nation, not a Party government.

DEMOCRACY AND MONARCHY

The fight between Parliament and King has come to a definite end. Edward VII was only a strong figure in Outer-Politics—and this only by virtue of the German-English contrast. William II and his World-Politics made Edward VII great and important.

In Inner-Politics, Edward was forced, although reluctantly, to content himself with the fact that an English monarch is now only the representative of an idea, not a governor, or the representative of the Country. His son, George V, is the first monarch in England to stand so far off from antiquated ideas

as to the functions of a King, that he accepted without any feeling of jealousy or bitterness the purely symbolical and representative rôle which belongs to the King of a Democracy governed by Parliament.

While George V renounced the useless attempt to win back to his House that which was lost, he made clear for himself the way for the development of forces which alone give a considerable importance to the Crown nowadays: he created a human model, and tries to incorporate the moral ideas of which England stands in need, and which the people are able to understand. The secret of this Monarch's popularity is his moral weight in the State. The "prerogative" is a matter of secondary importance. One has to look here upon morals in their widest sense—in the same sense as one can say that English democracy has an aristocratic background.

This kind of democratic-aristocracy is the counter-balance against the tendency to doctrinary and egoistic Party-work, which England tries to escape, and probably will escape. That endeavour to overcome the Party-spirit by the forming of an above-Party, a national policy, is the clearest expression of the aristocratic fundamental thought, and the Crown is thus the symbol of that "Great Coalition", called the British Nation.

This does not mean that the English idea of democracy would make a monarchistic Head of the State indispensable, or that one believes that, without the existence of a Monarch, national Politics would be impossible, or too difficult. Nothing else is meant but that the British wish to give to a Monarchy, which they possessed, a suitable rôle in the modern State. But he who wishes to play this

rôle must be more than merely a good and pleasant man—he must stand above the crowds, something like a personified warning: Here stands the Nation! The King himself must be a democrat, in the word's most noble sense.

GEORGE V

The present Monarch leaves no doubt as to his personality. The public knows George as a kind, well-educated, warm-hearted man, who hates every snobbish pose, and who never adopts for his intercourse with others anything but the natural and august dignity of a gentleman who holds a high position. His ways have nothing of the heroic, and his sky-blue eyes, in a healthy bearded face, never deny his true character.

This King has always been simple, so simple that, at certain high functions, a strange contrast could be noticed between all the traditional pomp of the State-dress, and the simplicity of the man himself upon whom all this symbolic splendour was forced. His voice sounds soft and discreet on such occasions, and most decidedly one never has the impression of seeing a great Leader of the people, and an orator.

But George V is more than that. Democracy has put him to the test, and he stood it well. Since his accession to the Crown in 1910—between two stormy General Elections—the British monarch had to face far more complicated political tasks than most of his predecessors of the House of Hanover. Not one single case is known where the King's tact—his political and personal tact—and the cleverness

of his actions has been doubted. It is for every outsider difficult to say how much is due to the advisers of the King; but it is hardly imaginable that the King would have played his rôle so well if he did not possess qualities which make him absolutely fit for his post.

For a man of a suitable mood, it may not be difficult to play the rôle of a tyrant, or of a dictator. The dictator is, at any rate, able to make good every personal blunder by a correction. A dictator can twist and turn round as he pleases—the whole State will always twist and turn with him!

But nothing is so difficult as to move with tact and precision in the narrow, but therefore all the more important sphere that the limits of a Constitutional Government leave open for the King. Especially is this the case in England, where each over-stepping of these boundaries by the wearer of the Crown would hurt the democratic and Parliamentary feelings of the people just as painfully as an Act against the Constitution by Communists. It is the highest that can be said, from the British view-point, about George V, when one of the most serious political economists writes: "History will praise him as an ideal Constitutional Monarch."

The King of England is not a doll King. At least twice—the first time shortly after his accession to the Crown, the second time in 1924—Constitutional questions of the greatest inner-political importance were put to him, and in both cases there was an opportunity for him to make cardinal blunders. The Constitution left him free choice; in both cases the King chose instinctively the correct thing.

The first time was when George V, after his accession to the Crown, gave his support, not to the Tories, but to the Liberals, and gave power of attorney to Lord Morley to break the resistance of the House of Lords against the Liberal Government, by the threat to the Lords of the creation of many new peers who were friendly to the Government. The second case concerned the attitude of the Crown towards the famous first Labour Government. The King was in favour of this "jump into darkness". But when MacDonald retired, the King followed his advice to dissolve Parliament, though that in itself was not necessary, and for the moment disappointed many politicians, especially the Liberals, who had hoped to become the Leaders. In both cases, it was soon realised that the King had thrown his political weight into the right scales.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC MONARCHY

Seen from the wide national perspective, from which all politics ought to be reviewed, it is surely, from the British view-point, the greatest merit of George V that he was successful in spreading out and strengthening faith in the English form of monarchy to such an extent that the illness of the King was felt, in all classes of society, as a personal grief. All England, the whole Empire, suffered with him. The relationship between the King and the working classes—except a very small minority—is as cordial as can possibly be. The King of England is a national asset. It has not always been like this!

The House of Hanover needed a hundred years development in order to arrive at this unique position. The first bearers of the name George have not done honour, either to England or to the Electorate Brunswick-Lüneburg, where they originated. It can be instructive for us Germans to see how England gradually educated this imported race of princes, and made it, from generation to generation, more suitable for what the English nation expects from a modern Monarch.

How great this task has been, one can guess when one reads the essays which Thackeray devoted to the first George! The task was to make out of a bad man, a gentleman, and out of an enemy of the people, a friend of the nation. Also, after the English Kings had learnt to talk a correct English, and had learnt to live in English fashion, they still left most owing to the nation. Even Queen Victoria had to put up with the disgrace of being whistled at in public! Only in her old age, and in the pathetic glory of her lonely and human grief at the death of her Prince-Consort, and only from the moment when the formation of the modern British Empire had brought new and highly important duties for the bearer of the Crown, did Victoria arrive, in the judgment of the people, at the legendary dignity in which she lives now in history.

Edward VII took over the new idea with a thoroughness that could be quite alarming. The negative part of Imperialism—the repulse of would-be attacks upon the blossoming Empire—permitted him a diplomatic activity—parallel with the Politics of his Ministers—whose results became to nobody more distinct than to us Germans. In spite of his reactionary inner-

political views, Edward VII managed to win many hearts of the people for himself, that had been frozen in the cold strictness and hopelessness of Victoria.

Edward woke up modern English society to a new life, while at the same time he was, as a gentleman, and as a sportsman, a gay friend also of the lower classes. But the deciding task was not placed before Edward, but before George V, before whose eyes developed the great Labour Party, and it was he who was destined to reach his royal hand out for a kiss from the first Labour Premier. George V and Ramsay MacDonald did it with dignity, and the result was that there is in England no question of a would-be Republic.

England is the only great and modern land where a King's throne is perfectly safe. The reason is not the great conception of the British for loyalty and tradition. Was it "loyal" to behead former Kings, or to whistle mockingly at Victoria? The reason is that the English Kings have advanced with the times. They did not try to assume a power which they did not possess, and could not get. English Parliaments would not have tolerated a Wilhelm in the twentieth century, even for half a day, nor would the people have done so. Here lies the difference, not in the greater loyalty of the British. The English Kings—and foremost George V—have learnt that there can be no longer any dictating, and a fussy much-ado in the politics of our times. They have learnt that the value of a kingdom lies, so to say, in its abstractions; in the idea, in symbolic value, not in an individualistic fussiness.

THE PRINCE OF WALES

It will not be easy for the successor of George V, for the present Prince of Wales, to fill out the inherited position, thus reconstructed by the country. The heir-apparent is as popular as he can wish to be; but the deeper thinking among his contemporaries put to themselves the anxious question: "What will become of this happy young man?" As a boy, he was delightful, a *real* "boy", as the English love them.

This "Boy Ideal" is the idol of many continents. Handsome, fair, blue-eyed, slender—perhaps a little too small and delicate—fresh, happy, natural and straightforward; friendly and amiable; disinclined for any mere pose. A young blood, with an "atmosphere", an English atmosphere—this means strongly "animally", and without youthful cleverness, or too early spirit. One watched his bodily development with satisfaction; one noticed that he tried to harden his young body, and to train his will-power. His frank smile seemed to re-assure. One was waiting.

During War time there grew up the inclination for camp-life, which the Prince shares with most English boys, and which seemed to fill his whole mind. With this inclination grew his sporting spirit. The youth became nearly a man, but for English boyhood there exists the right to remain longer a boy than his years, strictly taken, warrant. The pleasure of the Prince in sport and play began to become, however, a little one-sided. The whole way in which

the young man constructed his life, when he was nearing the age of thirty, remained governed by play. He remained playful after he had passed the thirtieth. The Prince entered into society; he laughed and danced in jazz-band rhythm. His friends—as his whole way of living—seemed to be chosen rather too much in conformity with his own liking. Many looked upon this with anxiety.

Long tours round the world became included in this life. They might have brought about a change, for the Prince possessed any amount of opportunities. But he preferred to remain just as he was: a keen rider, a gay comrade, and a happy-go-lucky globe trotter. He insisted upon remaining a bachelor—a bachelor who has a strong longing for freedom, and who takes also much freedom! The Press recommended several valuable matrimonial unions—pure British, of course. The Prince remained obstinate. Oh, if only they would leave off bothering about him! But who dares to leave the heir of a throne unobserved?

Indeed, it is not exactly a pleasure to be a Prince! Every movement, every mood, every friendship, is watched by eager eyes. Even in his happiest hours, the Prince did not escape observation—the Press showed him up sometimes in female disguise. That displeased! His accidents, while riding, became an object for public discussion. One would also have it that the Prince no longer looked so well as in former days. How could he? Fairy-times were over, ever so long ago. The charm of early youth passes away, and even sporting people develope nerves. The Prince is noticeable by his erratic movements; there is “quicksilver” in him, even on days when he

sits in the House of Lords, on a throne-fauteuil near his Royal father. Will such a life lead to the right way? Will it end well? God's mills grind slowly.

Prince Edward is surely a man who will come to maturity very late in life. The crisis in the life of his father, which brought the son so near the throne, must have given a new impulse to the Prince. The hunters are sold. Will it become the turning point of his life? Since he stood at the sick-bed of his father, his social zeal has doubled. His advisers acted very cleverly here. The first thing that the Prince did in England, was a visit to the mining districts of Durham and Northumberland; the Prince mixed with the poorest of the poor, who there suffer cold and hunger. He knocked at the doors of slum-houses, and entered into wretched hovels, where misery stared into his face. The Prince was not afraid; he would not allow himself to be "led"—he investigated the slums after his own desires. The people realised his good will and his courage. This gay horseman begins to penetrate into a field where greater honours are to be won than silver goblets with engraved inscriptions.

THE NEW FUNCTION

For the moral value of the British Monarchy—though not exactly for its stability—the development of the heir apparent becomes Fate. Its stability is safer than ever, because the King of England has become the central-point of the British Empire. It was exactly this growing in power, which the Government and the Head of the Government experienced

in England, that made the British Premier unsuitable as a central-organ for the political and constitutional gathering together of the Empire. The Dominions do not wish to depend upon the London Government, but they are ready to give to the King the oath of fidelity, as he is the Empire's symbol. The more, therefore, the Empire developed into a union of great and mighty single nations, united to the Empire only by their own free will, the greater and more important became, for the English, the institution of their Kingdom. Since the last Empire-Conference, the Crown is the only recognised direct link with portions of the Empire.

The new Constitution of the Empire guarantees directly the indispensability of a Crowned Head in England. In the same years in which the power and the prerogative of the British Monarchs was reduced to a minimum, the Kingdom received this guarantee-letter through the States of the Empire. Since the later years of the Victorian era, the tendency to such a development became notable. But it was left to George V to live to see the time of the great test of the stability of the Empire, and, when it had stood the test, to see the day when the Empire was closely united with the Kingdom—as closely as mere men *can* unite it.

THE COUSIN AND HIS WORLD EMPIRE

ENGLAND AND THE WORLD AROUND

THERE exists a sort of relationship which is rather hindering; for an Englishman it is, in general, no pleasure to realise that he is related to a German. Of course, he likes still less to be related to an American. One can almost say that the nearer the relationship, the more trouble arises out of it. Matters work out here as it is so often in life. A really cordial relationship is only possible when man is not born into a forced position. Relationship is such a forced position. The German-English relations do not promise much good when one presumes a moral obligation towards the German Cousin. By this is not meant that our relations must be merely a matter of politics in general; on the contrary, he who has friends in England will hear again and again that many Englishmen feel happier in the society of Germans than in the company of any other foreigners.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

The English people look upon us Germans as an unsteady, but eminently capable race, in our national fundamental feelings. Their strength lies in the

stability of their national key-note, and sometimes they become alarmed by our waverings, but they admire German accomplishments. The courage and the energy with which the German people have mastered their new position, are admired by the British. The New Germany has won their confidence.

The contrast in the English attitude towards Germany during the last ten years must make a deep impression upon every German who has lived in England during this time. At that period, when the first Germans came back again to England, the *Times* wrote that England would receive them coldly, but correctly; a long time would, however, pass before they would again be welcomed guests. To-day, we Germans are welcomed, though not all, and not by every Englishman. In every sphere, old threads have been picked up again, while new bonds have been created.

The peculiar lack of many Germans in manners, tact and taste, and the no less strange inclination of the British to presumption, and to an outward reserve, make a spiritual union rather difficult. But there are, I believe, a good many Englishmen who have found out that the German, who at first sight appears not so favourable in their eyes, wins strongly in value; while the far more polite Englishman loses not seldom just as much when placed under the microscope. Social relations are nowadays so shallow that outward forms and first impressions are far more important than they deserve to be. The French owe their popularity in a large degree to the delightfully wrong accent with which they speak a foreign language. For the German, who speaks English, this charm very rarely exists.

As far as sympathies and antipathies govern the course of the world, we have also in England a good outlook for the future. The type of modern German yields cleverly to up-to-date international conditions of life. The democratising of life in England, the raising up of new foundations, and the social change about which we shall still speak, and the similar developments in Germany, will bring the two Nations in closer contact in their fundamental relationships with each other. Mutual understanding will become easier. To-day sympathies and antipathies are still kept a little in bondage, by a few elementary facts in international Politics, from which the English are unable to get away. Just these facts are the reason why German-English relations will not get over a certain line within the near future. It will stop at friendly relations; political help is less probable.

LIMITED INTEREST

In the Politics of both countries, there exists to-day no really important motive why an approach should be difficult. Since Germany had to renounce the world-conquering dreams of Wilhelm II, and since the Tirpitz "Risico" Fleet lies at the bottom of the sea at Scapa Flow, there is, surely, no serious reason why there should ever be a German-English conflict.

Economical competition is certainly no hindrance to sincere friendship. As the importance of Economics has for a long time been undervalued in international relationships, so they are now overvalued. The reason is that certain people who were anxious

to solve the War-indemnity question, arrived at the idea that the Great War had its origin in British commercial envy. Slackness in the organisation of international work made the War more easy, but it did not cause it!

Meanwhile, the reducing of the market, and international experience, has led the people to start new organising methods. German competition is inconvenient to English people, but in the near future, it will serve as a motive for a better understanding, and not for more conflicts. Besides, England has far more troublesome competitors than Germany is to her.

The essential view, in German-English concerns, is rather that the real vital future problems for British world Politics lie outside the German-English sphere of interests; while England, in pressing questions of yesterday and to-day which concern us Germans directly, sees herself, by her unity in the War, and by the consequences of the War, more or less tied to France. The negative result is clear: the old grinding plane of rupture with Germany exists no longer; but positive elements for a German-English approach are not so easy to find. Germany has to announce many desires to England, but German Politics can offer England to-day very little in return.

THE CONTINENT AS AN UNAVOIDABLE EVIL

For a long time, the English have looked upon their relations with the Continent as a burden, and as a source of displeasure; first the rupture with Germany, then the so-called "friendship" with

France. Can one wonder if a nation, to whom the whole world appears to be open, and before whose gates lies the huge territory of the British Empire, endeavours again and again to have as little as possible to do with our Continent of conflicts?

Europe means, for England to-day, four-fifths of vexation with the egoistic nationalism of France and her East-European appendices. The islanders must, indeed, be tied with iron fetters to this Continent, if they do not turn their backs upon this Europe! But these fetters *are* of iron; they *are* unbreakable. England would be ruined if only a single one of her European customers were to break down, or be trampled down.

True, British Economics stand to-day much firmer than the pessimists believe, but not a single stone must break off this building—or the building would crash down unavoidably. Peace with Europe is indispensable for England, since there is such a thing as international exchange of goods. No Englishman dares to dispute this nowadays, no matter how much the idea may still be haunting many heads that the British Empire is sufficient in herself.

But only a minority is aware that there exists, next to the economic element, a far more pressing cultural argument against the isolation theory. What would have become of England without the constant illumination of the spiritual beacon-fires, which, in the course of centuries, were first lighted upon our European Continent? But, also, how much darker would have become the Continent, if the beams of the world-wide British atmosphere had not reflected again and again upon ourselves!

NOT FEAR—BUT LUKEWARMNESS!

During the constant wrestling with France since the War, English diplomacy tried alternately the gentlest means of friendly persuasion, or she held the French Imperialists as corruptible, and offered them—uselessly—political presents. Soon one heard, however, the angry voice of Lloyd George, and read the harsh notes of Lord Curzon. Again and again the aim of the English was to get back the tranquillity which they had lost at Versailles.

At first it appeared as if the fear of French submarines and French aviators was the leading factor in British Politics. Such motives do play a certain part, but they were never *deciding* factors in the Foreign Office. An open conflict with France did not lie within post-War possibilities. As the “straight waistcoat” was not applicable, it appeared to most Englishmen impossible to tame the French, who had become “wild,” in any other way than by patient persuasion. Of course, if English Politics had not been managed by “antiquated” professional diplomats—who very often had far greater influence than their changeable political Chiefs—the English ought to have seen that they had a very firm stand against French militarism, if they made use of the new instruments which had been created by the democratising of international Politics.

Public opinion was ripe for this. The Labour-Politics of 1929 are using the one and only correct method: absolute up-to-date Pacifism, as a moral foundation for an open international expression of each other's opinions. When Lord Curzon, under

the guidance of Lloyd George, sent his sharp notes to Paris a few years ago, the effect was not the same. The weak point in English Politics was always that British diplomacy, in the decisive post-War years, was not guided by a convincing moral impulse, but that political usefulness seemed to be quite sufficient. Anyhow, that was the opinion of the world, whether deserved or undeserved.

With regard to what *is* efficacious, many opinions are possible; as a matter of fact, there were at times in Conservative Camps a few voices to be heard who were even of opinion that the British need for rest in Europe would be best served if France were to insist upon upholding the Versailles demands, on the stress of her greater military power. This suspicion arose mostly by reason of the suggestion that the famous English-French Navy Treaty of 1928 had for its aim, the Continent for the French, the Atlantic for the British.

But this idea is so fantastic, and so contradictory to the feelings of the British nation, that Austen Chamberlain can hardly have understood the proposed agreement in that sense. Besides, the opinions of most Englishmen about the future importance of Germany are far too high as to suggest such an inferior role for Germany. The spiritual leadership of the Continent lies with Germany, not with France; armaments and aeroplanes do not count in this case.

ENGLAND AS A GATE TO THE WORLD

The declared aim of English Politics is an understanding between Germany, France and England,

with regard to the fundamental questions of European Politics. By this it is hoped to reach the stability for Europe which is necessary so that England can devote herself in peace to the great tasks which wait for her in her own country, and in other parts of the world.

That England has these practical back-thoughts, does not lower her from a German viewpoint. Her aims are perfectly justified. We, too, are not longing for a quarrel with France—we are seeking the great world at large, the great world-markets. Our way to them leads through England.

Continental Politics, exercised by France and Germany alone, would be far too narrow, and far too provincial, quite apart from the fact that this would bring us earlier or later into a conflict with England which we could nowise afford. English life is, in many respects, much poorer than the continental; but English style, the style of good old everlasting England, is a *world* style! We are in need of this London, and its world-political air. We need the great measures which only a nation can win, that is not always occupied in quarrels with her neighbour about some border land or other.

When, up till now, we were missing a strong moral impulse in England's Continental Politics, we must not forget that the proportions of our acute questions of dispute are changing place considerably, if we transfer the picture into unconcerned foreign countries.

How differently looks Europe, and the European questions of dispute, if one views the Continent from England or America, or even Australia! The English are inclined to look upon the liberation of Poland as something far more important than the

crossing-through of East Germany by a Polish corridor. They do not like the corridor exactly, but they consider other questions to be, just now, more pressing. Among these stand the certainty of peace, and dis-armament as the price of peace. There exists only one lever to relieve Europe of this load of arms, to do away with the grotesque ill-proportion between Franco-Poland and Germany—united English-American disarmament politics.

This brings us to that complex of questions which occupies English Politics most of all since many years now, and for whose solution Germany could not render any other help, so far, than the fulfilment of the peace conditions. The real work must be done by others. If this work meets with success, then England's moral influence in Europe will grow rapidly, and with it, it may be hoped, also that moral impulse in Continental questions. The English feel that all they say about Locarno, and about the French Polish Imperialism, is without any value, so long as one can retort that they follow up, with their Naval arming, exactly the same aims as the French and Polish generals with their Armies—i.e. hegemony, based upon war-power.

THE ILLUSION OF THE SEAFARERS

The English people pay, every year, many millions of pounds sterling for a mere illusion—the illusion that England governs the Seas, and must do so in order to retain her world-prestige.

The British Empire stretches over five Continents. One has to protect it “against all eventualities”.

This was the opinion before the War, and at that time no one contradicted, because Herr von Tirpitz saw to it that every Naval budget was popular in England. But since this pretext holds good no longer, one begins in England to question: against whom do we really build all these ships? Who is threatening the Empire? Suppose there were some danger lurking in over-sea waters, how can one picture to oneself the Empire's protection?

THE AMERICAN DEMAND

Not every Englishman puts such questions to himself, but those who do have realised for a long time that, also in that direction, reality stands far behind theory. One thing has become clear through the world-war: if a war should break out within a short time, or if the League of Nations should request England to take up maritime rule, the strongest British fleet could not prevent the Americans from demanding that their merchantmen should pass unmolested across the seas.

The refusal of this "freedom of the seas" would spell war with America. If England wishes to avoid a conflict with America, then she must either renounce an active control over the seas, or she can enter war-activities only when America takes England's part. Neither the English, nor the Americans, wish for war. Every shilling which the English spend in order to protect themselves "against all eventualities", and every dollar which the Americans spend to show the British that they mean what they say, is senselessly wasted.

On the other side, every attempt to let the "lawyers of the Fleet", the Admirals, decide as to disarmaments, is in vain as well. There is only one way out of the dilemma: the owning up to the fleet-illusion, and an agreement with America. A sharing of power is the aim of the English-American negotiations. The Kellogg Pact is to lead automatically to an agreement concerning what is to be done, not in the case of a private war, but of a war, authorised by the League of Nations. Private wars are excluded by the Pact.

Such an agreement as to "Naval Rights" would leave the American-English problems of the Fleet without any further object. For the present, the English Admirals run rather shy of owning to the people how relieved they would feel at such a solution, because there is no land that depends so much as England upon over-sea supply for nourishment, and for raw materials. When the English do not talk diplomacy, they own up quite frankly that, under modern conditions, no country is so interested in the Freedom of the Seas as England herself.

The confession that the epoch, stretching over so many centuries, when Britannia ruled the waves, had passed now, would spell the grandest upheaval in the thoughts of a nation that any people have ever experienced. Yesterday only, England was challenged by a European Power concerning this illusion; only yesterday, the Fleet of England triumphed over the Fleet of the young German Marine; to-day, America approaches the grandchildren of Nelson, and declares to them: Let us throw all armament programmes into the waste-paper basket. They are no longer of any value.

This suggestion to the old gentlemen of the seas is so staggering, that a deep inner-political conflict is unavoidable, unless the Americans do their armament industry the favour of accepting a bad compromise. If they do *not* do this, then the whole weight of the problem will fall, before long, upon the unprepared British Parliamentarians.

PARLIAMENT AND THE CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY

One can sometimes hear the prophecy that the great Captains of Industry are out to dictate the route that English politics are to take during the coming era—in fact, that “die Wirtschaft”, i.e. domestic or National Economy, is going to govern England.

The big industrial agglomerations and the amalgamations that are to come by necessity, if the rationalising of English national economy is advancing, will heighten and strengthen the political weight of the leaders of Industry, or so many will have it. The recently visible endeavours for a reconstruction of the relations between Capital and Labour will lead up to it, and the most vital affairs of England will become settled *outside* Parliament, exactly as the great “General Strike”, which brought the fighting epoch to its highest point, was enacted entirely outside Parliament.

Admittedly, great upheavals are taking place upon economical and social ground, without any help from the politicians; but that is nothing essentially new, and the political life of a country does not get exhausted through it. One might rather become tempted to believe that, in the same measure as such a

tendency gets stronger, the desire for a Court of Judicature in England will grow—a Court where thoughts can be uttered and realised which are above mere economical and materialistic contemplations.

The life of a nation does not reach its zenith in Political Economy. The more “Americanism” enters into British life, the stronger the sources and the streams of idealism and humanism will begin to flow, though their present smallness *seems* to predict their drying up. Parliament will then be the place where all spiritual and material powers will work together, and that we consider to be the standard for the life of a great Nation.

THE EMPIRE IDEA

It is largely the fault of the English themselves that the Idea of the British Empire is not better known to the world, and to those who imagine they know the British Empire, as viewed from their local European corners.

There are many Englishmen themselves who possess only a very limited understanding. Those who did look ahead brought us very little help; they all understood well enough what was happening, but what they felt was difficult to grasp, difficult to describe—the Empire was in swing, and is still to-day in constant motion. Everybody has seen it, and describes it as far as he understands it, in conformity with the constant development of his own personality.

The Empire lives, grows, and changes its shape, its character, its spirit. It lives and grows in conformity with its own laws, not with a dictation from London, not even with a London recipe. No people in the world have ever possessed the mobility and the adaptability that are necessary to enable them to say, in all these phases of an often incomparable development: "This is, and this is going to remain, our British Empire."

It is the nicknamed "lazy Englishman," the most conservative of all globe-trotters, who manages to produce this immense progress and inner changes of position.

EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH

Since November, 1926 (the last Empire Conference), there exists officially a "British Commonwealth of Nations," a free Union of "autonomous Communities within the British Empire." This "Union of equally entitled, and from each other in Inner and Outer Politics independent States" announced that it felt united through a mutual fidelity to the British Crown.

This Commonwealth of Nations is not identical with the Empire; "British Empire" is the more comprehensive conception. The self-governed Oversea Dominions (Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand) and Ireland, together with Great Britain, form the "Commonwealth," while to the Empire have also to be counted all Crown Colonies, Protectorates, Mandates, and, of course, India. To the Commonwealth countries remains the British Imperium. The Dominions have no part in it, and,

mostly, no interest. To pass out of the realm of the Imperium, into the parlour of the Commonwealth, must be the ambition of the progressive Empire-members. In the Commonwealth they are independent; only bound to the Empire by their own free will. But in the Empire reigns Autocracy, although made milder by a representative (Democratic) system, which shows up, according to its local conditions, all degrees of dependency or independency.

THE SPECIAL POSITION OF EGYPT

Egypt stands apart! The English, who, for strategic reasons, started the occupation of this country about fifty years ago, never had the ambition to make a Dominion of it, nor do the Egyptians long to be received into the British Empire.

English-Egyptian relations are an entirely Outer-Political matter, with, as it is known, very valuable consequences for Egypt. But it does not belong to the real Empire problems, with which we deal in this book. The important difference between Egypt and India in this respect becomes indistinct, because the English people in both these countries live in a constant quarrel with the upper classes. But it remains decisive that they wished to make India a permanent Member of the Empire, while this was never intended, as I have said, with regard to Egypt.

The English wish to secure for themselves the Suez Canal, in the same way as the Americans reserved to themselves the control over the Panama Canal, and this exhausts British interest in Egypt. In

India, the attempt is going to be made to form out of a resisting and autocratically governed object of Power, an obedient partner of the Empire—exactly as this has been done with Ireland after the War—but of course, with the elementary difference that results out of such a total difference in skin, religion and civilisation.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPERIALISM

The development of Commonwealth within the Empire took place within the last few years. It is necessary to be clear about it, that the whole Empire-Idea is of very recent date.

Only in 1815, England annexed the Cape of Good Hope, and it is little over sixty years since the oldest Dominion of the Empire, Canada, received its Constitution. Five years later, 1872, the Cape Colony became a self-government.

The idea of a common aim, the realisation of a common fate, and therewith the Empire-Idea, is hardly over forty years old. When the first Colonial Conference met in 1887, one thought less upon the Empire than of the honouring which one meant to give to Queen Victoria at her Jubilee.

It was only after this that Imperialism, i.e. the Empire-Idea, was started. Up till then, one had left the Colonies more or less to themselves. They grew strong through their own strength, and lived in conformity with their own local conditions—without a preconceived Empire-plan. This was to the greater part a consequence of Liberalism, and of the Manchester motto: “*Laissez faire!*”

Joseph Chamberlain was the first who tried to develop an Empire-Idea, and respective Empire-Politics. The economical interest was to open the road to Empire-Politics. He had taken the German Tariff-Union and the German Empire as a model. Joseph Chamberlain's plans were frustrated by the resistance of the Dominions, on an Inner-Political opposition. The problem remained: how is the Empire to be safeguarded, and how can one tie the Dominions to the Motherland while they are becoming of age?

One thing was clear: it would be useless to work out any theoretical Constitution. The development of the Empire was far too advanced for it to be possible to tie it up with paragraphs. The world concluded, out of this, the existence of dangerous differences in the Empire, and many foresaw its breakdown.

In this arena fell the World-War, and with it the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917—an Empire-Government. Was this the first step to an Empire-Federation, to a sort of Unity-State, or of a Super-State? It was soon shown very clearly that the Dominions did not wish to know anything about such federative-plans. They did not like the expression "Cabinet", and most decidedly they had no inclination whatever to appear as Empire Government, under the guidance of an English Premier. The European troubles of England were already too bothering to the Dominions, and too far off. In no case did they feel inclined to be dragged, or towed to London!

An Imperial Cabinet, so it appeared to them, would only be a wider British Cabinet. The self-governed Dominions wished to remain independent, and only be tied by the Idea, and by practical life, not by the

British Premier. So one arrived at the definition of the Imperial-Idea in the famous document of the Empire-Conference of 1926, and the fixing-up of a few fundamental rights. With regard to Foreign Countries: the right for the conclusion and the signing of international Treaties. Within the Empire: direct communication from Government to Government. Since Versailles (where the Dominions signed) and the Nations Union Statute—which gives them membership—the world knew that henceforth only one principle would count: absolute equality for the principal members of the Empire. Everything else was left to the future.

THE END OF POWER

Can such an Empire, such a loose union, be of any duration? For this there is only one answer: for anyone who thinks historically, who can understand, under the word Empire, only a fabric whose safety depends upon the existence of bayonets and cannons, or war-ships, to him one can say that the Empire is only existing in our imagination. There exists no longer a Cæsar, nor a Roman Empire. England might perhaps be able to tie to herself an African Colony, by force, for a certain time, or, perhaps, also India, but not for a moment longer would the British be able to keep the Commonwealth together, when a Cæsar and his Legions or the ships of a Hannibal would be necessary for its further existence.

The Empire was created in an epoch when the display of a warlike Power, and personal greediness, had a stronger international weight than to-day, and

even in our days it would be easy to put up a list of indiscretions and sins made by British Empire Politics.

But all this weighs rather lightly in comparison with the fact that the Empire has developed, during the last decade, in a direction which opens a world-historic look-out of utmost importance. Here is a huge complex which has to be kept together without the slightest display of power. Here serves true international Democracy: a wise submission under common ideas and aims, a free tie, and the recognition of a Leadership which is not trying to withdraw from the weight of this Democracy. Cobden has told this to his compatriots already.

EMPIRE DEMOCRACY

The working of this international machinery goes on sometimes very draggedly; Cæsar would lose less time with his Provinces! England cannot walk one international step, before first assuring herself what her Partners in the Empire have to say about it. England's World-Politics suffer through this.

Still more frequently it happens that a hesitating English Foreign Minister hides himself behind the Governments of the Dominions, because their opinions *must* be sounded first. Of course, they *must* be sounded—the English Government has the same limited freedom of action as the British Premier in comparison to his Parliament, but, exactly as in the Parliamentary State, so there is in the Empire the possibility, nay, the pressing obligation for Leadership. Not all questions lie equally near to the hearts

of all Parties, or all M.P.'s; not all Dominions, or other parts of the Empire, are equally interested in England's Outer-Political actions. There are cases here, as there, in which the English Government, or the British Premier, becomes busy with a matter which concerns only one of the Dominions, or only one Party of the Opposition really urgently. More or less the Empire grows into a role which looks like a transfer of Parliamentary Democracy into a super-national, international field. Only he who feels at home on the Democratic platform, who has studied the ideas typical of Democracy, and has placed himself in her service, stands a chance of keeping the Empire-Unity together, and conducting it. It is not mere chance only that England is the spiritual centre of the one and only State-Unity of this kind, of the one and only Democratic States-Union that ever has existed.

Only a Democratically-educated Nation is ripe for such a task. An Autocrat, who ignores Democracy, may perhaps have the good fortune that the Nation does not fall to pieces; but the International Democracy of the Empire is nowadays too touchy and easily hurt for one to think of a Dictatorship for the Dominions, or even only an occasional sharper pressure from Whitehall.

England has been, and still is the Political Teacher of the Empire, but the child has come of age, and has become at the same time the spiritual educator of his parents. England will learn more and more to put into practice the wise principles of her Inner-Political life in the Politics of the World, because the Empire is a between-link, an intermediary member between the Nation and the world, where no falsification of the Democratic Idea will ever more be possible, because

the Empire States are, for the London Government, still a stronger factor of power than the Parties in the House of Commons, upon whom the Government depends.

The thought lies near to draw the lesson that a true Democracy is impossible without strong powers of this sort. The secret is only that the Statesman must master the art of getting these powers into motion not against, but for himself. Here lies a wide field, open for the study of people who call themselves Chief-Politicians.

THE COMPULSION TO A LOVE FOR PEACE

The English people have not yet drawn the one and only logical consequence out of the new development of their Empire—out of their development to a Commonwealth of Nations, instead of to an *Imperium Britannicum*, an Empire of Great Britain. True, the English do not exactly try to impose their obstinate English will upon the Dominions, but they cannot yet get over the old romance of power.

They arm themselves, as if England was forced to do so, or could defend the Empire against a world of foes. This awakens sometimes the wonder if the British ever did believe in a threatening downfall of the Empire if fewer British cruisers swam on the ocean. Fantastic minds are perhaps guided to the opinion that the Empire was losing power in the same proportion as her fleet became smaller, or other Powers enlarged their navy. But with the inner stability of the Empire, such a military or naval power has very little to do, because such an Empire construction

is unavoidably condemned to be weak, if one takes its military power-to-fight, and its military will-to-fight as a touch-stone. It is weak, undependable, yes, even helpless, if one tries to picture the Empire into a world of gigantic treaties, after the model of a pre-War diplomacy.

It must be admitted that the Empire has passed the severe test of the Great War splendidly; but this War was a European War, and the Dominions sent their troops to France, because they imagined that the Motherland was attacked and in danger. If it was possible to think of a war in which not only this single centre of danger, but half a dozen others, spread over the whole world, were in existence, then the weak point of the Empire, the multiform of local interests of the Members of the Empire, would quickly show itself. If, finally, a conflict were feasible, in which England and America would stand in different camps, then the Empire would become exposed to a danger and test in comparison with which the problem of 1914-1918 would appear very small.

For War Politics, therefore, the New Empire, the Empire of independent self-governing States, is not created. Its aim *must* be the maintenance of a World Peace. English League of Nations politics are therefore nothing else but widened Empire politics.

EMPIRE AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS

From the view-point of Empire Politics, the League of Nations is a two-edged instrument for England. The Dominions would show less zeal for participation in the Geneva work, if their Membership did not

give them, every day anew, the proof that the Dominions and Ireland were indeed partners with equal rights in the British Commonwealth of Nations. We already know that several of them took steps that were not liked very much in London, so one can easily imagine that the British joy in the League is not without clouds, because there are cases imaginable in which, for the Dominions, a serious conflict between Empire interests and League of Nations interests could arise.

But against this stands the advantage that the active participation of the Dominions in the League of Nations, which deals to the greater part with European problems, widens the look-out for the Dominions, and makes it easier for them to understand the European interests of England, and to do them justice. The Work in the League of Nations is a training in International Democracy, and the Empire Politics of England are profiting by it, because the British Commonwealth of Nations is, after all, nothing but a League of Nations upon a small scale. On the other hand, the League of Nations will learn many things from England's Empire experiences.

The Empire has to toddle along the same weary way of the super-National Democracy with which the people in Geneva had started to enter. The English are not impatient when the League of Nations makes but slow progress, because, they, as the builders and constructors of the Empire, know with what times we have to reckon.

With all this, the Empire had the great advantage that its development was not hindered by a previously fixed constitution to constrain it, but that it could grow up free and unfettered like a creature

of nature. The British, remembering the great trouble it cost them to build up such a world-wide Democracy, feel slightly embarrassed by the Geneva tempo, and by the realisation that there are in Geneva so many different Political people, who have equal rights (and who oppose each other with equal authority!) with whom they have to work, just as if this was a matter to be understood by itself.

But is it not the very secret of Democracy, of democratic success, that an *education* for Democracy *must* precede the exercise of political power? Surely the history of the Empire shows that the Empire Democracy could only progress step by step, and be made practical in the same tempo as the English considered the work of education as finished? It is more than a mere master's point of view that is expressed in this tendency.

Now at Geneva, all this is supposed to be different. Political feelings are up in arms against it, and out of this feeling the dualism is explained of English Politics that are wavering so far between the Kellogg Pact and Navy armaments.

CUSTOMS-POLICY AS AN EMPIRE FOUNDATION?

The realisation that the British Empire is not based upon power, in the old sense of the word, has deeply grieved many old Tories, and the quite open reconstruction of English Politics (as for instance in India) has caused unreasonable complaints (as in "Lost Dominion", the book of an insignificant writer, which made, however, a remarkably strong, but entirely unjustified impression in Germany) that this enormous

and many-branched Empire is not in need of a Power-Policy to remain alive. This is for many who are no Power Politicians of the old style, so incomprehensible, that they make use of their whole intellect to search for a new cement.

Economic-Politics, which are pulled along nowadays for so many purposes for which they are of very little use in themselves, are supposed to supply the new cement. There are a few who believe in the value of small presents, and offer to the Australian or African exporters of grapes a small accession to the Tariff-Union. That is called Preference. The policy of Preference-Customs, or freedom from Customs between the Dominions and the Motherland, is a Conservative invention, and runs on the same lines as the safeguarding-Customs of England for trousers-buttons and cotton-gloves. Both bring about, and favour small private interests. Sometimes, of course, such helps are quite sufficient to enable small industries to get over initial difficulties that arise in the beginning of a trade.

But the same obstacle which proved to be unsurmountable for a Master of Politics like Joseph Chamberlain, stands forbidding and unconquerable before the smaller acrobats of Politics of to-day. Preference of real value presumes the existence of strong Custom-walls; England can grant to her Dominions only a remission of Custom-duties if the rest of the world is cut off by Customs; while the Dominions can only favour England, if they put to disadvantage all the other countries in proportion.

England imports, for many hundred million pounds sterling, food and raw materials, and the bulk of

this mass—which is not balanced, in proportion, by any visible export, has grown mightily, and is still growing with the increasing population, and the increase of its necessities for the people. Of all this import-bulk only a minute fraction is burdened with duties.

In order to give to the Dominions, which supply England with corn and meat, efficacious Preference, the whole corn and meat import from other countries would have to be burdened with customs. The oversea exporters are principally great capitalists, and not likely to sell their goods so cheaply to England that the enormous rise in prices of eatables and other goods, imported from other countries, could be counter-balanced even in a very moderate proportion. This sort of business would be, for England, just as little profitable as for the Dominions, who would be compelled to bind themselves to buy of the Motherland expensively (and perhaps badly) manufactured goods, customs free, but would have to shut out the cheaper, and perhaps better, foreign goods by custom duties.

Politics of a Custom-Union would tear up England politically, because the idea of Free Trade is still firmly rooted in the people; it would also tear up the Empire, because, even if Australia or Canada were agreeable, the South-African-Union and India would certainly not be willing to sacrifice their economic freedom. Even a modern Cromwell would become powerless when he handed on his Mandate to the Dominions. The building-up of the Empire needs finer means than this. The Empire offers to the English numerous possibilities, and it is time that the best brains of the country should

get busy with the study of the Dominions, and the working-out of development-plans in larger proportions.

THE LIMITATIONS OF EMPIRE POLITICS

To be the leading Nation of an Empire is a grand task but it has its well-defined limits. On the one hand stands the still more pressing need of the English people, to set, first of all, their own country into an up-to-date state—this, as well as the disinclination against the Navy-Illusion, is at the bottom of the motive of the cool, even rebellious attitude of one portion of the Labour Party against Empire Politics. On the other hand there remains the fact that English Economics cannot afford to neglect their other world-commerce interests over the care for the Empire. Empire-commerce comprises only a little less than one third of the total British export-trade. The Empire is not able to take up quite half the English export, in spite of its huge territorial extension; not one fifth of the transit-export concerns the Empire. To crown it all, only about one quarter of England's import comes from the Empire-States. During the last ten years England's Empire business has grown very little.

Above all, the Empire States' growing power to buy is for the benefit of the whole world, not England only. As a matter of fact, the last thirty years have shown that the relative share of the Motherland in the blossoming trade of the Empire has gone back considerably. England's share in the exports of the Empire sank from nearly fifty per cent in 1895 to

thirty-six per cent in 1923; in the imports, from fifty-two per cent to thirty-eight. The retrograde movement was strongest in business with the real Dominions. America's share in the outer-commerce of the Dominions (especially, of course, Canada) has increased in proportion. The procentual difference, to the disfavour of the Motherland, is not a consequence of the War, because this tendency can be proved for a duration of thirty years—the War only sharpened it for the moment.

Under such circumstances, it is difficult to realise that there are intelligent people who believe that a few artificial measures could alter the natural tendency of its development. The Dominions buy and sell where they see the greatest advantage. There is a great difference between a development according to plan of the Empire States, and the attempt of an artificial influence against natural tendencies.

THE IDEA AS A CEMENT

If military and economical Power-Politics fail, what will still keep the Empire together? What is it that cements inner-most this strange union? A natural and very powerful feature is the universal language, while the *habit* of keeping together is another great factor. Besides, the English style of living possesses great charms for the whole world. In all the Empire-States, an Englishman governs, and the economical conditions are narrow, but, as we have seen, not forcing.

But all this explains matters insufficiently. There must exist most valuable, unmeasurable, untouchable

influences. Surely, the fundamental tendency of the English people, that democratic spirit that tends to unity, to team-spirit, to State-education, is not the weakest among these influences. Does there exist a greater superiority than the one which goes out from a person who knows how to arrange his own life, and his living with other people? Is there a stronger feeling of satisfaction in public work than to be convinced of one's own worth, one's own responsibility, one's own controlled power?

The English Colonist may have been a profiteer once upon a time, but he is now a patient teacher of the members of his Empire in the art of governing their own country.

The States of the Empire owe very much to their teachers, and they have not forgotten it. The people of the British sphere of the world learn how to organise themselves. Often, without knowing or wishing it, they submit themselves to the greatest political organisation of our earth—the British Empire. Now and then they may hate it, as the Irish did during their fighting years; but the human instinct for living together is stronger. They like to be great with this great Empire.

It may be that it is the destination of England to bring up, within the borders of its Empire, young States, young Democracies, and then make the same experience as parents always used to make. It may be that a few, who have come of age, wish to go their own ways. But it may be the other way about, and that the borders of the Empire become quite dim to the eye, and that this grand organisation of States extends so greatly that its centrum changes its position. It may be that it will rise up in a world-

organisation, whose model it is to-day. Nobody will dare to prophesy; only one thing is certain, that the Commonwealth of Nations would lose its sense and with it the right to exist, if it were to look upon its vocation differently from what England's best men begin to recognise to-day—a refuge for progressive freedom, and as the product of an eternal instinct to a community-life, and for the organisation of peace.

English history is rich in wars, and deeds of violence, and nobody would like to say that the Politics of the Empire do justice to all demands of reason and right. But in order to see what happens around us, it is necessary to make one thing perfectly clear: the Empire has only recently started its new life. Only *after* the Great War has the Empire begun to be a Democratic Organisation. In the Imperial Conference of 1926, the principle has been sanctioned and sealed that the Empire can only be governed with the permission of the governed, and only with the Mandate of the governed. Such a state of things is called Democratic.

DEMOCRACY IN THE PRIMEVAL FOREST

BLACK AND WHITE

THE burden of Democracy presses the British the heaviest in the Oversea territories of the Empire, which have not yet a Government of their own. It is there that the art of the Briton, in the construction of political life, finds its highest test.

The Englishman does not live there among his own race, nor with those who emigrated as children, or who were born there of people who were anxious to adhere to everything English, to the England which they had known once. In his Empire, the Englishman is compelled to live with various peoples and races, and to work with those whose peculiarities fill most of the British with disgust.

There are hundreds of millions of Indians, of every imaginable shade, and the most manifold degrees of culture; there are many millions of Mohammedans; there are millions of Negroes of indescribable degrees of blackness. There are independent Dominions, like Cape Colony, Australia, Canada, who have formed their own thoughts about the best way of living with differently coloured people who have stopped behind Western ideals in their civilisation, trying to make the best of a weary existence.

England, London, Whitehall, lie far off from these battlefields of the Colonist, and the tempo of English

Democracy is far in advance of the gradual development of Colonial Democrats. Whatever may be thought in London about the problems of the Races, and about the form of Government for many-coloured Empire-parts, the London-thoughts are by experience very different from the ideas of the people on the spot. The English Government ought always to pour Colonial water into its goblets, even if it could boast of possessing the most delicious wine in the world.

RACE INSTINCTS

England is ready to offer to the foreign races, which live within the Empire, the highest amount of British understanding, British experience, and British ability; but there are very few English men and women who would like to open their hearts to them.

In its Empire-Politics, the flexibility and adaptability of the British mind has reached its highest triumph; but the English heart beats only for the white Britons. No honest thinking person will deny the merits that England has won for the opening of the Oversea world, and for the governing of hundreds of millions of globe-dwellers; but it is just as clear to notice that British success is limited, or is made limited by personal intercourse of an Englishman with what is foreign, and what is disquieting by its strangeness, or what is even repulsive, with which the English have to deal more than any other nation.

The English remain estranged from everything foreign as it is, but in the direct touch with other

coloured races, the average Briton finds something unsurmountable. If we add to this the superiority which every high-aiming civilisation must carry with it by necessity, then a kind of spirituality will result, which must be at least very hindering in the development of Democratic tendencies in the far-off parts of the Empire. The inclination to the super-man-type is understood easily.

All the more astonishing, therefore, is the pouring out of Democratic blessings with which we see the British busy in several parts of the world. Surely, the English go in this much further than the French, in their Colonies in Asia and Africa. The French attract to themselves a native and mixed higher class of persons with whose help they govern the countries, without bothering themselves much about Democratic principles. But they offer them something that no other white race is ready to offer to a coloured race—they flatter their hearts by not minding a mixing of the races! They do this in a way that arouses disgust in England. The British think that they are able to guard the distance, and to keep it—they are thinking nationally enough to imagine, even, that the foreign races are quite satisfied with British wisdom, and that they do not grieve in the least having to renounce the affections of the British.

This is a great mistake, and a deciding weakness in English Politics. The different coloured citizens of the Empire experience again and again the disappointment that they—when coming as guests to London—are always received with great honours, while in their homeland, the duty of standing back at a distance, is brought home to them drastically.

Only very slowly do changes for the better take place. Even in London the coloured man is kept at a distance.

"I don't like his colour," was the answer I got when I asked an English Civil Service man to play tennis with an Indian. He said it was not the right thing to do for a Civil Servant! The consequences can be easily imagined. Especially the Indians suffer to a great extent from this complex of inferiority.

It is difficult to blame the English in matters which leave the doubt open as to one's own attitude in such a position. The problem does not become visible when, for instance, a highly educated scientist of one of the dark Races travels through Europe; also it will not be noticeable if we undertake a journey for mere study through Asia or Africa. It will only be noticeable when a working-together side by side, or a daily struggle becomes necessary—a fight with different weapons, a game with different rules, with a different moral. At first, perhaps, instinct only is speaking, an instinct that is not inborn only with the British. But this instinct is a very important factor, more so with those who have to sigh under the burden of Democracy in foreign lands, because something still more important is added: disappointment and overstrained nerves!

Contemplations about national Economics are not of such importance for the English in their working-together with other-coloured people. They do play a great rôle in countries like the South-African Union, but not in the same measure as the position of the English towards questions of race within the Empire, and at the decision about the Colonial forms of Government. The present British Empire and

the Colonies are not organisations for taking advantage of foreign races. Where, as in Kenya, a state of things is going on under the very eyes of British Managers, bordering very closely upon brutal extortions, the London-Central is trying to undo the evil as we shall soon see.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

England cannot act independently in the political development of her Colonial Territories. With regard to the construction of South African Native-Politics, it is clear that the English Government has no more direct influence than upon the Nigger-illtreatments, and the Nigger-boycott in the United States of America.

This is very unfortunate, because the race-problem becomes more and more a world-Political central-point. Through the medium of the British Empire, England could become a model to the world, and through this model, future generations could be spared conflicts which must shake the foundations of Europe far more than the "earthquake" of 1914-1918!

In India, and Middle-Africa, there exists the possibility for England, as well as the power, to lead the world in these questions; but since the separation of America from the English world-Empire, and since granting perfect Self-Government to the South African Union, England's freedom of movement has become limited. This has deep-cutting consequences: it will become impossible for any length of time to proclaim the humane and political rights of the

different coloured people of Middle-Africa, and to trample it under foot in the Union, or in America.

Indeed, too much has not been said when General Smuts declared: "The Empire, and the world, must learn to understand that the question 'White or Black?' will become on the African Continent the most interesting and leading problem of the twentieth Century."

This is the reason why the East-Africa report, which was placed before the British Government in the spring of 1928 by a Committee of Education, has caused such surprise in England, and in other countries. The world is aware, since ever so long, that England is determined to lead the Indians towards Self-Government; but it is less known that British Politics have a similar aim for themselves as regards the Black Continent—though perhaps only in a dim future. This intention is the key to Empire-Politics of the future.

THE MANDATE

An intercourse with coloured races will, for the European, always be decided by an instinct often very difficult of control; but a courageous "Political Idea" may become a powerful regulator. Do not all of us do our political work in an everlasting conflict against inborn, or acquired instincts? Is not social work, for the greater part, a matter of misled instincts, a matter of sympathies and antipathies, by which the outward forms of life, and their æsthetics, play

very often the deciding rôle? Is not a test for the political education of a people to show how far it is able to conquer such primitive instincts, and not let the team-spirit get shipwrecked on a dirty collar? What has made this collar dirty?

SETTLERS AS OBSTACLES

However, such instincts must be far stronger, if social differences among one's own people are not concerned, but the rudimentary disputes between other-coloured races, and their incomparable degrees of civilisation.

In India, there exists a large upper-class of educated, and well brought-up people, even an upper-class who get their opinions and their dress from Oxford. But in tropical Africa the fair Anglo-Saxon lives under conditions that do not allow comparison. Quite apart from all other differences, the *Asiatic* problem was, for the English, much easier from the very beginning, as they had no territory to govern in Asia, which came into question for lasting English settlements.

It was, therefore, long perfectly clear that administration in India was to be conducted from no other point of view than on the principle that the Indians would have to take over the Government gradually by themselves, and that the European minority would have to be satisfied with measures considered necessary for good in the interests of the Asiatics. There exists no special interest, and, least of all, no will of a settled European Party to govern the country by a European Minority. The conflicts

between England and India have nothing to do with *this* question.

It is very different in Africa. Here are large territories where a lasting European settlement is possible, and where such has been made already in a large style. Wherever we meet large European settlements in Africa—be it in the largest and most important of all, the South-African Union, in tropical East Africa—there had begun a fight for the land, and for the government of it. The problem “Black or White?” became a burning one. The settlers felt themselves the masters of the country.

THE NEGRO REPUBLIC, NIGERIA

In West Africa, however, where the climate is less favourable, there developed a totally different type of settler: the most characteristic example is the Negro Republic, Nigeria, which belongs to the Empire.

The native Chiefs there govern their black flocks themselves under the British Protectorate, and they do conform with the feudal system of their primeval forest-traditions. In West Africa, the Englishman tries to make himself as invisible as possible—not out of a spirit of magnanimity, but because there remains nothing else for him to do in this inhospitable zone. The black races retain their ground rights; the white people are forbidden to possess land-property.

It is impossible for Europeans to master West Africa, therefore it is best to disturb the traditions of the natives as little as possible. The English

Protectors made the up-keeping of the Native feudal-system, and the keeping at bay of European influences, a *principle*. In North Nigeria (which, only a short while ago, was joined administratively with South Nigeria, after the Royal Niger Company had been dissolved shortly before the War) this went so far that even Christian Mission-work was forbidden.

Several of the most cruel native customs became modified under British influence. The natives will now no longer be thrown to the crocodiles by their own fellow-men. On the whole, one can well say that the Negroes live very comfortably—as comfortably as Negro tradition itself allows.

THE NEW ROAD

Kenya, however, the big East-African Colony, to which many thousands of British people emigrated, is anything but a Negro paradise!

The hilly land of the Colonies on the East-coast was tempting to Europeans, and in conformity with this were the consequences for the Negroes! The English settlers, very naturally, expected to domineer, exactly as the Boers did in South-Africa. In Kenya, therefore, the English Colonial-Administration faced a pressing problem for a long time, and the whole question of the relationship between Black and White became acute, because one cannot govern each colony after a separate principle.

When, finally, the former East Africa (the British call it Tanganyika), which is the neighbour of Kenya, came after the War under British administration, the answer could no longer be put off. The English

revised all their Colonial machinery. Their aim was the working-out of a generally-legal Native Policy, by which in East Africa a compromise was to be found between native-interests and settlers-interests.

The London Government realised from the beginning that England could not follow the way of the Boers in Race-Politics—not in Kenya. This has been said repeatedly, and unequivocally, in London, in the years after the War. England found herself forced to follow up Politics which, as everybody knows, are just as contrary to the wishes of the English settlers as Native-Politics are in the South African Union. The London-Central considered it its duty to act over the head of the men on the spot, and in complete contrast to the official Politics of the Government of one of the most important Empire-Members. The London-Central was inclined to walk in the new road, and of their own initiative. Since the formation of the League of Nations-Statute, the Central and the Empire became solemnly and irrevocably obliged to do it.

THE DUTIES OF THE GUARDIAN

In Versailles the "Mandate-Idea" was proclaimed. General Smuts got that brain-wave, so that the taking away of the German Colonies could not be called simple annexation. But on this occasion, the nations to whom the guardianship was entrusted, over people who "are not able to govern themselves under the particularly difficult conditions of the world to-day," recognised one principle, which proved that a new chapter was started in Colonial

history, namely the principle that "the welfare and the development of these people must remain a sacred obligation of civilisation," and that it is the duty of the League of Nations to see to the fulfilment of this task.

In a special Mandate-Treaty, which England made with the other allied and associated Powers, on August 1st, 1922, at Geneva, with reference to Tanganyika, this obligation by England has been brought into a still more precise form. The Mandator takes on the obligation to do his utmost for the material and the moral welfare, as well as for the social progress, of the Natives. There must be no forced work, except in Public-Service. The Natives must be protected, so that the settlers cannot take their land-property away, and there must be no compulsory military-service, except for the Police, or for the protection of the Mandate-Territory. The Mandator has no right to put up any fleet-protection points and such like objects within Mandate-Territory. All Members of League of Nation-States have equal emigration-rights, equal rights for commerce in the land, industries, shipping concerns, and concessions. The Mandator is obliged to account to the Mandate-Commission of the League of Nations concerning all measures taken. Disputes that cannot be settled by Committee Meetings, must come before the Court of Justice at the Hague. A Mandate-Statute can only be altered by agreement of the League of Nations Council.

Finally comes the famous Article X: The Mandator is allowed to unite the Mandate-Territory with regard to Customs, Finances and Administration, with his own bordering possessions, to a Union or

Federation, provided that the above-mentioned Mandate-duties do not become violated.

THE RIGHTS OF THE BLACK AFRICAN

This Mandate-theory has an imminently important consequence. In the midst of a world of Crown-Colonies, and Colonial possessions of all kinds, territories are set apart by the administrations of international guardianships, in which the rights of the owners and administrators are strongly limited. It is the duty of the Mandate-Commission to watch that the administration is not carried out in the one-sided interests of the white race, and of the European settlers, but in the interests of "*the material and moral welfare and social progress*" of the Natives. No rules must be set up which serve the interests of the settlers, if they are against the interests of the Natives.

By this, a new right of humanity is proclaimed: the rights of the Black Africans. First of all, so one might say, at the expense of the German settlers in East-Africa, but this suggestion is simply nonsense. During the last years nearly as many English people emigrated to Tanganyika as Germans. Besides, particular stress was laid on the fact that *all* League of Nation States were to have equal rights, and with these also the same restrictions. Something altogether different springs up: the rights of the Black Africans cannot be fenced in by a Mandate boundary—it is impossible in Tanganyika to take the interests of the Blacks into consideration, and to make it a first principle, while making the English settlers masters of the country next door in Kenya.

THE DISPUTE IN KENYA

The London Colonial Office, for years, has been engaged in an obstinate quarrel with the leaders of the 12,000 European settlers in Kenya, who demand a Self-Government, by which the European minority would govern the two and a half million of black people. Besides there are not merely the Blacks, but also the 10,000 Arabs and the 26,000 Indians, who live in Kenya.

The London Government is in a difficult position against these settlers, who show great arrogance, and who, as a matter of fact, have done much for the opening of the land. Lord Delamere, who owns 100,000 acres in Keyna, is the leader of the settlers. The notions of these Colonisators are robust as they are themselves. The idea that the Black Africans should have the first rights to their country, is incomprehensible to them. In Kenya the Blacks even are forbidden to plant coffee, yet the European farmers export coffee to the value of a million pounds sterling!

Considerable economical interests of the English settlers are concerned. But the London Government has declared already, in 1923, that if the interests of the Natives are in conflict with those of the settlers, then the interests of the Natives must come first. One can easily imagine the anger of the settlers! This conflict is ripe for a final decision, and the East-African Report offers the means for it; in fact, it *has* this very aim. Lord Delamere has—as an answer—laid down his seat in the Legislative Council of Kenya. He realises that his hopes for the establishment of a

predominance for the White settlers in East-Africa has come to naught. The Mandate-System is on the way to put an end to the Colonisation-Ideas of the old style.

THE PRINCIPAL POINT IN THE EAST-AFRICAN REPORT

The English East-African Report declares that there can be only Common Politics for Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, and these are: Administration in the interests of the *Natives*; Education of the Black Race so as to share the ability to take over a Government. Slow raising of the Africans to a standard by which they are able to conduct their own affairs. The goal lies at a nebulous distance, but the Commission believes it can see the road very clearly. The Report describes it in detail. The English follow hereby a "Dual Policy," because the European settlers are not going to lose their rights for the guarding of their special interests. Everything depends upon the finding of an Office which is able to weigh impartially, and to level the "White" and the "Black" interests—always, however, with the principle before our eyes that we are living on a Continent which belongs to the Black Race.

This Central-Office is to have a High Commissioner, and later a Governor-in-Chief. The propositions of the the Commission have, for a principal aim, a gradual extension of important Mandate-principles beyond the borders of Tanganyika, and the attempt to approach from this side the great problem: the paving of the way for an agreement between the White and the Black Races. The road

is strewn with difficulties. One has only to think of the Hertzog law-suggestions for the South African Union, which move in an opposite direction.

There is nothing left for the English but to say: tropical Africa has its own life-conditions. But new English Native Politics will, probably, influence, earlier or later, the conditions in the South of the Black Continent. It is difficult to work out this perspective.

AND GERMANY?

What exactly are our German interests? If we are to give up the hope of regaining our lost territories as unlikely, and if the possibility to acquire other land-complexes in Africa is somewhat untimely, it seems as if the watching over, and the furthering of, the Mandate-Idea is for the present the only direct task.

Article 22 of the Versailles Treaty, and the special Mandate for Tanganyika, supply the legal foundations. We shall have to take care that our countrymen get their rights in the Mandate-Territories, but it would be, at the same time, welcome to us if the great fundamental thoughts of the "Guardianship-Rights" in Africa would become universal, because they bring, apart from other acquisitions, equal rights for all League of Nation States—and the prohibition to use Black Expedition Armies. Principles of this sort deserve international spreading. Also, if we had cause to complain about the disregard of Mandate-Orders—perhaps in connection with the future gathering together of the three East African Colonies—then we would have clearly defined laws at our disposal; everybody has the right to address a petition

to the Mandate-Commission if he considers that the Mandate-Treaty has been violated. On the other hand, it is out of question that a Government would make use of a Representative of its Country at the Mandate-Commission, because such a person is absolutely free, and must not be "instructed."

A second road leads directly to the League of Nation-Council; each Government has the right to introduce and plead any Mandate-concern before the Council. Thirdly: every Government which claims a violation of the Mandate-Statute, or which is anxious to get a judicial interpretation of a Mandate-order, has the right to appeal to the Hague Courts of Justice. In so far as a real doubt exists about the ways of the intended administrative-union of the three Colonies, as conforming with the meanings of the Mandate, it is easy to get the matter settled lawfully.

WELL-MEANING AUTOCRACY AS FIRST STEP

It is to be understood that the British in Africa *neither wish* to realise the Democratic characteristics which lie in the Mandate Idea, by an enthusiastic export of Democratic Western Institutions, nor *can* they do this. For the present they prefer a Negro, riding on his bicycle, imported from Birmingham, than his sitting at the green table of a Colonial Parliament!

For a good long while, so it says in the East Africa Report, there will be nothing else left for the Administration but a "well meaning Autocracy" ; but the further aim will remain, the education for practical co-work, even for Self-Government. The English do

this, not only in order to create a ventilator through which pressure can be removed, which had occurred gradually through European ideas entering into Africa. Their motive is not *only* the old truth that a People's education creates a desire in them for imported goods, and it is necessary that it should be so. Apart from all materialism, there will always be the notion retained in England, that the possession of such a large part of the world means also an obligation, and that British spirit has a high mission to fulfil. What else could the English present to the world but what they own themselves? So the goal appears in a nebulous distance, the goal of Democracy in Primeval Forests!

EXPORTED DEMOCRACY

Development has brought it about that England has become the greatest Political Education Institution, by her British Empire, that the world has ever seen. England is not merely the greatest export-land for industrial manufacture, England is also the greatest Spiritual Exporter: the Grand-Exporter of Democratic ideas!

Since the French Revolution, there have been no stronger spiritual-Political radiators than these. Bolshevism appeared to become an export-competitor for some time, who, in the world at large—of which, as we may well remember, Europe is only a small portion—would drive off English goods just as effectively as certain American goods did in the

realms of real Commerce. But this crisis is overcome for the present. British conceptions of Democracy, of Representation of the People, and of Parliament, flow in gay waves far into bright and dark Continents.

How far this is a blessing, cannot always be defined easily. This Export, which is now going on, stretching over decenniums, does not carry with it the preconditions of British success—the Englishman! But, above all, he who copies the English System, is copying it in its present state, which may have changed considerably to-morrow. It cannot be said that the then-existing phases of developments in England always spell a progress, and a betterment. We saw this at another place as to what changes British forms of Democracy are subject. True, a few of these principles stand for all Eternity, but just these presume the existence of conditions which are not to be found in India, and still less in Dark Africa, nor can they be expected with any certainty.

HOW IT HAPPENED

The British have not pressed Democracy upon their Colonies. For States like South Africa, Canada, Australia and Ireland, the acceptance of the British System arranged itself quite naturally. But beyond this—that is to say, in territories where the working of Democracy was not a matter to be understood by itself—the English did not grant Democracy to the Peoples of the Empire. On the contrary, the British got in no slight an embarrassment by their stormy cries for Democracy!

It is well known how this happened, for the greater

part: the Crown sent a Governor; the Governor surrounded himself with a few advisers who knew the country, and these advisers became more and more important, and developed into official characters. At first they were called, then they became elected. Thus they acquired power as "Representatives of the People", a power which they took away from the Government of the Governor. So it came to conflicts, at which the Governor yielded for the sake of peace. The power had split; the first step to "Diarchy" had been made.

The country was wavering between Democracy and Self-Government and London Autocracy. London pressure became weaker and weaker, until the point was reached where the question was no longer: Self-Government, or London management, but Independency, or a place in the Dominion.

Why was it happening like this? Not because there sat weak-minded men in London, but because it was only a natural development: England was not merely out to govern her Colonies, but wished for their development. The English grew into an educational-role, whether they wished it or not. They organised the Countries; they gave employment to the people; they built schools, and they taught them. The inhabitants came to London, and saw how "Mother" lived herself.

Democracy is the natural consequence of education. One may try to educate spiritual and political slaves, but not for long. England did not go *that* way; England was anxious to produce, even out there in the wilds, human beings, statesmen, citizens and fellow-workers. Herewith the seed was strewn for a democratic harvest, because every man who is aware of

his own value, every alert, upright, elementary built-up character, has a right to demand his place, his share in the Empire. This has not happened because the British had the intention of making the world happy at any price with Democracy, with Parliaments and with Self-Government; it has not come about by reason of necessity, as all things change by themselves into Democracy; the simple explanation is that a democratic spirit grows up in all men naturally, provided that this tendency is not crushed out of them by brutal force or—cod-liver oil!

LATE CONTEMPLATIONS

It is quite a different question whether the longing for self-realisation, which arises in every educated man, must be satisfied under any circumstances by the same means which a nature-favoured people has chosen for itself, after a development stretching over hundreds of years! All the conflicts, the internal ones, as well as the conflicts between the English and their guarded subjects, concerned, as a rule, the tempo of the democratising of the Colonial form of Government, and the modifications which were deemed necessary in the interests of those concerned. Conformably with the degrees of developments, one tries to find in London different solutions.

The strange thing about it is that England thinks she has the duty to find forms of Government for other Nations or Races. This is an altogether un-English problem-position. The British get, by this, into a position in which they were never placed for their *own* interests, namely to create a paper-

Constitution and to bring in it democratic principles into concrete form. A strange literature was the consequence in London. The best contributions are contained in the reports of the diverse Commissions for India, Ceylon and Africa.

The more they thought about it, the clearer it became to the English that the democratic forms in the Colonies must look quite differently from what they were known hitherto. These contemplations are rather interesting, but they arrive a little late.

EXPORT DIFFICULTIES

By the transfer of British systems into Trans-Atlantic countries—and not into those only—there arose continually three fundamental difficulties. Firstly: the British System takes for granted a homogeneous people, which is not torn asunder by unbridgeable abysses. Secondly: the British System cannot be carried through without the team-spirit, without the will to sacrifice personal interests, and to face small difficulties for the sake of the common-welfare, and for the great fundamental Idea. Thirdly: the Parliamentary system of England is based upon the existence of a few, well organised Parties.

Such assumptions do not exist in the Crown-Lands of the Empire, where the English have placed before themselves the task of governing not only the Autocrats, but of educating the people for a participation in the Government, or for Self-Government. Somewhere, beginnings *have* been made; somewhere, there exists already quite flourishing Political life, while, however, in other Countries

even the most elementary foundations are still missing. Thus we note the most different types of Governments. Somewhere we see the correct Crown-Colony-Administration, i.e. an Autocratic Régime, conducted from London, via the Colonial-Office, which is managed in many most practical forms.

In the smallest Colonial District, in Gibraltar, no complicated machinery is needed. In others, as in Fiji, and in British-Guinea, there exists a Legislative Council which is appointed by the Government, and in which Native-Chiefs hold seats. Again in others, as at Ceylon, the first seeds for a Democratic System have grown up to a selected Council; at Barbadoes, Bahamas and Bermuda there exist already two real Houses of Parliament. The British West-Indies (Islands) have been already a sort of Democratic Paradise, but the owners misused their Political power, for they would not give up Slavery, and therefore the rights of these Islands for Self-Government were cancelled again by the London Government in most of their Colonies. They take things rather easily at Barbadoes, so one hears, for they belong to those lucky Isles who have kept their Parliament. The time of bloom has passed since ever so long for the British West-Indies, and one does not exactly know what to do in future with this part of the Empire.

THE FUTURE OF INDIA

For the largest and most important Crown land, for India, development has been clearly marked out at least since the latest Constitution-Reform. The

Indians demand Self-Government by Parliament. The Montagu-Chelmsford-Reform made a start with it; a remnant of Crown-Colonial-Autocracy has been connected in a very complicated way with a clumsy system of Parliamentary Self-Government. Under India, one has to understand, in this case, that portion of the country which is not governed by Autocratic Princes, who are connected with England by Treaties.

Taking it for granted that it would be possible to raise up the Democratic Spirit, and to make the conditions of life gradually conform with the British System, England has given to the Indian Politicians a closed-in Administration territory, which allows the possibility for Self-Government.

But British confidence was not great enough in 1917 to grant to the Indians sufficient independency in really important internal affairs. To all their gigantic difficulties, another one was added to Indian Politics: a Parliament, and an upper-class party of professional Politicians, who, in questions which concern them mostly, can only talk, but not act. All the defects and stupidities of a Parliament, and of professional Politics, which exist also in countries where Parliament has the power to insist upon its will, must have made themselves felt in India all the more.

In Egypt the same experience was made with imported Parliamentarism. Nothing else is, after all, probable!

The Parliamentary-System shows itself in such countries as grotesquely ill-shaped. The duo-responsibility in India, the existence of two kinds of Ministers, of which the one is responsible to London,

the other to Delhi, has made Democratic instructions, the principal aim of the English, into a political farce. Whether the Indians will become able to work up a political team-spirit, and a "Sense of Citizenship"—in spite of their social, religious and characteristic hindrances—in a British spirit, and group themselves politically into constructive parties (to be anti-London will not be sufficient for any length of time) is often doubted, but remains to be seen.

But if British Politics believe in the possibility of educating the Indians, or when it should be found that India's demand for Self-Government has become gradually irresistible, then half-measures will not do any longer. How very difficult the Indian-Problem really is, one can guess from a sentence which appeared in the "Nation" a little while ago: "If one wishes to import Democracy successfully into Asia, one must import it in fullest measure. It must reach the great masses of the peasantry, and the land-population, and must not be made to be swallowed in little tablets by only a handful of favoured people of the better classes."

How is this going to be done? Indian Self-Government does not so easily mean Indian Democracy—even if it should become possible for the very wisest of English and Indian thinkers to sketch out, for this Asiatic land of Mystery, the most perfect Democratic Constitution which ever human brain conceived. If we allow ourselves the time to get busy with problems which have nothing to do with Reparations and Rationalisations, then here we are offered the opportunity to watch a unique historical event—the metamorphosis of one of the most costly British

Crown lands into a British Dominion of full value. This act is gradually being accomplished in the name of Democracy, and with the aid of Democratic art. It remains to be seen whether the product will form an enjoyable chapter of Democratic life.

A NEW RECIPE

The considerations against a transfer of the Representative-Systems upon unprepared Countries, have arisen in England to such an extent that a Commission refused to go, though the Government meant them to report about the position in Ceylon, and make the trial for the preparation of the usual Parliamentary-régime for this important Island—on account of its nearness to India. The report of the Commission is highly interesting, because it is proposed therein to give to the four millions of Natives who live upon Ceylon, Democratic Institutions of a different kind, which the signatories think can be functioned without Democratic knowledge, and without Political talent on the part of the population!

Ceylon has been, until 1910, a simple Crown Colony. Even to-day the Governor has still the right, supported by Whitehall, to decide over the head of an embryonic Parliament, whose majority has been elected since 1920 by the men and women of Ceylon. The rest are nominated. The severance between power and responsibility has destroyed here every possibility for a Democratic education.

Democratic talent, however, appears to be conspicuous by its absence; not a trace of Party-formation is to be seen. The Democratic forms (the right to

vote, and Parliament) are senseless. In order not to disturb the primitive System of the native "Communities," and in the belief that heterodox races flourish best if one lets them develop themselves, these Communities have been chosen as a foundation for the Representative-System (in contrast to territorial Election-realms), with the result that the team-work of the people as a whole has become far more difficult—in fact, a very mountain of difficulties.

In the Ceylon-Report of 1928 it is straightway declared that the present Government-System is "disastrous." Consequently there could be no question under such circumstances of a "responsible Government," and still less of the importation of the English Parliamentary-System. The Commission had even the courage to say that, in a time when, in the Motherland of Democracy, the form of the Democratic System, i.e., of a Parliament, had begun seriously to be disputed, an exportation of this System into foreign lands, was, most decidedly, not to be recommended—least of all into a Country such as Ceylon.

COMMITTEE-GOVERNMENT

The Commission made a proposition which might be called revolutionary, if its fundamental ideas were not known already for long from British Communal Administration. The Ceylon-Report wishes to offer to these people all the advantages of Democracy; it wishes to retain for them its imminent educational value; it wishes to educate the Singhalese for good "citizenship," by giving them responsibility,

and with this, the heavy burden of their problems to carry; it wishes to prevent them from merely talking and agitating; in fact, its object is that they shall *practise* Self-Government, without suffering the evil consequences of a sham-Government. In brief: the Parliamentarians are requested to do the Government-work by themselves.

By direct voting of the people, a Council of State is to be formed, whose Members shall form by ballot a number of Executive-Committees among themselves. It is the task of the Committee to conduct, pro-tem., a group of Government-Offices, and to control them. A special Finance-Committee is recommended for budget-questions, which would have to consist of the Presidents of the other Committees, and of three permanent Ministers.

In other words, Government is supposed not only to govern, it must also reign, and administer. It shall not govern in the old-fashioned way, but Parliament itself must be the highest Executive. A Government by Committees, instead of Party Government. Individual responsibility of each M.P. in his own field of work, instead of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet. But the Ceylon-Report wishes to place above this Democratic element an Autocratic element, the Governor, who acts conformably with instructions from London, and who can domineer over the Representation of the People.

CRITICISM

The proposition for a "Committee-Government" met, at first, with a certain admiration in London,

but at a closer look, much of this admiration got lost again! It was said that such a System would not be suitable, not even for the relatively narrow conditions at Ceylon—quite apart from that, it would most certainly not spell a new world-solution for Democracy. It is quite true, so the Critic admits, that a Committee-Government of that type would, perhaps, do away with Party-Politics altogether, because if it comes to the working-out of concrete things in the Committee-Room, the *person*, and *thing concerned* carry weight, but *not* the Party.

But where is to be found the "*Moving Spirit*" of such a System? So asks the "Round Table." Where is the compensation for the *Leadership* which goes forth from a Cabinet that is upheld by a Parliamentary majority? Who sees to it that the work of the Committee will not become scattered? Who will replace that Clerk of the County-Council, without whom the whole Committee-Administration of the Commune is unthinkable? Does not such a System undermine the very element of life of all Democracy: *responsibility*; because nobody would know afterwards who was to blame why a Committee-resolution worked out in this or that way. The British elector wants always to have a close look at the man whom he wishes to grip by the collar, when his deeds misplease him. The Committee-door hides this man from him. It is not merely the idea that Parliament is going to take a stronger share in the Administration that frightens the critics away from it; but the fear that Politics and Administration would get mixed up with each other under such a proposition.

A Parliament has to do with the great *fundamental* principles of Politics, but not with the details of

the Administration. A Constitution ought not to be anxious to win the greatest possible "efficiency" of Administration, but its meaning should be to raise the people to a higher Political standard. But Political progress is to the British of equal meaning with a higher corporative responsibility, i.e., with Team-Spirit, and the *Party* is for the Englishman the natural medium of all Politics.

The Ceylon-Report has therefore the weak point that it wishes to create deliberately a Constitution which is supposed to function without the existence of Parties, and of a Team-Spirit. The British answer is: Let us put up rather with a little more definite anger, with a bad Administration; let us rather have a disastrous Constitution, than renounce the fundamental principle of all Democracy: the education to a proper Team-Spirit. Even in Ceylon!

A QUESTION TO THE TEACHERS

Many a motive could be named with regard to Political work in Transatlantic territories, which is of little interest to us in its cohesion, but with which everyone ought to start his statements if he wishes to throw good searchlights upon the negative. The British have again the good fortune to join the pleasant things with those which are useful. They have here also the advantage that they were able to find for a—if one may call it thus—National Egoistic-Policy, a formula which allows them to

appear with a serene countenance before the Last Judgment! While giving away slowly to Democratic pressure—sometimes with twisting, and frequently also with moaning and lamenting—they pursue the only way which is still permitted to them to keep the Empire together, and—if the right man comes along with the right method—to sustain it, as a very costly basis of their economics, and to build it further out. All this is done in the name of Democracy, for the benefit of humanity! Happy people!

All depends, however, what use will be made of the developed individuality by this "freedom," and of the founded institutions in the Transatlantic Democracies. The British find it difficult enough themselves to procure for their best heads the possibility of leadership in their own country. How much heavier will lay the Democratic weights upon the mere scholars! So long as they remain members of the Empire, and certainly so long as they are still in a state of development, where at the worst London can still think and decide for them, their weakness will not show itself to the full. From the South Sea Islands to India, as we see, the Government-System will be marked by a higher, a leading power, which stands above the Democratic turmoil. Its prototype is the British Crown. Its legal adviser in India is the Vice-King, the Viceroy, together with the India Office, and the British element in the Indian Government and Administration. In other dependencies, it is the Governor-General, or High Commissioner.

The British lay the greatest value in placing a higher personage over the Territorial Democracy, someone who is impartial, someone who can smooth

over and lead. This power will show itself clearer here, dimmer there, but all conform with the Political progress of the countries. The British do not choose this form simply in order to give to the Empire a greater unity, without which it would no longer be an Empire, but also because they find that Democracy is not enough for these countries. This is the teacher's view-point. Earlier, or later, the "pupils" will hate it!

But these pupils overlook one thing: English Democracy would fail disastrously in its own country if it did not acknowledge a *final* authority: that tradition which had been formed through a lifetime of experience stretching over hundreds of years. The question will be, whether those who have been educated will recognise it. They will the sooner be ready to do so, if England gives an example by the individual's own life—if it proves to them that the Democratic form is only the means to a higher purpose. England *must* be the Leader in her own realm.

A nation who wants to be a leader to other people will have to give the answer to three questions: what is she *doing* to instruct herself and others, and to *prove* to them that her Materialism fills out only one part of her life. What does she do to prove that all Democratic Institutions have no sense when they serve to legalise a system of social-profiteering?

The third question is the most pressing of all. It is the touch-stone for the value of that new conception of a Democratic Colonial Policy, about which we have spoken in the preceding chapters. The great Transatlantic territories are to be governed in the interest of the Natives!

There will be Natives whose interests are satisfied if their granting of a share in the Government means

a personal advantage to them. British Politics will always be at a disadvantage in Africa because they are obliged to be dualistic: they must do justice also to non-Africans. Unfortunately, the interests of the Settlers and Enterprisers do not correspond with those of the Natives, while—as the Indian example shows—the import of West-European methods, and West-European industries, only tends to increase the social want of union.

The “civilisation” of Africa was, for the time being, no blessing for the Africans. What they might have won by it, they lost abundantly by becoming the slaves of the rich openers of their country. The invading civilisation destroys the old working of their homely mode of life, whose primitive form is, and remains, dear to the heart of a Native. True, “slavery,” as such, does no longer exist, but there are conditions in the African mines, and on the farms, which are little better than slavery.

Twenty years ago, Lord Oliver, who now belongs to the Labour Party, wrote a book, whose title is: “White Capital and Coloured Labour.” Well, this book attacks White capitalism as sharply as possible; it is still so up-to-date that it appeared, last year, 1929, in an enlarged edition. This book appeared about the same time as the East Africa Report, which latter looks like a proclamation of the rights of Natives for a free existence in their own country. The book contains all that the Report carefully avoids.

Lord Oliver tells his readers how the practical use of the outpouring of the Democratic Spirit in the darkest of all Continents must be the same as everywhere where Democracy is not merely an empty form—i.e. the awakening of the Social conscience,

and the prevention of making a heartless use of this power wherever it shows itself. The principle of the Mandates, of Guardianship, and the obligation contained in the League of Nations Statute, for all nations to see to it that these laws are obeyed strictly, has opened new possibilities. The way is clear how Europe can make good all the evil that has been committed in the name of civilisation since generations.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CAPITALISM

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

IF England had to face a powerful Revolution, it would spell very little embarrassment for the British; the over-powering majority would join hands in a fanatic self-defence. How very instructive was the small test-mobilisation during the General-Strike!

But Fate is not going to make it so easy for the British; it is not placing it before an uproar, but before a Political problem. Fate forces Great Britain for the first time in history to ponder deeply over her social and economical foundations, and turn to serious self-criticism and work. The teacher here is again Democracy. The politically Democratic people demand to see social fruit, but, apart from a few fools, no Englishman wishes nowadays to leave the road of Democracy while fighting for a better social position.

SOCIAL STRAIN

The abominable state of conditions in the English Proletarian quarters, and the misery of those who are out of work, has been often enough described. The abyss between rich and poor, between the cared-for,

and the uncared-for people, between the well-nourished and the hungry, is wide and ugly. The contrasts are seen more clearly in England than in other countries, because the people are living much closer together, and more unceremoniously. Palaces and slums are separated in London only by a few steps. All the same, on Derby Day, on the hills of Epsom, high and low have free intercourse with each other in instinctive naïveté. The fundamental mood of the British is delightfully kind-hearted, and to be envied. The waters run slowly, but they are deep.

Far over one half of the population, and among them nearly all the workers, have the right to vote, and the House of Commons has Sovereign Power. The workers are in an overwhelming majority; if they wished, they could seize the capitalistic Bastille. Never before was it easier, without any particular expenditure in strength or genius, to replace the old "System" by a newer one. One voting would be sufficient.

What do the political battles of the 19th century mean in comparison with the tough underground fights which are enacted in our own days. What is the meaning of Ireland, Free Trade, of the Reform Act, in comparison with the question, whether the ladder upon which all the Britons climb—as all the rest of us too—should fall to pieces suddenly? England may have to-morrow a Labour majority! Democracy is ready to enter the holiest of holies. How will the intruders behave in the drawing-room of capitalism? Will they smash the costly china, will they upset the columns upon which the house rests?

This is an anxious question for the pessimists, who never see light, for those of weak nerves who

cannot see a way out, and for thick-heads who do not want a way out. But this question does not exist for the sound instinct of the lively Briton, and we shall see that it also does not need to exist, because England will see to it that it never comes so far as to make the dictation of a socialistic majority necessary.

As soon as the Political pressure, which issues from the Labour Party, is strong enough, then the Capitalists will swim in the new stream. For this reason, the state of opinions of the capitalistic Parties in England is a measure for the weight of the anti-capital Movement. This is a fundamental law, in conformity with which British Democracy lives. We shall have a look now at the development of Party opinions: what do the "Capitalists" want; what is the desire of the "Socialists"?

In a nutshell, the picture is this: the Conservatives would like to bathe the child, without making it wet. The Labour Party hangs the child up in the wind and in the rain—making it thoroughly wet, without wishing to bathe it first. The Liberals write fat volumes about the temperature of the bath-water, the condition of the bath, concerning bath-salts and towels!

NEW FACTS

While the Politicians take their time, and while Parliament looks on strangely unconcerned, something new is developing slowly. In wider and wider classes of society, conscience begins to work, and life itself is helping with its time-proved remedies; it brings about *new* facts, *new* developments, which make a

large portion of the old quarrels and old watchwords quite unnecessary. British life is quicker than British minds! It does not halt before Parties, and Party-Programmes! A fresh wind tears the recipes out of the hands of the Party-preachers, and what only yesterday appeared to be a worthy aim for Party-propaganda, works out to-day to be a worry, from which we have already freed ourselves without being aware of the fact.

Development disorganises Parties; new groups are springing up. Yesterday only two truths seemed to exist, and only two Parties: "Socialists" and "Anti-Socialists." Life has passed by both of them, while they stood quarrelling at the street-corners. A few are bitterly disappointed when they notice it; others step out on the new road with a glad heart, and follow as Life is leading them.

THE BALANCE-SHEET OF CAPITALISM

The "bankruptcy" of Capitalism (not exactly a scientific theory) is the moral justification of each anti-capital English speech, and of each article—so we read it, in black and white, upon the programme of the Labour Party. Is British capitalism really bankrupt? Has it indeed led into a cul-de-sac, or even to National ruin, so that "only the Labour Party is able to lead to economical bloom?" Can England only be helped economically if the "order of the capital" is replaced by a "socialistic" order? Will there be a social justice

only if the recipe by Bernard Shaw ("for intelligent women") is obeyed: an equal income for all? If British capitalism were bankrupt, would this not show itself from its balance-sheet? Here it is.

BANKRUPTCY—AND RISE

One portion of British Industry is clearly bankrupt. Big Cotton concerns are hopelessly involved in debt; others flourish passably. In the wild after-War boom, they became ridiculously over-financed, and were again ruined by speculation which was rife at that time. Huge iron and steel industries became so helpless that many millions had to be wiped out as finally lost. A few of them are still bankrupt; others are in full swing. Mining districts, which were once exceedingly rich, are at present beggarly poor. Still others await their liquidation. Again others do very well, and are quite sound.

In some parts of the country, putrefaction concentrates; in others there blows a fresh pure air. Industrial distress is only to be found in certain parts, and is restricted to certain districts. It is felt doubly hard, because it happens to exist mostly in those parts of the country which used to be the richest in England; looked upon from a social view-point, it is so very critical, because the majority of the workers are dependent upon these branches of industry. What used to be the strongest, the most important, and the most profitable concerns, namely coal, iron and cotton, could not keep pace with other industries under the greatly changed post-War conditions.

The export-business of the staple industries lost more and more ground, but the industries of the inner-market spread excellently. New realms of production spell fine profit. The chemical and the electrical industry; automobile construction, and artificial silks (the latter two only in their best types) met with splendid success. The numerous breweries, the whisky firms, and, above all, the tobacco trade, had exceedingly huge returns. Hotel trade flourishes, and so do the big department Stores. Greengrocers are able to buy luxury-autos. Money circulates at rapid speed. The Cinemas are overcrowded; sporting arenas and Variety theatres are sold out; the working girls wear silk stockings.

The country is rich. From Transatlantic sources flow streams of gold into the City. They arrive from gold, tin and copper mines; from diamond-fields; from india-rubber plantations; from the oil-fields, and out of many industrial works. For all and everything that promises success, money is not lacking—even for things which are fairly doubtful. Of course, nobody likes to invest in the bankrupt concerns of the heavy industries; in those quarters, lack of credit is greatly lamented.

INCREASED PRODUCTION, INCREASED WAGES

England is producing nowadays quantitatively more than before the War. Not *much* more, in spite of increased population, but anyhow a little more. The domestic use of coal (a measure for its production) reached in the post-War years nearly the height of the pre-War average (98 per cent) in spite of the colossal

use of oil, and an actual rationalising in the burning of coal, which must be taken into consideration. Railway transport (goods) was a good 10 per cent less, but street transport made gigantic progress.

The wealth of the nation is to-day certainly not less than before the War: reckoned upon the then price basis, England's national income is nearly as big as before the War. It is estimated to-day as round four milliard pounds sterling, against about two milliards in 1911. It is therefore not surprising that, in spite of the great financial difficulties of a few big industries, and in spite of over one million out-of-work people, and in spite of the increase in the population, the pro-head income of the people is little less than before the War—according to the estimates of Professor Bowley and Sir Josiah Stamp, it is only about 5 per cent less. It shows therefore that England could pay to the ever-growing number of workers, in spite of the depression, at least the same, and probably higher wages than before the War. In 1924, there was an average of £3 per week for full-time working adults.

The two mentioned authorities speak even of an increase of fully 11 per cent. They reckon that about 44 per cent out of the national income spells workers' wages, against 43 per cent in 1911. Of course the difference in the wages for the separate branches of industry are unusually great, especially under pressure of foreign competition. All the same, nobody disputes that the general standard of life among the working-classes has become considerably higher. That this was possible, although the working-hours were reduced by about 10 per cent on the average, is a proof that Great Britain's industrial work has greatly improved in efficiency.

ENGLAND HOLDS HER OWN

British economy, through its dependency upon export, is condemned to suffer under the depression of international business. England is dependent upon the import of food and raw material. The exporter saw, after the War, the agents of other nations, especially of America, in *his* accustomed place. There are also cheaper goods than the British on the market. In spite of all this the balance is not at all so discouraging as it is painted by those in opposition to the "System". Who would have expected that England would have kept her place so well during those difficult years; but it remains a matter of fact all the same. Also London is still to-day the centre of international finance.

One must not weigh British balance with the unprecedented economical rise of the war-winners: the Americans. As things stand, it was certainly a great merit that British capitalism still functioned well enough to permit to the working-classes a rise in their standard of living. Their raised power of purchase was very favourable for the internal market. The working-classes have better food and better raiment, better entertainments than before the War. The demands on life have greatly increased, while the wages certainly could not keep pace with it in proportion.

TRANSFER OF WEALTH

The financial progress of the working-classes is accompanied by a retrogression of other classes. The incomes of the diverse working-classes show a

tendency to equalise a little more. As, on the whole, the standard of the middle-classes has not much changed, it is taken for granted that this important class of people could not save as much as before.

The Colwyn Committee calculated a few years ago that the total savings are reduced by one quarter; a larger proportion of them belonging to the middle-classes, though the saving capacity of the upper classes has gone back as well. The higher rates and taxes, made necessary through the financing of the 150 milliard marks National Debt, and the more expensive mode of living of society people, are ample explanation for such a deficit. But a new class of Proletarian small-capitalists, and small savers, has sprung up among the lower classes of the people, whose importance grows with every new decade. The old great fortunes crumble gradually; industries are no longer private property, and new great fortunes do not accumulate in the old tempo. But instead of this, more money glides into the hands of the lower working-classes.

THE DEBT-ACCOUNT OF THE CAPITALISTS

The grotesque distribution of capital, and the extravagance of the rich, is also in England a source of social displeasure. Nearly 40 per cent of the National Income flows into the hands of the proprietors in the form of interest, rents and hire-moneys, or some other profits. Nine-tenths of the National Capital are in the possession of little more than one tenth of the population. Here lies one of the principal points of attack for Socialistic Propaganda.

Far more important, however, is the fact that the proprietors, and those to whom capitalistic enterprise is entrusted, allowed such a large portion of the National Capital, which was meant for production, to drift into bankruptcy, through stupidity, laziness, and ill-luck, either openly, or more or less concealed. The Social Critic cares very little about the total balance of capitalism; it is quite sufficient to notice that the bad management in the Cotton, Iron, and Mining Industry has made the balance-sheet decidedly worse, and that within these branches of single concerns, through the complicity of the managers, a serious catastrophe has befallen the workers. Old-fashioned management; technical arrangements which brought no interest; strict refusal of all that is called rationalising; inability for modern financial management—in short, the long list of fatal mistakes of the capitalists, who have nothing to do with “capitalism”, and with the “System”, are the principal points which give also to the moderate direction of the Left, again and again, cause for the sharpest attacks. A little more intelligence, energy, and will for sacrifice by the managers, could improve the balance-sheet considerably within a very short time. Obviously, reforms would be quite sufficient, which have nothing to do with an upsetting of the System.

THE LIMITS OF THE LABOUR PARTY

In spite of all the inborn wickedness of the Capitalists, it looks as if there are, after all, more people

in England who adhere to the inherited System, than the Socialists admit. In one way, or the other, all of us are interested in Capitalism. Somehow we live by it, well or badly, but we certainly *do* live by it. Only a few, those who are "down and out," are not interested. They do not even get out-of-work-pay; they get no old-age pensions. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that, in England, with nearly twenty-nine millions of people with the right to vote, little more than eight millions voted in favour of a Party whose official programme sets them the task of "transferring Capitalism into Socialism."

There has certainly been no lack of Political "enlightenment" during the last thirty years. The financial worries of the paterfamilias, and the everyday difficulties of the house-wives, had been, and still are, so pressing, that the most daring lies, or attempts to smooth things over, which the propagandists of the Capitalists used, would not be sufficient to let the ninety per cent of people with voting rights, who belong to households, and whose income is less than three hundred pounds per annum, forget their Proletarian-misery. All the same, it remains a fact that the large majority of the British workers hate Capitalism so little, that they do not give even their votes in favour of the Socialist Party of England.

A WRONGLY-WORKED PROBLEM

Figures provide the key for a Political position. There would be no difficulty in getting an overwhelming majority of people, if Propaganda was

made against the grossest evils of Capitalism; but nowise by suggesting to replace an old well-known System for an unknown new one. No majority was ever won for a Socialistic Utopia. The large mass of the people are of a practical disposition; they are no Utopians. Their disapproval does not make them blind. The old-style Socialism failed, because there existed quite sufficient idols, but there are not enough idolators. It suffered shipwreck through its own inmost untruth, on their mere phrases!

In the decisive hour—in the time of great upheaval-work after the World War—it proved to be unworkable social-politically, because the socialistic phrases are impracticable, and cannot be carried through. It was clearly shown that: “Capitalism or Socialism?” was a wrong, out-of-fashion way of putting the question. The Labour Party, therefore, was hastening to adjust herself *de facto* with the Capitalistic System in a convenient way, though she kept in mere theory to the Socialistic phrase.

By doing this, she drew a group of super-Radicals to her banner, but made at the same time an insurmountable barrier for herself; it stopped until to-day at eight million votes, and of these at least twenty per cent are no lasting Labour possession. Hardly more than ten per cent of the Labour Electors of 1929 are looked upon as Radical-Socialistic. Even this figure is still too highly estimated.

ENGLAND DOES NOT WANT CLASS WAR

In other words, the watch-word: “Hic Capitalism, hic Socialism,” proved to be unworkable, because

the people did not like to be torn apart arbitrarily. The dividing abyss would have become too large between the Right and the Left. Both Parties—the Party of consistency on the Right, and the Party of upheaval on the Left—would have had no common national ground upon which they could have exercised their Political powers in a reasonable traditional way. The idea of Class-War for which—as a Marxism present—in England, Propaganda was spread for three decades, made rather difficult the grand Social-Political evolution for which it would have ripened long ago under wise leadership. The voting totals prove that a large, a very large, portion of wage-earning Englishmen shrank back from the idea of a god-desired Class-War. It was the “Policy,” the Party doctrine which prepared for herself a greater defeat than the Capitalists could ever have brought about for her.

THE RISE OF THE LABOUR PARTY

The rising up of the Labour-Party was unavoidable and necessary, because old English Liberalism stopped where the foundations of the social-structure would have been struck by reform-zeal. During the Victorian era, there were fights about voting-rights, about Ireland, for Empire interests; but the Capitalistic System appeared to stand firm beyond any doubts—it paid too well to be in need of reform! A large proportion of the hatred that the then young Lloyd George drew upon himself, was explained through the little respect he paid to “vested interests.” But, on the whole, the old Liberal Party did not

realise the task placed upon her. All the same, decisive steps were made by her: the right of voting became enlarged, and opened to the Labour-Party the gates to Political independency.

The Labour-Party was born in a fight. As in other countries, the feeling of a Class-difference was almost forced upon her. We are all suffering to-day under the quixotic neglects of which the civil world became guilty, when, blinded by the unheard of success of industrial enterprise, a quickly increasing number of Proletarians, counted by the million, were left to their fate. They appeared to possess no power of their own. That seemed quite sufficient.

This crying social wrong was bound to raise the desire for self-help, and in the Trade Unions—who in themselves were nowise meant to be Political fighting-organisations—the Workers were offered the means to see themselves righted. The more the Mining Companies had to fight against suspicious organisers for their very existence, the more they were inclined to mix with Politics. It was the greatest, and surely the most decisive day in the history of the Labour Party, when the Trade Unions reached out hands officially to the new Party, and promised to finance it. On that day the bond between Capital and Labour was torn, which formerly often existed, and which our generation is trying to tie up again with great trouble, and after heavy losses. Socialism receipted the event with the mad parole: Class-War! A fight among those who are forced to work side by side! Thus even the cool Britishers accomplished something which they themselves would declare impossible in calmer considerations: a football

team starting a wild fight among themselves, in the midst of a competition game.

RECONSTRUCTION

To make again a good team out of a horde of fighters is to-day's Social problem. Translated into Politics, the task reads: Get rid of the unfortunate idea of Class-war! Try your best to overcome the sterile Political Party doctrine that you ever could get modern life tied up in the simple forms: "Capitalism or Socialism?" Overcome mere Social illusions, mere phrases; get on with Social examples, be it still ever so sober. Get on with the job, even at the risk that Party-Chiefs, and even Parties, may become useless, and that the Political march must be arranged in an altogether different tempo than during the last thirty years.

So much, however, is sure: since the rising of the Labour Party, it is no longer possible to hold any illusions as to the true problems of Politics. A noisy, accusing, even threatening crowd, announces its demands. The Labour Party has roused the Nation, and has organised the masses Politically, but by this it is not meant exactly that the Socialists will become entrusted with the re-organisation of the Social World, nor that it will be they who will make the largest spiritual and political contributions.

It does not matter in the least what name may be given to the leading Party of the future. Those men will be leaders who are able to interpret the fundamental tendencies of the times, and to act accordingly.

WITHDRAWAL FROM SOCIALISM

Whatever single Labour Leaders, and their official programmes, may have to say, and whatever the Reactionaries might think, Socialism and the Labour Party are two different things. British Socialism is much older than the Labour Party, and since the existence of this Party, the Socialists have tried everything to fix up the Labour Party for doctrinary Socialism. The Independent Labour Party accepted this role.

Through the catastrophe of the World War, and a revolutionary high-fleet in connection with it, the Socialists came quite near their goal. Their Propaganda spread like a steppe-fire. It looked threatening when it appeared as if Socialism would be able to conquer the Trade Unions and to win them for themselves. The "direct action", and the ideas of the staff of the workers, gave to the Social movement an imminently important, and, for a few years, not quite harmless Political character.

CRITICAL YEARS

Already before the end of the War, in February 1918, the Labour Party made for herself a Statute which raised "pure" Socialism for the Party's goal: a just distribution of wages "on the basis of common property of all means of production", was to be the aim of Labour-Politics, and the "Democratic administration and control of the diverse industries and

branches of administration" was to supply the means for all this. Conformably with it, we read in the first official Party Programme (of 1918) that the Labour Party demanded the immediate Nationalising of the Railways, the Mines, and all Electricity Works, as well as the "Nationalising of Life Insurance". If words have sense, this is the meaning of Socialism of the unmixed kind.

This programme, for ten years, filled the minds of the opponents of the Labour Party with distrust and disgust over such an upheaval. The Capitalists saw their incomes threatened, and the Socialists gave themselves airs with the threat that there could be, of course, no question of any compensation. Even the more moderate among their leaders acted as socialistically as possible; the crisis which England experienced, appeared to make this a necessity to them. Many did it with that "twinkle in the eye" which makes many things bearable to an Englishman, because he sees from it that matters are not exactly meant to be as they look and sound; but where property is concerned, most people lose their sense of humour.

THE DISENCHANTMENT

When MacDonald formed his first Labour Government (1924), Radicalism's high-tide had already passed. Since then there is the ebb tide. The General Strike had been, as said before, no Socialistic concern, although it was put down as such. But in the same measure as the sobering of the Labour Policy advanced, the circle of their friends increased.

This is the most important phenomenon of the whole Labour epoch. The real Socialism was an epidemic, which ran its time; it had no lasting grip upon the British masses. It approached the people from the outside, it did not germinate from within the Nation. In the heart of the working classes may reign, perhaps, a spirit of rebellion, but it is not a doctrine. The British workman may be sometimes a bit of a Radical, but he does not tend to a Communist-Socialism. He shows, therefore, in the eyes of every foreigner, an astonishing tolerance towards the non-Proletarians, whose influence grew more and more among the leading ranks of Labour—the Party increased its form, and became a National Institution.

The word “class-war” had never belonged to the official phraseology of the Labour Party. Already the Party Statute of 1918 placed manual and mental work on equal lines. But the Radicals among the Labour leaders, and especially the propagandists of the lower ranks, tried to tell the British workers that they were a class of people condemned to fight against another class. But “class-war” was only an official catchword of the Socialists, not of the Labour Party as such; unfortunately the Labour Party became measured by these Socialists.

OVERCOMING SOCIALISM

In 1928, before the General Elections, and with regard to them, a new Programme was given to the Labour Party. What in it remained of Socialism? Very much, evidently, because it was nothing less than the demand: the transfer of the Mines, of

Transport, and of Power-Production, as well as of Life-Insurance, to Public Property. The same is demanded for Ground Property.

This is still a heavy weighing concession to Socialism on paper, because everybody knows that the Labour Leaders have, meanwhile, come to the conclusion that no confiscation of these rights is possible without full compensation, and with that Nationalisation loses its value, because it becomes uneconomical.

As a matter of fact, the Party is already on the road to a limitation of their practical demands by the ordering of a public control for the most important industries. The Guild-Socialist, G. D. H. Cole, has already undertaken this step, and he is not the only one. In the next Party-Programme there will be, very probably, little left of Socialism. The programme of 1929 prepares for further retreat quite openly. The Party "does not speak as the representative of this or that class"; it speaks for all "who have to bear and share the human destiny to work." Then follows a sentence which makes the idea of the Party as clear as this is possible: these workers "know that it is not lazy possession, but creative work which keeps Society together, and that the world can be made a better place for future generations through science, co-work, and by serving for the general benefit of all people. . . . As the Labour Party confesses to this credo, it is a Socialistic Party."

THE NEW AIM

Service for all—this then is the meaning of the new, purified Socialism! The property question,

the ownership of means for production, and with it the Communistic foundation tendency, are of little concern, may even soon drop off altogether. As its aim, the Labour Programme of 1928 sets forward: Organisation of Industries, and the Administration by Industry of created works in the interests of all those who contribute by their work for the benefit of all—not in the special interest, and by the despotism of a rich minority. These sentences spell directly the burying of the old-style doctrinary Socialism. In that sense, every reasonable and modern man is a Socialist.

Of course, so one might say, the Labour Party may push forward again, within the frame of her programmatical sentences, fresh Radical, or even Communistic demands. To this one can only reply that each living Party can limit, or extend her demands. The leading point is the tendency in those realms out of which the party draws her strength. Therefore, it is quite sufficient to know that the up-to-date tendency among the millions of Labour electors nowise pushes their leaders to a recurrence of doctrinary Socialism. The Leaders themselves have become wiser in the school of Democracy than they were before, by being drawn to responsible Government duties. Mr. Lansbury only spoke at the Debate on the very tame Labour speech from the Throne (of 1929), of the "Spirit of Revolutionary Socialism" which is breathing out of the Government Programme! There is not one Englishman to be found who would not be quite pleased with such a type of "Revolution."

THE MANIFESTO OF THE RADICALS

In spite of all, the phrase still lives, and as long as it lives, so will the Socialistic Manifesto of the Radical Wing of the Party, as a whole, remain a potential danger. That phrase is the joining link between the Labour Liberalism of MacDonald, and the doctrinary Socialism of the Maxton and Cook group. The Moderates reach out a finger to the Radicals; they must be careful that their whole hand is not seized. In the summer of 1928 (in reply to the new Labour Programme), Maxton and Cook declared again for Class-War, and full-blooded Socialism; no peace with Capitalism, sharp Socialisation, and that without compensation; replacement of Capitalism by Socialism!

This announcement for a fight originates from the Leader of the Independent Labour Party, to which belong a large number of M.P.'s of the House of Commons. Many of these are sharp opponents of the Manifesto; others feel inwardly sympathetic. During the second Labour Government, this Manifesto, and the studied Radicalism of Maxton, is supposed to work as a magnet which will draw to their side all the dissatisfied, and the discouraged, among the supporters of MacDonald. This is, however, very unlikely to happen, but all the same, there is the germ of a new Socialistic Party, one which is different from the Labour Party.

Here is also a new source for a double-meaning, and for *that* reason, there is danger. The British are rather fond of indistinct positions, and so long

as this strife is not decided, not finished, the future of Labour remains in the dark. The Labour Party likes to remain in this darkness, this is her secret, her strength, but it sets her limits also. Of course, there would be little sense in speaking of "Evolution," if everything in life were clear and settled.

CONSERVATIVE ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

That a new era has begun, is felt even by the Conservatives. It is the fate of the Unionist Party that she has to swallow, at each new period in the Political and Social development of the Country, a large morsel of mental nourishment, and with it to put up with a number of people who reach this morsel out, yet who stood, up till now, Politically further to the left.

The characteristic part is that these newcomers are just as friendlily received by the Unionist Party as the Bourgeois remnants who seek entrance into the Labour Party; friendlily, although a little sceptically, by the old "Die-hards" of both Parties; however, friendlily enough, so that they may be drawn within, shortly, to important positions by the leaders of the Parties, if they should deserve it. This noble disposition towards Conservatives is characteristic of the British mind, and important for the evolution of Politics. It makes all the easier the approach of both wings to the middle-line of National Compromise.

CAPITAL AND LABOUR

One can reproach Mr. Baldwin upon the fact that the magnanimous liberal movement, with which he took over Office as successor of the first Labour Premier (the famous "Peace in Our Time"), has remained nothing but a gesture; but this has not diminished its value as a symptom. The attitude of the Premier was a proof that England has arrived again at that spot where she must swallow one of those "morsels." Sir Alfred Mond (now called Lord Melchett) was quite a solid morsel of such sort; his stepping over from the Liberals to the Conservatives was a symptom—the Leader of one of the last great Industries, which were still connected with the Liberal Party, went into that Political camp in which the British Great Industry has become a reigning factor! Great Capitalism, as concentrated in the Conservative Party, may become one day the bearer of a new "scientific" protectionism in England (connected with a new Empire Policy); but for the present the leading spirits of industrial life in England have placed before themselves a different task, namely, exactly the one which Mr. Baldwin had marked out in those remarkable speeches about peace between Labour and Capital, as the object of his revised Conservatism.

It is not only Socialism that is an old-fashioned notion; there is also the just as out-of-date idea that employer and worker are hostile powers, two powers which are supposed to fight for life or death, to get to their rights.

Mr. Baldwin did not get over more than programmatical speeches, which were followed by the heavy Socialistic catastrophe of the General Strike; but, anyhow, he supplied in them the rhetorical background for practical Politics, which led, under the guidance of Alfred Mond and Sir Hugo Hirst, to the so-called Turner-Mond conferences, to united heart-to-heart talks between the Leaders of the mines and the Leaders of a few great industrial concerns. Its purpose was the return to a basis of mutual confidence, and reasonable co-operation between Capital and Labour, for the general welfare.

These conferences could not bring about any solutions, but they had this result, that now the official Unions work for the same object, together with the official Trade Unions, and have their mutual consultations. The Mond Group is not going to give up its activities; it will pave the way, and (if danger should threaten) is to be ready to assist to keep up the newly tied relations. Mr. Turner sits in the second Labour Cabinet—this means that his endeavours for a social evolution have nowise hindered his position; while MacDonald, on the contrary, saw no cause to offer seats to the Radicals who stood in opposition to the Turner-Mond conferences.

IT WILL BE ALL RIGHT . . .

No matter how highly one may estimate the Liberalising Social tendency among the Conservatives, and even if one puts to the credit of the Party that they can rely upon a competent younger generation of modern type, the fact remains that this

Party, would not be called the Conservative Party if the law of gravity did not order their tempo!

Conservative Politics have to drag about the whole ballast of egoism, self-esteem, stupidity and snobbery, which accumulates in every country, and which delays progress for so long, until a few Leaders have the courage to jump over it. This would take for granted, for Great Britain, a forced Political situation, and this position does not exist. But it will be quite all right. The tendency of the Party, considered as a whole, limits itself to-day for the task of fighting Socialism and of leaving other things as they are: "to remain Master in one's own house." The Conservatives have long since left off being such masters, and they do not see any clearer: as for instance, the British Nation realises that there exists no longer a British "Ruling of the Waves". They are hoping for a miracle, for a sort of high-conjuncture, at which so much will be earned that even the most miserable works would be in a position to pay high wages.

In the meantime, they accuse the workers, and state that their greediness spoils industry, and that they demand protection or privileges, customs and subsidies. But the Conservatives are weak enough to grant hundreds of millions in out-of-work and poor-relief, in order to buy for themselves the people's "tranquility".

AUXILIARY HELP

Winston Churchill made an attempt in his Budget of 1928 to make, out of numerous small remedies and half-remedies, a Constructive Policy, which, under

the catchword "Improvement of Productive Industries", was to enforce the reduction of rates (the parochial taxes of the land-owners, and first of all those for industrial concerns), a thing that, of course, was nothing else in reality but a *transfer* of the financial burden. Instead of the manufacturers, the users of benzine were to pay the difference in the rates and taxes. This plan had the mental reservation that it would quiet the Protectionists for a while.

Then there exists quite a lot of small helps: from the protective-duty on trouser buttons to export credit insurances. Only one thing is missing: a broad-lined, and definitive conception for a reconstruction, or better, a new-building programme for British Industry. Under cover of the small auxiliary helps and occasional subsidies, the old carelessness is going on. The contrast between the well-conducted and the old-fashioned Industrial enterprises became greater than it ever had been—75 per cent of the British smelting furnaces are twenty-five years old. One part of the country goes to ruin; another flourishes. The Conservative notion is to leave it to the individual himself to choose this or that way.

HANDS OFF!

The Conservatives have, in other spheres, of course, a very high notion as to the obligations of the State and of the Government. No Institution in the world has ever experienced such a high flight as the State. Who would have dared to prophesy to the Conservatives that such vital tasks would be

required of the Government as to do nursery duties for manufacturers of incandescent burners? But when this self-same State requested one of the numerous Mining owners to close up the pit, or his ironworks, because it caused expenses to the Nation, instead of being of use, the angry answer came back: "Hands off the inherited freedom!"

The Conservative Party has not yet got over this discord, therefore she is excluded for the present from taking a leading hand. The Conservatives are ready to sacrifice the lives of their sons, *en masse*, if the imagined honour of England is at stake; but they do not like to request any of their partisans to part with a penny, when a sacrifice is demanded from the owner-rights of Capitalists conformably with *their* notion. Conservatives, therefore, grasp convulsively the catchwords "Socialism", "Anti-Socialism"; so long as these words still exist, and so long as the People are torn asunder by them, Conservatism is safe.

THE LIBERALS AS PIONEERS

So long as the Conservatives do not conquer their inclination to passivity, and so long as the Labour Party has not prevailed over the remnant of Socialistic speculation, England cannot possibly get over the dead point in her Social Politics. The hindrance is in the form of Parties, together with their Party-doctrines, and Party-interests; British life itself flows more freely and more quickly. In it a rock-principle has developed, which is guided by example, and

which again and again holds its own, no matter how often single individuals may sin against it—the principle that the Capitalist is nothing by himself—that he is only a member of an organisation, that he has only a right to an existence if he cherishes no egoistic interests, but that the goal of all his thinking and working is for the common welfare.

It is the same democratic principle which we meet in every chapter of this book. The individual man becomes the Nation's faithful agent. It is to this practical tendency that the Radical-Liberals adhere, though it is no more to be found in educational works, nor in Party Programmes, like other fundamental rules of British Democracy, when they made the attempt to give to England during the last few years an up-to-date Leadership, and above all, a well-considered Radical Programme, which keeps away from Conservative passivity just as far as from the illusions of doctrinary Socialism.

LIBERAL SOCIALISM

The Liberal pioneers and thinkers kept strictly in touch with the given facts of British life. By tracing those new tendencies of British example systematically to their very roots, they achieved a knowledge which could serve them as a foundation for a reform of the Capitalistic Order. Out of such knowledge a new Political Idea was born. This principle will gain a Party, in due course, by force of reason. Yes, it will happen, what happened with the old Liberalism, which did not place merely one Party victorious and guiding on the top, but which governed gradually

the mind of nearly the whole Nation, and of all Parties, and which made all England a liberal country.

This new Social-Liberalism of to-day will make good what old Liberalism had neglected in Capitalistic realms; therefore it is also fundamentally different from the old, and in consequence also hated by many of the old Liberals. One can term the new direction Liberal in a modern sense—one may just as well call it, *also* in the modern sense, *Socialistic*.

No wonder that the movement is enacted for the present only by the leading departments, and that little was heard of it in the Liberal General Election Propaganda of 1929.

The point of contact with the Labour Party is clearly visible. Freed from their illusions, modern Socialists say in their Programme of 1928, that British Socialism, "is aiming at a new social order, guided by a scientific thoroughness, in which National goods are administered and organised for the general welfare, thus to allow for every single individual a greatest possible measure of economical satisfaction, and personal freedom." This is exactly what the Radical-Liberals have said already, before the official reform of the Socialistic-Programme! Individual Economics are to be maintained where they can do good work, but *all* Economics must be subject to the Common Welfare and serve it first. Thus have the Radical-Liberals formulated it.

THE LIBERAL REPORT OF ECONOMICS

The work of that growth of Liberal politicians and experts who met together for a "Liberal Indus-

trial Inquiry", has been published, after one and a half years studies, in a huge volume of five hundred pages—as a report of this Commission—under the title: "Britain's Industrial Future". It is the most valuable book that can be bought in Great Britain; it has reached a very large edition, but it will be hindered in its object by Party Politics, although it omits all Party propaganda.

The Labour Party has studied it diligently, and, as one can notice from their Programme, has learnt much from it; but Labour looks upon its Liberal tendency as a disagreeable competition. This influences—greatly to the disadvantage of England—the effect of this great work. This book, produced by the Liberals, describes with accomplished mastery the position of British Industry. It investigates the Organisation of Business, and the relationship between Capital and Labour. It works out a plan for the National Industrial Development, and investigates National Economics. The last chapter sums up the practical consequences. At this Study-Commission, whose President was W. P. Layton (the well-known editor of the "Economist"), participated Prof. Keynes, Prof. Ramsay Muir, Lloyd George, Sir John Simon, Sir Herbert Samuel, Philip Kerr, and many others.

FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS

Private property will not be touched by the Liberals, of course, and the individual ambition to succeed in life will remain the spur of business-life. On the contrary, the signatories are convinced that the

individual, and the leading role of the single person, is of the greatest necessity in Democratic-Economics, but it is also made quite possible. The catchword "Nationalisation" is taken to pieces. Not, for all the world, new State industries, only because one wants to "Nationalise" something! Not, for all the world, Economical Red-tapeism! The despotism of the Capitalists can and must be curtailed in another way; above all, profiteering must be fought. Why should the business-man, in a narrower sense, be the only human type who cannot manage without absolute freedom of movement, and freedom of profit-making? Does not the statesman, the teacher, the soldier, the scientist, the civil-servant, do his whole duty, and often enough much more than that, without getting any possibility to earn unhindered, and freely?

A fixed salary, and the hope of promotion, or of a bonus, is, so the Report says, preferred by the people as a rule. Why should one allow oneself to become tyrannized by the greediness for money of a small portion of "Business-men"? This sounds almost like Bernard Shaw.

PROFIT LIMITATION

As a matter of fact it has been proved that things are quite all right without making huge profits; no less than two-thirds of the great enterprises of the country (before the War, England's total wealth was estimated at fourteen milliard pounds) are already managed differently than in agreement with the rules of individual domestic economy and freedom of profit.

Apart from public concerns of vital importance, like ports, docks, transport enterprises, post-offices, water, gas and electricity works, we find on this list such interesting enterprises as building societies (which have to make use of about one-tenth of the Nation's savings and whose fortune runs into about 190 million pounds), as well as the numerous Co-operative Societies (with 153 million pounds capital); the agricultural societies; the wholesale businesses; and many others among them, not the least, the Bank of England. It is common with all of these that they are allowed to distribute only a limited profit (if such is not altogether excluded); that they are managed by persons with a fixed salary (in some instances by volunteers), and that they flourish in spite of exclusion of profit freedom. They are "Public Concerns".

The Liberals do not advise transferring the co-operative principle of these economical organisations upon other realms without looking into them; but they believe that, gradually, many enterprises will accept those economical forms—in the near future, electrical works, and railway companies. It is only necessary to train a class of functionaries for this type of capitalistic work, who would be able to hold their own with the managers of the best private concerns. The rest would follow: limitation of profiteering freedom would lead automatically to atrophy of the shareholders—their only function would be to place their savings at some one's disposal, for which they would receive limited interest. Surplus profit would be used to lower the price of production, or for their improvement, but the unearned harvest in high dividends must be done away with. Thus one portion of dispensable high-capitalism would disappear.

INTERMEDIARY PHASES

Have the big Limited Companies not started already, since a long time, to crush the organisations of individual enterprisers? Are these big concerns not very distinct symptoms showing that the present form of Capitalism is but a passing stage? In an ever-growing measure, they show that the shareholder is but a lazy and stupid onlooker, who stands powerless and helpless in front of the managers of the enterprise. This will become a rule, gradually, with Public Companies (that is the name for these ten thousand big Limited Companies who have over fifty shareholders each). Of course these Public Companies form only the minority (there are 90,000 Private Companies—that means limited companies with less than fifty shareholders), but they carry enormous weight; they are the types of modern great capitalism. The twists in them have developed so much that they have become, as the Report says, a public scandal. The directors govern undisturbed and nearly uncontrolled, although the Board consists often of very doubtful persons. Badly managed and hopeless enterprises are thus kept artificially alive by incompetent people. The open bankruptcy, as a sound means of cleansing, has become old-fashioned. Old fossils, pampered good-for-nothings, and other noodles who are idling about in the directorial offices, are the real hindrances for a reconstruction and for a powerful Rationalizing—just as the Parliamentary noodles hinder the reform in the Houses of Parliament. So it happens that the “System” will not work where it is most urgently needed.

The Report criticises most sharply the happenings at the Stock Exchange; the misuse of information, the speculation and manipulation, originating from Members of the Board of Directors themselves.

PRACTICAL PROPOSITIONS

Here now are most urgent tasks—not for Socialists, but for Capitalists themselves. The Report makes very precise propositions how to attack the evil. Enforcement of a management, in the interests of public welfare, by unceasing publicity of all business dealings of the Limited Companies, including the publication of the private business of the Private Limited Companies; employment of responsible, powerful watch-Counsellors and effective control by the shareholders.

Where this is impossible, because the number of shareholders is already very large (leading to a “diffused ownership”), and this means where the largest and most important Limited Companies are concerned, a definite step is to be made to hasten on their gradual transformation into a public concern, i.e. to a management no longer arbitrarily egoistic, but economically and “publicly” conducted, as described above. For the interim condition, the Report has chosen the term “Public Corporation”. All Limited Companies with diffused ownership are to come under this rubric, as well as the group of about fifty large industrial concerns which hold a monopoly; and finally, all Trade Associations (cartels, rings, etc.). Constant publicity, and a special inspection, is to make certain that all these enterprises are conducted for the common welfare.

All smaller enterprises, and those of a private nature—above all, all partnerships and individual firms—are to be left untouched. Earlier, or later, they may grow into the sphere where control will be necessary. The development of purely private and individual enterprises into Public Concerns, takes place in numerous degrees, and between stages.

In the division between the responsibility for the management of a business and the capital ownership, which took place in recent years by the spreading of the great Limited Companies, and in the constant tendency to big amalgamations, cartels and commercial leagues, Liberal thinkers see directly a key for the solution of the Capitalistic problem. The desire for the acknowledgement of an authoritative control over industrial dictators, and directors, would rise up, not only in Socialists, but in the suppliers of capital as well. If one likes to term it thus: Socializing also for the protection of Capital! In this way, the abyss between Individualism and Socialism begins to fill up; the new Social Idea is to be made practical, without any necessity to upset the foundations of the Industrial System.

NEW DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL

The Liberals wish to protect Individualism where it still exists; nay, they promise even more: they will do their best to see that the large industries, and the great Capitalists, are counter-balanced by as large a number as possible of smaller Capitalists. This meets the Socialistic demand for a re-distribution of

National Income. The Liberals wish, in addition, to divide property anew: "The aim must not be to crush the owners of property, but to widen their class."

The power of Capital is in too few hands. Nine-tenths of British National Capital belongs to a minority of a little over four million people. In spite of the number of twenty million employed people, only 62 per cent of the National Income is used in wages and salaries, while 38 per cent flows to the capitalistic minority, in the shape of rents, interest, and promoters' shares. The doing-away with the large private fortunes, and the prevention of accumulating too much capital, will therefore be the object of this Liberal-Socialistic Policy; while at the same time the number and the property of the small-holders is to be raised. Inheritance (Death) duties, which take away as much as 40 per cent of large inheritances (while of large incomes nearly half is swallowed up by direct income-tax) is to be made higher still in future. High wages of workers and employees, connected with encouragement for saving, as well as an extensive scheme of participation in the profits, are considered to raise the welfare, and with it the possibility to purchase, of millions of the smaller consumers.

THE BUILDING-UP OF NEW CAPITAL

The tendency of British Economics meets this desire; the lower classes become, in an ever-growing measure, a new source of Capitalistic Power, whose form and utilizing demands new methods and new management. The Liberals make this a principal part of their Finance programme. They designed a

working plan for the organisation of the very small savings of the large masses, leading the collected amounts into the National power works. At the same time they nowise neglected the desire of the small Capitalists for the acquirement of shares, and for financial advice.

Liberals are, however, not so much concerned in the transformation and new distribution of existing National valuta, but in a just contribution of this rapidly developing and enormous new capital. Fully 500 million pounds of such new capital is added yearly, quite apart from the replacement of old capital by new. About three-quarters of this arises out of the accumulated reserves of the Industrial enterprises.

The workers, so the Report says, have a right to have a share in this newly-added Capital, and to be employed in the new concerns—the *workers*, not only the shareholders, as formerly. Profit-sharing is recommended, not only in the present (in England, fairly wide-spread) forms, but also in the shape of the holding of shares in new-formed Capitals.

THE MORAL PRINCIPLE

But why all this? "Industry is no private concern, it exists to feed all." In another place, the best proof for a sound Industrial System is when it can show an ever-increasing wages-index, while at the same time Capital gets a sufficient, but not extravagant rental. Even a minimum wage must be put upon the programme of a reformed Capitalism, not Nationally (as the Socialists want it) but for the

single Industries, conformably with their working ability. A promoter who is not able to work this out of his industry has no right to an existence. If one starts work in such a spirit, then it will not be difficult to regulate the relationship between Capital and Labour, because even the workers themselves will find out that the doctrine of the Socialistic Propagandists, of the "natural opposition" between workers and employers, has been a perversion of reason, which has poisoned the life of the Nation for generations.

It is clear that this Liberal Work is a piece of British history, written of the past, the present, and the future. An important portion of British life lies here open before us; not a Party-recipe. The Liberal Party has a dull outlook as a Party, but this spiritual contribution of their Leaders towards a solution of the Social problem is impressive. It is a tragic triumph for the Liberals that others are called upon to prove the value, and the propositions of the Liberal Industrial Report, by their practical work. One look into the Labour Programme is proof enough.

A NEW GENERATION

THE DECADENCE OF SOCIETY

FOR a new life, new people are wanted. The Democratizing of England has arrived at a point where the Political and Social life places demands upon mankind which are altogether different from what was necessary yesterday, and what was also quite sufficient, after all. But the "State" can no longer be upheld by a small and exclusive class of society.

If the British System is to be alive and effective in its newest form of development, and to *remain* so, then this Democratizing must send its roots into the Nation's heart; only then will be created a common social and spiritual basis, without which the mutual game of Party Government becomes unworkable. Politics and Political Institutions can unite these groups and classes of the Nation, now divided by traditions, interests, or temperament, into one whole, only when, through instinct, education and social evolution, a common fundament, or, at any rate, the tendency to a Social Unity, is given. People are more important than Institutions.

SOCIETY AS A MEDIUM FOR POLITICS

During the epoch which closed with the World-War, that is to say during the era of the old Liberalism and the duo-play between Tories and Liberals, the two principal Parties grew up out of practically the same classes of society. That the Whigs were not always much liked in the drawing-rooms of the Tories is of no importance.

Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, Great Britain's Government was directly a social function of these narrow-bordered classes of society. Society was the centre of Politics, and social intercourse was an indispensable medium of Politics: an imminently important link between Politicians. Apart from this, Politics have been for a long time simply a hobby for people of good and wealthy families. This has changed thoroughly through the victory of formal (Political) democracy, and that in such a way that Society has left off playing a serious part, pretending to be a necessary function for State-life. Society does not go in for Politics any longer, and only in very isolated cases are her drawing-rooms the *rendezvous* places for men and women from the old and the new leading classes.

This has very important consequences. The social contrast between the upper classes and the others had to become sharper, the more unimportant the existence of Society became for all. If not, the international diplomatists, at the expense of the tax-payers of their countries, were to make it their ambition to be the ornaments of Society drawing-

rooms; then the unimportance of society life would become still more striking.

Society is degraded, and will remain degraded, because the old style receptions in the drawing-rooms are useless for the reconstruction of things upon a mutual social basis. They will still have a sort of sham-bloom, mostly because the leading persons of the newly risen classes have often a queer tendency to over-value things which were out of their reach till now—just as the Proletarian admires, on the films, with beaming eyes, the state-rooms of international hotels, and rich country seats. The number of former Public-School boys is also increasing on the Ministerial seats of the Labour Government. All the same, Society, as a necessary medium for Political work, is dead.

THE SUICIDE OF SOCIETY

Who has killed it? On the Democratic State lie decisive Political power-centres, so far outside Society that a leading role would be in any case very difficult for her. The desire to rise, the will to a social elevation is, however, in England so intensive, and will be so increased by the snobbery which shows itself among nearly all the people, that the role Society *can* play would be even to-day very considerable, if it had not meanwhile denied its right to exist, while starting a lazy life of its own, instead of fulfilling a function. One has said that British Society has never been so exclusive that the possession of knowledge has not ranged equally with nobility and capital.

Certainly Society has always adorned itself with spiritual properties not belonging to her, and Society is also quite ready to do this to-day. But in the critical decade in which England has opened her Political sluices, and has realized Political Democracy, the provoking narrowness of Society life has reached its zenith.

The tendency of a so-to-say "un-social" Society, and the tendency of Social Politics, made a hopeless discord. Society thus became, consciously or unconsciously, Labour's open enemy. Her baser social style makes extremely difficult a social levelling, or an organic union of the leaders of Society-life with the now advanced middle and lower classes of the Nation. The Court, the natural sanctum of British Society life, acted very wisely when endeavouring to bridge over the chasm. Since then, several Society drawing-rooms have become open to rising men and women, but, as a whole, Society remained passive. No wonder, because Society is no longer aristocratic in the true and full sense of the word. Its character and style is dictated by plutocracy, and plutocracy is strongly disliked by the social world of "Labour" people.

Who are then, nowadays, these "Society people"? Country nobility and gentry are gradually dying out; the centre of gravity no longer lies with them. Of all the famous old Names, there are now hardly half a dozen left who can still claim national importance. New riches, with new titles, have no tradition, and are, therefore, socially unstable. Round this accumulation of old, newer, and newest titles, and round the swollen purses, pushes a swarm of insignificant people—a large crowd with "connec-

tions", that are sometimes of more than doubtful character. Even among the nine thousand guests who take part in the garden parties of the King, there are probably not a few who, fifty years ago, would have pleaded for admittance in vain. But the cups from which they drink are not of Royal porcelain; they are hired from Lyons & Co.

The borderline between good and bad Society has become untraceable in any case. One thing only is clear, i.e., that no social intercourse could be more boring and purposeless than the usual kind of London Receptions. They have done their duty so long as the newspapers can report: "Among those who *accepted* the invitation are Lord and Lady" Whether they were really *present*, is of no great importance. At the best, they might show their heads for five minutes at the door.

How on earth can a social gathering of that kind be a Social background, or even a help for Democratic Politics? Of course, there are still, even to-day, a few quite interesting "parties", and when gentlemen wish to talk over something among themselves, they sit down, first, to a good lunch or a good dinner. But this has nothing to do with the typical "Society Life," at which ninety per cent of all who partake in it groan, and which ends up, each season, with a series of "nervous break-downs".

A CHANGE IN VALUES

Unfortunately, the decadence of Society has not been noticed by most of those closely concerned with it; on the other hand, it has been consistently

ignored. What a grotesque contrast has sprung up between its significance, and its glittering, overbearing outward show! How powerless it has become, and how thorough the change which has developed since the Great War, and the great reforms!

Society, however, still behaves as if it represented England, and was still ruling it. Whoever tries to understand Albion from its Society life, will find himself hopelessly in the wrong. England has experienced such a thorough social upheaval, during the last few years, as was never before witnessed in all English history. This change took place so quietly that many English people have hardly noticed it, inasmuch as it took place in a period in which other countries experienced far greater dramatic upheavals. A Labour Government in aristocratic England! What an exchange in power; what a social revolution! What a demand from a race-proud, Anglo-Saxon aristocrat!

In 1929, a former servant-girl, and a lady of the highest aristocracy, were elected to the House of Commons for the Labour Party! The King accepted an ex-policeman as a Court Official. The Conservative Party Organisation elected a formerly unemployed workman as President.

Are these not proofs of a fundamental change in the valuing of social standards and descent? Can such a change, in a land like England, be called anything but revolutionary? Yet, deep as it cuts, it does not cut deep enough by far. The real transformation of social intercourse which will, earlier or later, be the natural consequence of a Democracy, has hardly started yet, unless one likes to accept Mr. Baldwin's pipe as a sign of a new era!

The social exchange from Right to Left, and from Left to Right, must become still far more extensive, if a social homogeneousness is to be reached—such as existed formerly, in comparison, at the exchange-play between Tories and Liberals. The Political Problem in England, and not only England, is unsolvable, so long as the so-called middle-classes—those classes which had become so decisive for the British Government during the recent decenniums, and whose importance for the future of England has nowise lessened—live to see in their own ranks such a regeneration by which they honestly come in closer touch with the million-masses of the people.

WHAT IS NECESSARY?

The Labour Party fights a brave fight. Her Liberalizing politicians sacrifice themselves, to lead the Party from class-war away to National Politics. On their right side, in the camps of citizenship, and of organisers, such a tendency *exists* already, as we have seen; but it is not yet strong enough, and not sufficiently ready for sacrifice. The Conservative “Die-hards” are not the worst. Society, and high capitalism, have produced a type of people that is far more offensive than the most colour-fast old Tory—that type of business-Politician, those eel-smooth political hodmen and underworkers of “big business”, who possess so very little of the advantages of old English culture, but all the disadvantages of smart modern society.

These are the people who compromise capitalism far more than most of the capitalistic organisers

themselves. Their time of bloom is seemingly passing away, but they still exist, and they, and their style of living and immense social following, remain a living provocation for their less well-to-do compatriots. Only when types of that sort leave off ordering the tune, will come about such changes in the social upper classes, as will enable them to fulfil their functions in the new State, *worthy* of a *British Democracy*.

English Democracy nowise denies altogether the wish for leadership and representation which Society raises; certainly not, because it refuses the right of existence of a *leading* upper-class. It denies it only because the outward forms, and the construction of present Society, originate out of a period which England wishes to outgrow, and which England has already outgrown in wider fields. Of importance is the fact that English Democracy does not deny, even in those realms, the aristocratic *principles* which characterise it.

NEW SOURCES OF POWER

Social re-organisation, and the transferring of Political gravity, have brought to the fore-ground a type of people which is altogether different from the legendary prototype of British fairness, beauty and bravery, which is sometimes called "Nordic".

There are, in every country, rare ideologists, particularly so in England, where, through the centuries, a social and cultural idea of a certain type of

"Albionism" had formed, with an ogling to Greece. The Public School was the hatching-oven of this type, but the anthropologists evidently forgot to add that this School for the body, and for the mind, has the strange characteristic of dismissing an eighteen or nineteen year old "Nordic", when one has sent there, five years earlier, a thirteen or fourteen year old "Alpine", or "Mediterranean" boy.

English climate, and English mode of living, soon change stature and deportment, as almost the whole attitude of a man. This is of greater importance than any race-theory. Nobody, of course, who has watched the million-masses of the lower classes in the streets of the big cities, in the public-houses, in the work-shops of industries, and around the big racing arenas, will be able to deny that these politically and socially rising bottom-ranks of the people are, in their temperament and character—and doubtless also in their outer characteristics—very different from those carefully trained and educated types of the higher classes. This is bound to lead to far-reaching consequences for the whole style of life and way of thinking of the Nation.

MIXED BLOOD

Also on the British Isle much variety of blood is to be found. The blood of Mongols, even of Negroes, is not missing in the British race. Although immeasurable eras are concerned, it appears, even to-day, that the mixture is still differently strong—so, at any rate, the anthropologists say.

As a matter of fact, the difference between Englishman *and* Englishman is very great indeed. The principal types of the British are, in some parts of the Isles, thoroughly different, outwardly and inwardly.

The theories of anthropologists may be of a certain value for the explanation of the difference between a Welshman and an Englishman from the South; between a Scottish Highlander and a Squire from Buckinghamshire. It is quite possible that the strict exclusiveness of the old class of Lords—in connection with the large spacial distances—have made the preponderance of single race-elements in a single social group easier than anywhere else.

But, no matter whether it was merely a question of blood, or of education that enabled the class of Lords of the real England, which headed the Nation through centuries, to develop a special type and adhere to it, one thing is certain: the tall, fair, blue-eyed and long-headed Briton, which on the Continent is looked upon to-day as the principal type, and whom many people acclaim for the "Nordics", is now in a hopeless minority.

The dark oval heads, and the still darker round skulls, form now the majority, no matter whether we call these "Mediterraneans", and those "Alpines", or whether we declare them a play of mere chance. Again, it remains a fact that the non-Nordic type is prevalent among the masses of the people, who have nothing to do with the former class of Lords. On the other hand, it is true that the higher social classes of the Present England are very far from looking always "Nordic", or "Nordic" even in their greater numbers.

After all, the son of an East-end family does not

become automatically a "Nordic" when raised to a baronetcy, or when he votes for the Tories. Just as little is it probable that a dark Welshman, who becomes rich, and who buys a country-seat in South England, will have—with his successors—from henceforth fair Nordic curls. Not even when the transplanting took place a hundred years ago. What happened is simply this: his grand-children, and great-grandchildren cling convulsively to the "Nordic" tradition of Eton and Cambridge.

SHAPE OF HEADS AND REVOLUTION

It is clear that anthropologists walk on very thin ice. But if it is true, as they say, that Lancashire, and with it all the North-Eastern counties, and the South of Scotland, are the principal settlements of round-headed "Alpines", and if Nordic and Alpines differ particularly, so that the one type is more martial and sporty, the other more given to study, and more intellectual, then anthropological theory is quite nicely in agreement with facts, because this settler-territory of the round-heads was, indeed, the principal source of Protestantism, Puritanism, Quakerism, and industrial movement. Of course, coal and iron lay already in the earth, before the Alpines emigrated! Did one not call the rebellious followers of Cromwell "Roundheads"?

The fact remains that historic revolts in England never originated in the world of the "Nordics", and one cannot prophesy anything better for the twentieth century, because all the heads on the Labour benches, be they long or short, round or square,

Alpine or Mediterranean, or what else, be they East Londonish, Lancashire, or Scottish—all are for movement and progress—they are, so to say, anti-Nordic, decided opponents of a pre-eminence and special culture of the old class of Lords.

If, to crown it all, the anthropologists were right, and that the townsfolk and the Proletarian masses had a Mediterranean tint, then these would carry with them rich potential treasures, like all people in whose blood lie reminiscences of a past Mediterranean culture, because the Mediterraneans have, so it is said, imagination, wit and artistic instincts, although their moral qualities stand, as we are assured, not exactly at the height of "Alpinism", or even of the legendary Nordics.

ENRICHMENT

But let us put aside fun and theory; the social upheaval has laid bare immeasurable potential forces. They are often still rather raw and vulgar, but they are fresh, and can be developed. The neglect of the lower classes through centuries, and the bodily and mentally crippling of a very large portion of the people, have unfortunately spoilt much.

But the sources out of which modern England has begun to draw, are powerful and very rich—far richer than they ever have been before. Only one element is missing: peasants, real natural peasants, as a sound foundation and National element, such as are to be found in Germany. These peasants, are difficult to influence, but they are delightfully unsophisticated.

The British peasant, as well as the British workman, is mostly already an art-product, created after the

model of those already further advanced. This makes him easier to deal with, but he knows already far too well what sort of a hat a gentleman wears, and how he wears it. In this way many tints get lost in the national fixtures, which we Germans would not like to miss.

All the more important is the freshening-up which England experiences in another way, namely by the diversity of the principal races who live together on the British Isles. The consciousness of their individuality, of their "being different", and of the particular value of being so, is very great with the members of the diverse races and nationalities (or how else one likes to term it) of which Great Britain is composed. "I am not English, I am Scotch!" This means a good deal, even more than when the Bavarian, or the Württembergian, refuses contact with the Prussian.

The same tendency is shown among the real "English". A man from Yorkshire, or Lancashire, feels himself a different being from the man from South England, or even a Cockney! He *is*, indeed, very different. "What Lancashire thinks to-day, England thinks to-morrow," or so one likes to say in Manchester. Well known also is the very strong Irish influence in matters of art. About a dozen of the prominent "English" writers are of Irish origin. Well-known also is the fact that Lloyd George hails from Wales—this explains the whole man!

Lastly, but by no means least, come the Scots. It is the fate of these clever and hardy people that they must emigrate. Their land, rough and neglected by the Barons, does not feed them. Many go over the seas; very many "emigrate" to England, to London! They take their silent revenge for the Political triumph

of England over Scotland; they conquer for themselves leading positions in the City, in the Bar, and in the Politics of the Metropolis—while the English, who go to Scotland, go salmon-fishing, or shoot interesting birds, or harts—that is all!

All these transfers and tendencies are not new, but they belong all the same to a comparatively new era in British history, and the stream from the North becomes stronger with every decennium. With it, comes its influence!

We are probably inclined to forget that the Political levelling between England and Scotland is of a comparatively newer date, and that a journey from the North to London is no longer a special event since several decades. Only since the political understanding, and the construction of modern traffic, was this passage made possible.

A hundred years ago, even sixty years ago, when England had comparatively few inhabitants, the English were fairly among themselves in the South; they were the masters of their own country. To-day they share already in the governing with other races. The more lazy British are pushed backward to modest positions by the lively elements. One must also not forget, in this connection, that the way to prominence was opened to the Jews only in recent years, and that thus, in a round-about way, powers flowed to England from Germany, which the Squires of old could never have produced. I am thinking of men like Cassel and Rothschild before the Great War, of Alfred Mond and Hugo Hirst of post-War days. Formerly they were great organisers of finance; to-day they are great organisers of industry—of the most modern and most important of industries, Chemistry and Electricity!

WHAT RESULTS?

Just as little as it is possible, in politics, to make the New into something separate; to fence in the new plot, and to hang out a notice: "For Socialists Only!", just as unlikely it is (or rather far less likely) that the New should form itself into something set apart culturally.

For the future, neither an "Insulary" culture is possible for England, a pure "English," nor a "Proletarian-Socialistic" one. The Labour Party does not even attempt to work up such an impossible culture. Therefore we are very little interested in the analysis. Here Nordics, there Alpines, over there Mediterraneans: nor is it really of sufficient interest to know that there are in existence Englishmen, Scots, Welsh and Irishmen, and that all these Nationalities have peculiarities of their own. The only thing really worth knowing is, what will be the *outcome* when all these racial-streams, nationalities, and diverse classes of the people, meet and mix.

Every friend of humanity would wish, for the Nordic, a bit of Mediterranean *spirit*—not Mediterranean blood, because he has got that already, and the new Englishman could do well with some of the virtues of his forefathers. It is, however, not at all easy to melt together old and new ingredients.

Whether England will live to see a triumph of his Mediterranean blood, is difficult to guess. One thing, however, is pretty sure—as in the jargon of the anthropologists it would read: Nordic visions are gone for ever and aye, and even Alpinism no

longer exists. It began in a revolution; ice-cooled Victorianism squashed it! Then came the War, and with it a veritable Asiatic tumult. Now one gets ready to stir up the ethnological pudding, once more, and very thoroughly! A soaring upwards of all brainy folk out of every country.

THE RISING GENERATION

A young Englishman is not brought up on Politics. Democratic example is no school for the youngsters; it is mostly a means of education for the older people. There are, of course, in Parliament, quite a number of young men, who serve as candidates and helpers in electoral circles. There takes place also extensive training in speaking and debating; but in Political life, and with it in Political schools, the older people are prevalent. For young Britishers—to whom sport, technics, or other hobbies are not sufficient—debating is added, but merely as fun—fun among other fun, game among other games. Anyhow, this debating is quite good sport, as it makes the young people familiar with the most important notions and institutions they will meet in later life.

In playing at Politics, young ladies are for a few degrees more serious than the boys. As far as the Labour Party is able to attract the young people, it does not seem to lay any value upon embittering them by Party Politics, and filling their young hearts with “unyouthful” gravity. That would be too

un-English, and besides, the Britons always find that too much seriousness in social matters is mostly a hindrance!

THE INFLUENCE ON THE YOUNG

I can talk here only about impressions in general, because the true tendency of education cannot be read out of instruction-books on this subject, nor would it be fair to generalise single experiences. They are very intimate happenings, which are enacted in very different ways, and which allow for different interpretation: I believe one can talk about Great Britain's young people only from the view-point of what one might term *milieu*-influence.

Leaving Party Politics entirely alone, the fact is that the *milieu* of a Public School widely differs from that of a County School, or of a factory-yard or working-men's Club.

At the same time, I am equally convinced that one can easily prove the tendency, that, different as all these *milieux* are, they are far less different now than they were a few decades ago. If this were not the case, then all the endeavours of the diverse Parties, and especially of the Labour Party, to gain a "National" character, would be lacking in a practical foundation, and it would also be entirely inexplicable why the Labour Party receives more and more actual support, in circles which are the very opposite to Proletarian!

The leading class of the Labour Party especially is known to possess many men and women in their midst, whom—as regards their parentage and social colour—one would have expected to find rather

among Conservatists, than among Socialists. It is hardly possible that all of them should have joined the Labour Party, because there were positions to be gained.

There are types like Sir Charles Trevelyan; Arthur Ponsonby; Mr. Dalton; Sir Oswald Mosley, and Sir William Jowitt. Their "milieu" was the Public School and the Colleges of their Universities. There seems to be no doubt that the Public School and University have brought to Radical Politics, and especially to the Labour Party, more and more partisans—indeed more than many a colour-fast Labour man, and men of his kind, like. But those who wish to strip off the class-character of the Labour Party altogether, will be well pleased with this up-to-date mixture.

EDUCATIONAL TENDENCIES

There can be no possible doubt that the very foundation of the British education-system has changed. It is the natural consequence of the social upheaval, of which we have spoken in former chapters. The Public Schools, as indeed any of the higher schools, are also visited by children of all those classes of people who "got on" during the last fifty years. Nearly everywhere, educational work tends to open the High Schools and Universities to all, through the system of free-places and scholarships. As to the Universities, one has to reckon with the invasion by the female sex.

It is worth noting that the tendency for the democratising of British centres of education, was favoured

also by the last Conservative Government. The great style (which appears from our German viewpoint exceedingly luxurious) of many of these English schools, must not deceive us, and deny the fact that important progress has been made. The Schools, as well as the Universities, try, although in *tempo moderato*, to do justice to the present times, and their practical demands. Progress is shown with regard to the question of parentage of the pupils, it shows itself in the spirit of the Schools, and especially in the syllabus. England is trying to form a universally applicable system of education, which connects the primary, the secondary, the technical schools, as well as the Universities, with each other, so that the children of the poorer classes have the chance, according to their abilities, to rise up into those higher circles. The direct care of the Governments is, at the present, to open suitable technical colleges for those children who visited the County Schools while they were young, as well as to extend the school period for another year.

The far-reaching freedom of the schools allows for numerous educational experiments, among which the Dalton Plan (the scholars, not divided in regular standards, *choose* their own work, under the supervision of the teachers) and the Rendcomb College (a private school, in which non-paying former County School pupils, and paying pupils from rich families, learn side by side) range as the most interesting.

It is characteristic of the tendency of the Universities to-day that men like G. D. H. Cole (the "Union Socialist" and philosopher) at Oxford, and Prof. Keynes in Cambridge, exercise a very strong influence. The younger men among the tutors and professors

are of a different type from the more or less reactionary elder teachers. The characteristics of the smaller Universities of the North are, more than all the others, tuned for the practical and the modern.

Another symptom is the rapid rise of the London School of Economics, which is politically and economically radical-progressive. She supplies not only the Labour Party with new recruits (and with Ministers!); she ranges also as an enlivening factor for the higher English education in general. She influences also, especially strongly, the recruits for the Civil Service, the standard bureaucracy.

Surely, one must not forget, in this connection, the work of the British League of Nations, which has won within a few years a membership of a million people, and has thus become one of the greatest organisations of the Country. She influences, of course, non-political thoughts principally; but who could deny that, just by doing this, the whole character of a man becomes re-modelled? If one wishes to be all-comprising, then a list ought to follow here of institutions that educate in a modern spirit, to be topped by the Society of Friends; the Y.M.C.A.; and the Toc H. Naturally also the organisation of the Boy Scouts, and lastly, but certainly not least, the Chapels, i.e. the whole Church.

THE TENDENCIES OF YOUTH

Here are given a few important preliminary conditions for the development of a stream that keeps within the spirit of the times. As only a very gradual development comes into question, it is of the utmost

importance to keep the movements going, when the youngsters grow up. In England itself reign different opinions as to the character of the younger generation. Some call the young people lazy, pleasure-loving, and impotent; others call them sport mad, and thoughtless; again others complain about lack of Faith and obedience, or they find them effeminated, unmanly, directly "feminine".

But there are again others who declare the rising generation to be healthy and active, delightfully independent of the judgment of things by their elders; mentally and bodily in fine condition—in brief, young and gay as usual. Here also one can see how many various games are played in England, as everywhere else—judgments which are all more or less on the *niveau* which is conditioned by our so-contradicting civilisation.

One must certainly not expect that the young people, in a time where civilisation tends to the strengthening of social feelings, and international friendly intercourse, should show any leaning to greater brutality, roughness, or a loose life. Some seem, indeed, to expect it. Besides, there exist in England a few elderly gouty gentlemen, who look upon the erection of the first college bathrooms, and the heating of the schoolrooms, as a proof for national downfall!

Of course, the *niveau*, as a whole, of the bodily and mental quality of the younger generation, has not become a higher one during the period of industrialising, and of the rapid increase of Proletarians, accompanied by a degeneration of numerous wealthy families. The cry for "birth-control" is the answer, and for the same reason, the lately begun popularising

of sports, with the aim of a harmonious development of body and mind, is of such imminent importance.

The many thousands of young people who nowadays run in fog and rain "cross country"; who play Rugby in the morass of meadows; who camp in the open, and who free their youthful complexes from their souls by boxing, are hardly of a worse type than their grandfathers. When one takes into consideration that these same young people put serious questions to the general managers of moral, ecclesiastic, and political authorities, this proves that there are spiritual desires embodied in them, which outweigh the shadows of a—since the War—rather too *sans gêne* life of the young boys and girls in their twenties, and the darker affairs from which the young people of no country are free, and that one can accept them without being too greatly alarmed about the state of their body and soul.

So far as there is a question as to changes in the sexual constitution of youth, one may take it pretty much for granted that a too lively imagination of the critics was frequently the father of such thoughts. One can probably take also for granted that these things are to-day not much different from what they always have been in every country, and at all times. Only people talk and write more nowadays about such things. Probably there exist a few more undiscovered females like "Colonel Barker", and just as surely there exist men-counterparts. He who likes to enjoy the pleasure of partaking in the "parties" of the "Bright Young People"—that delight of young "Intelligentsia" or "Bohemia" of Chelsea or Bloomsbury—will occasionally discover that the desire for realism and wantonness on the part of

this small, but characteristic part of London Society, sometimes takes on forms, which, to put it mildly, simply ask for misunderstandings!

But to take such appearances too seriously, or even to draw conclusions from such upon the moral standard of the whole Nation, would be foolish indeed.

A NEW GENERATION?

As there are, then, young people who try to go their own ways, who do not take just everything for granted; as there is a young generation that puts questions, and which demands something of life, of his or her life—would one not be justified therefore in calling these youths a “new generation”, and to believe in a rising of the sun?

Who then is this “new generation”? On each day, at every hour, people are born, and difference of age is certainly not always the most important thing in life. It is impossible to say: a new generation grows up in England—*they* will be able to manage things!

There have been already, fifty years ago, people who wished to tackle the problems of civilisation; exactly as will be the case in another fifty years to come. The “new” in England has not been discovered yesterday, or to-day. It is a tendency in the nation which exists since ever so long, but which only in our days has spread so much that it begins to reign, and to become a part of reality. The recently born people have simply a better chance to notice the tasks of their era, more quickly and clearly, because they are witnesses of the ever livelier battle in which their elders, and the old

people, are engaged. There are among the younger people astonishingly many who quickly get used to seeing this struggle going on. The experiences of their own life are rarely lively enough to produce a sufficiently strong initiative for an early ripened, spiritual Radicalism. Of millions of young Englishmen it can well be said, that for them the attribute "common sense" encloses to-day a stronger social feeling than formerly—but they are most decidedly not inclined for revolution. With many, rather too many of them, signs of an early effort-lacking resignation are noted. Perhaps this cannot be wondered at, in a time where it is considered as particularly intelligent to be negative, and pessimistic.

THE RESIGNATION OF THE MIDDLE-CLASSES

Typical of the effortless renunciation of any rebellion are the young people from the endless ranks of the middle-classes—especially of the lower middle-classes, to whom millions of slowly risen people belong. Their life is more cultured than that of the young workmen, but it is often much poorer, and far more unnerving. I am thinking of the hundreds of thousands of well educated young people (often they went through a Public School), who drive daily to the City or the West-end businesses, who work there all day long in a gloomy room, or in a shop, for miserable pay. They spend a large part of their time and money over the drive between their suburban home and the office. Their nourishment is very meagre, and on week-days hardly any free hours are left to them in the evening. The

frequent over-time for which they are compelled to work, is often not paid at all, or only very badly, even by quite rich firms. Taking advantage of these boys is often incomprehensible—a heavy pressure lies upon these young bodies and minds! But most of them are not complaining; they do not seem to mind that the people who stand higher up on the ladder of life, are leading an altogether different existence. Hundreds of thousands experience the same—they tread upon a wheel, and when the Elections come, then they vote for the upkeep of the old proved order.

A LIVELY BEGINNING

A stronger impulse is felt, going out from the Universities. Sometimes these young undergraduates behave as if they were bred-and-born revolutionists. In many cases, it is merely a bit of fun; often only vanity, or silliness—but sometimes they can be in bitter earnest, and show up honest goodwill. But, alas! these young people, with all their rhetoric and pathos, with all their ideals, and their bright eyes, do not remain young for long. The world-stirring radical resolutions, which were passed in the debates of the Oxford Union, are readily forgotten by those who took part in them. The young gentlemen of the new generation grow older, and take on the yoke which all of us bear—the yoke of convention, and of life-experience. Many of them get quickly enough under the influence of the big money-making machine, called the City, while not a few of these youthful renovators fall a victim to Society, from the very first day they approach it.

Nevertheless, it is something worth noting, that there are nowadays also at Oxford or Cambridge, wild Socialists and rude Pacifists—they are the symptoms of the far greater movement which is gradually taking place among the whole Nation. What does it matter when so many young people shed off their first radical skin within a few years? Many of them may fall back again into the well worn-out ruts of their grandsires; but most of them enter a course, which is not exactly new and revolutionary, but decidedly more modern than that of their fathers. Thus enters, from year to year, a new portion of a new spirit into the lines of the elders. This continual influx, this constant influence over the elder people, is the great accomplishment of the young folk—they are seldom able to go beyond this. That is a fundamental law of all democratic evolution. Sidney Webb has coined the phrase, "The Inevitability of Gradualness". It can be used also in the above sense.

ON THE MOVE

In every branch of British public-life, the same picture is to be seen: wearily the Nation tries to get used to the new democratic forms, and the new development-laws which England sees placed before her. The tendency leans to spiritual and social reconstruction; but the powers of habit throw the Nation constantly back again, until they have to give way to the new and stronger impulses. Thus

all the contradictions are explained, and the strange mixture of old and new things. The atmosphere teems of political motion, and, as far as concerns England, strong expressions are in their place, and quite within the boundaries of spiritual revolts, and social power of will. How much easier, all the same, is the *intention*, rather than the *power* to do things! Thus the Nation wavers between doubts and hopes; is driven from plan to plan; nothing really satisfies, because there exists no solution of the social problem, only development. The flame must burn, and as long as it burns, there is hope.

The present stadium of British spirit is still mostly analytic. The synthetic-constructive is only in the beginning. Man has become more criticising; he talks without much ado, and tears off the covers. British Radicalism is above all other things opposing.

ONLY AN AIM, NO ACTUAL PROGRAMME

Its world-leaders appear weak. This is for the moment of no great concern for anyone—except for Party-strategists. For England's affairs in general, it is surely of far greater importance that the people try to overcome the era of Victorian self-satisfaction and a "God-given" Convention—in fact, they have overcome it already in part—and that they no longer wish to tolerate any cant, masks, or self-gratification. More truth, more reality—that is the meaning of the "Revolt." Nearer to real life; no fear of the conventional. What matters the perversion of Society life, what the little Party disputes, or the small

abuses of Parliament, in comparison with the historic fact that England has begun to *think*, and to talk over her fundamental problems? This longing is quite genuine. There are no realms where it cannot be felt in one way or the other. It can also be noticed in that place which serves for ever as a mirror of a Nation's mental powers, which respectable Englishmen, together with their Police Force, are so very anxious to keep pure: the Literature of the Nation.

IN THE MIRROR OF LITERATURE

THE NEW REALISM

IN what measure is the spiritual and social movement, which characterises the present England, though without having yet taken full possession of it, expressed in the literary work of the Nation?

We have seen in other chapters that what is of greatest concern is not to be found in concrete propositions or formulas, which, up till now, were laid down upon the table of the house; but in the general tendency to face, with a stronger will, life's real problems and Politics, and to examine them.

It is not different in literature. We notice an ever-growing compulsion to get nearer to life, and a liking for experimenting; but we do not see any completion yet. Here also the tendency is better worth noticing than the concrete single work.

Among the many thousands of books which are published every year, very few can claim that they represent in themselves a great accomplishment. It would also hardly be possible to find among the younger British authors, those who are called the "Modern", one whose influence upon the spiritual development of the Nation has been greater than the influence which the elder English writers exercise, whose names have already been world-known twenty or thirty years ago.

But if we view the general line, we find that the last thirty years brought an imposing improvement; an immense broadening of the perspective; a powerful increase in the intensity of experienced and represented events; and an undeniable social deepening. Of course, one has to ignore quite a lot of mere trash. Even the pure entertainment-literature, the mere belletristic, whose artistic and spiritual ambition is small, and the newspaper-novels, show distinct traces of the new way of thinking. What spiritual and mental distances British writers have passed through since then!

DISROBING OF THE VICTORIANS

The Victorian virgin came from the best families, and was dressed in a dozen full-sized articles of clothing, in which she knew how to move according to instructions—a "D. H. Lawrence" puts the people of to-day perfectly nude upon fauteuils, and then he places them in a common bedstead.

Of course, modern freedom of representation sometimes causes offence with the moral-law authorities, and it frightens many people, who scent a spiritual relationship with Bolshevistic sex-morals in it, or, at any rate, what one understands such to be. The moderns are often lacking in self-criticism and good taste; sometimes they appear to boast about their sensual inclinations, like young students of the top-classes. But the carelessness of expression is, of course, nothing but the expression of a desire to get as near to life as possible. When English people become *sans-gêne*, their behaviour becomes unbearable.

There is no more drastic example than the perverse lack of taste of those people who are called the "Smart Set," or "Bright Young People," in their open erotics, their vulgar unconstraint, their lack of tact and æsthetic feelings. Often they come from good families and have had a good education. They diletteer in some kind of art or other, and are to be found in the trail of this or that artist, or artisan. In brief, they want to appear to be something "out of the common". They want to "live", but it seems very often to be very difficult to "live"! One part of modern British literature is not quite free from this made-up and uncontrolled mood.

But the moderns are right in one point: if one wants to see life as it is, then nothing is left but to disrobe the female and "manly" virgins of former times, who were plastered up with robes and hypocrisy. This is being done, thoroughly, in every respect.

THE RELATIVITY OF THE MODERNS

Measured by the upheaval through which England has passed, then literary realism, and the revolt among modern authors, is often even tame and unoriginal. Amusing writers, people who describe unlikely adventurous events, and spiritual and moral odd persons, have always existed in England. After all, Thackeray was just as English as Oscar Wilde. Are the British writers, whom many people reckon among the new generation—measured by the conditions of *their* times—really so much more original, spirited, amusing and daring than the modern authors of earlier periods? Sometimes they are coarse in

the description of delicate situations; sometimes they overdo their intellectual peculiarities—only too frequently they are lacking in artistic power to raise the banal things of everyday life into such spheres where ordinary things become art. Thus revoking and provoking products result.

If one considers how much more difficult it was in England, during the last fifty years, to be original and daring than nowadays; if one considers that the one had for a social background the Victorian mourning-curtain, the others the newspaper accounts of the Divorce Court proceedings, for their literary production and criticisms, then the accomplishments of the up-to-date writers appear, perhaps, after all, not so revolutionary as some people may think.

LITERATURE AND LIFE

The modern among the English simply place the dot upon the "i". The change, which is expressed in their works, is not at all the exclusive merit of the Modern. It is only the last step of a decennium-long endeavouring. Whether we look upon the drama, poetry, the novel, or upon general belletristic, everywhere appear distinct signs of the spiritual emancipation which has gradually re-modelled the character of the whole Nation, and will still further re-model it, and which, after all, is only a side-issue of the social re-modelling of the whole people.

The literates did not hurry wildly in front of their times. The people themselves have become different; they live and think differently. The rhythm of their lives is governed by other lines, or

co-governed, different from those who supplied the material for dramas and novels towards the end of the 19th century. Apparitions like Lawrence and Joyce bluff by their realism, only if placed into a respectable middle-class family, in the drawing-room of a Vicar, or, finally, into the Salon of a Court-correct lady. But the hands of the "Bright Young People", and of all people who have decided already years ago to "live", and to be "different", do not tremble when they handle such books. They know ever so much better than the most daring literates what man is able to make of his life and his inclinations. In spite of much prudishness, and in spite of very justified endeavours to guard the decorum, modern England has become a very *sans-gêne* country. Hundreds of men and women are still writing for the people of yesterday; but a growing number is anxious to keep step with modern life, its special problems, and its particular morals. Is it astonishing, when the transfer from the prudish to frivolity, from Puritanism to Jazz-style, has thoroughly changed the ground-accord of literature, that the realists write to-day about the mysteries of body, soul and spirit, quite as openly as about life in the slums?

LITERARY INBREEDING

With the Moderns, the personality of the author is often far more important than the personal and spiritual world around which he builds. One gets to know from them more about the psychical complexes, and about the philosophy of the not always

competent and sympathetic authors, than about the real problems of the people. In spite of the highest acme of "Realism", many of the most modern products are neither true to life, nor of any importance for life. Their admirers belong, therefore, to a relatively narrow circle of intellectuals, and, of course, also of those intellectual snobs called "Highbrows", who admire a thing the more, the less it has a chance of being popular. Modern literary criticism directly furthers the spiritual breeding in-and-in, which forms in such a way.

But the average Englishman knows by the example of the great authors of former eras—and most certainly through his Shakespeare—that "popular" and "inferior" are two totally different notions. The tendency to make literature over-intellectual, which can be noticed here and there since the War, threatens to favour an isolation just at a moment when the democratising of the people makes necessary a deepening and spreading of education in ever broader circles, and this, by the way, at a time when other Nations have already gone through this literary development stage. For the present not much is lost by this isolation, because these super-moderns have not yet achieved much in their constructive work.

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

FOUR EPOCHS

In the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge hang a few famous caricatures by Max Beerbohm, the half-brother of the great actor Beerbohm Tree. Max, the cartoonist, was in his younger days a highly esteemed critic of his era. On four cartoons, he says (about the four most recent periods of British development) the best that can be said about it: Victorian era: "*It is so.*"—The 'nineties: "*It is not so.*"—Edwardian era: "*Is it so?*"—Georgian: "Let us investigate!"

These catch-words are plain enough. One learns from them that the stirring up began during the last years of the Victorian era. The knowledge came: life is different from what we like to pretend it is. At that time, Oscar Wilde wrote, and Aubrey Beardsley sketched. The "modernists" of that time unmasked the hypocrisy of the Victorians. One had found out that the great portraitists of the Victorian era had got hold of an unreal world. Refuge was taken in Art, and Wilde declared that "all Art is purposeless". What was gained in nearness to life, was lost again in artistry.

THE PIONEERS

In these same 'nineties began, however, the work of a new generation: Shaw, Conrad, Wells, Bennett,

published their first works at this period. Samuel Butler wrote *The Way of All Flesh*. This tale, which was published after Butler's death, became path-breaking, because it differed in the keenest way from the inherited formula, and it happened in these decisive transition years for the spirit of English literature, that a powerful stream of new ideas broke in from foreign parts—Frenchmen, Russians, Scandinavians (above them all, Ibsen); and in a lesser degree, Germans also.

Under these influences a profound change in form and contents appeared in the literature of the Edwardian Age. Romance looked forward to a new time of bloom—an immense field lay open. The writers began to study life as it is. Science offered help as never before. Siegmund Freud conquered for himself a wide realm, also, in England. Still more important than the representation and criticism of the "reality" of opinions on life, began the investigations and laying bare of the soul and the spirit. In the midst of it, thundered the War. Now began a high time for criticism, of contemplation of life, of philosophical speculation, of biography, of social "intensity". Out of the *instinct* for the new, became now a firm *desire* for the new.

Only if we keep in our mind this constant line of development, only then will the single figures of to-day appear to us in their correct proportion. Good twenty years have passed since the typical Society plays of Pinero, Wilde and Jones; this form-stiff, unreal, and un-representing class-stuff was driven aside by the satire of Bernard Shaw. Shaw, the Socialist, began to throw lights upon the deeper masses of the people, and their problems. The

Irish of to-day, where good playwrights have become very scarce, are great in this: thus Sean O'Casey.

The same thing happened to the novel. Since those years of the 'nineties, it has made long strides towards real life—not only since the World-War, and since the "Modernism". The "plot" became of less importance. The romance-heroes became mediums now for the ideas, and for the description of the typical in spiritual and social development. Others, like George Moore, Wells, Galsworthy and Bennett—even if one were to take them simply as literates and historians—accomplished great things, because they entered, through the open doors, deep into unexplored and immeasurable new literary territories. A long time has passed since then!

Thomas Hardy published his *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*; at that time, it was critised as too realistic and positively indecent! This already in 1891. Kipling's *Kim*, still one of the most beautiful books about India, appeared in 1901. Bennett's famous *Old Wives' Tale* is to-day also over twenty years old. These are a few of the milestones of the British art of narrative. Several of the elders, like Galsworthy and Bennett, were placed a little into the shadow by the commercialising of literature. But all these elders can claim the lasting merit of having furthered the approach to real life, and with it, through decenniums already, the up-to-date literature, and this within their limited space, and with their nowise boundless means.

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE

H. G. Wells opened to romance the wide realms of thought of the new "Science", which, up till then, had been reserved to the pioneers of science only. Similarly as Wells had entered—as historian, æsthete, and social reformer—already many years ago new realms in romance, which the novelist had never entered before, so D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, Aldous Huxley, Virginia Woolf, and others, made modern psychology a new means of help for literary art, under the influence of Freud, and this to such an extent that several novelists became nearly psychical-analytical propagandists.

The reserved, artistic realism which the English owe to Joseph Conrad, the nearness to earth of a Thomas Hardy, who opened to romance a geo-political idea, because he discovered in the landscape a natural background for romance; and the rich life of the soul—sometimes modified by a little humorous scepticism—which had characterised British belle-tristic up till then, glided in recent days into the background, under the influence of a more scientific treatment of the subject. Old sentimentality had been overcome, but a new one put in an appearance—even by James Joyce.

As a counter-action against scientific Modernism, one can notice in our days a growing inclination for a religious *milieu*, but, of course, this transcendental tendency has not yet led to a new type of literary art.

THE NEW BELLES-LETTRES

The desire for the truths of life, and for a new humanity, has brought to bloom during the last two decades—especially since the Great War—a particular branch of literature, whose significance has become imminently important for the English spiritual life. It lay in the tendency of the after-War-time, that historic-biographical, and time-criticising works, would experience a gigantic success.

British talent for this kind of literature made of it a real high-conjunction for "*belles-lettres*". The English idea of *belles-lettres* includes nearly everything apart from drama, novels and poetry.

The number of famous, and always-worth-reading writers is very great nowadays. Many of them belong to the front rows of British authors. The *belles-lettrists* have to-day a public which is very little behind that of the regular readers of the novelists! Lytton Strachey led the way with his *Eminent Victorians*, and *Queen Victoria*, for *Elizabeth of Essex* hardly comes up to the same standard. Philip Guedalla wrote his *Palmerston*, Nicholson discovered Byron. Churchill wrote brilliant War-books. T. E. Lawrence (not D. H. Lawrence) wrote *Revolt in the Desert*.

Siegfried Sassoon, whose War-poems are highly valued, wrote *The Memoirs of a Fox-hunting Man*. Dean Inge writes; Chesterton, Middleton Murry, St. John Ervine, Robert Lynd, Rebecca West, Augustine Birrell, and dozens of other much-read essayists, journalists, critics, historians, travellers, or what else they may be—they all write, and write.

Their works are of the best up-to-date literature. The spreading of this literary branch, little worked in foreign parts, is of the utmost value for British education; it is one of the most important symptoms of a spiritual rise, which distinguishes the Nation to-day in spite of Cinema, Jazz, and sporting anti-educational influences.

Never had educational and criticising journalism (in such a wide sense) a higher task, or a broader field than in our days, where millions of people, who have been led only recently to the spiritual manger, stand and wait to find *food* in newspapers, periodicals and books. The time has passed when big editions could be reached by silly books of fiction. The tendency of English literature, which is expressed in this desire for real life and actuality, is a proof that England stands in the midst of a critical self-inspection—and such an era leads to a lively stir-up, with things to happen.

UP-TO-DATE TENDENCIES

THE AIM OF THE MODERNISTS

The main stream of the present English literature is full of purpose. The greatest among the elders, headed by Wells and Shaw, are pronounced socialistic-political. Even Mr. Galsworthy is said to have voted for the Labour Party in the elections of 1929. The younger writers are, nearly without

exception, spiritual-politically progressive, with a strong touch of Socialism. The greatest among the moderns are directly world improvers. They wish to create new people, truer, livelier, more human globe-trotters. Of course, if they talk in tongues not understood by the people, they will not make things much better, but their goal is noble and good. The flower-gardens, and the splendid parks upon the hilly ridges of good old England, look magnificent, but underneath the chimneys smoke in the grey veil of the factory-town.

"How do you like Barrie?" let Aldous Huxley ask the young lady who lives at the hill-top, a young friend of hers. This is the answer: "Come down with me to Stanton, and ask me there. Down below we are sitting upon hard reality—with no air-cushions between us and facts! One needs five pounds a week first guaranteed before one can enjoy Barrie. If one sits upon hard realities, he comes near an offence."

Sir James Barrie is the poet of romantic wonderland—there is no longer much joy in fairy-tales upon our earth, but is it possible, healthy and desirable, to bathe day by day in the mud of reality? How much more is such a question justified, when one finds that, with many artists, "realism" is limited to the study of the body, and the necessity of its unrestrained sexual functions—meant, of course, as a prelude to new beauty and new spirituality!

THE VICTORY OF THE SOCIETY NOVEL

Even ordinary belletristic has outgrown Society-snobbism for the greater part. That is up-to-date

and honourable; but why did it take so long? Michael Arlen gave long ago quite an interesting answer: "It is ever so much easier to get to know Society-life, and to write about Mayfair drawing-rooms and country-seats, than to understand and to describe the life which the millions of the people live in their suburban cottages, in slums and in the houses of the middle-classes."

For Mr. Arlen, as a foreigner, it is particularly difficult, but how many Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans, do really know the life of countries to which they do not belong themselves? Society life (or rather the life of demi-Society) is dragged day by day through the columns of all newspapers, and this type of people is practically the only one which does not shut itself up in their houses, as is the habit of the multitudes. But, also, most people live with a look upwards—they like to have a look in their leisure-hours into elegant drawing-rooms and modern hotels, to the strand of the Lido—not upon the rough realities in which they live.

Not so long ago, social studies were not particularly liked by publishers and booksellers. Now they are much *en vogue*—even as magazine stories. A great proportion of the latest novels has become decidedly anti-"Society".

MODERN NOVEL-WRITING TECHNIQUE

The desire for a greater realism arose out of a feeling of protest—a protest against form and content! Everything was to become different—different from the famous great older writers, Wells, Galsworthy,

and other well-known names. The younger writers looked upon the elders as lazy onlookers of the world, who described it in easy comfort. They were supposed to be just illustrators, historians, journalists of their times, but not creative formers of reality. Such is the judgment of the Moderns.

Society, as the elders sketched it, is an abstract conception, so the young say—abstract, because they are obliged to be typical, in order to give to the story, which they relate, the resemblance of a picture. But the young writers wish to tackle life itself; they wish to pour the streams of life into words; they wish to write in the timeless rhythm of the world. They try to penetrate into life, by drilling one shaft after the other into the depths of the earth; by making one intersection after the other through the mass of material; by placing one scene near the other; one detail—looked at through a microscope—near the next. They take hundreds of photographic snaps at the same moment in most diverse directions. A modern novel, as James Joyce wrote it in “*Ulysses*,” or as Virginia Woolf and Aldous Huxley have written in several volumes, is like a string of pearls—a loosely joining together of numerous impressions, moods, scenes, reflections and combinations. Genuine pearls, and imitations, are carelessly mixed. In “*Point Counter Point*”, Huxley speaks somewhere of the “setting to music” of the art of novel-writing. Like the variations to a theme, like musical modulations, so shall scenes and thoughts glide into each other. In “*Mrs. Dalloway*”—her strongest book—Virginia Woolf livens-up half London before us—indeed, it is only half London. Also these artists, who are so eager to seize the whole life in its innermost character,

can give nothing but cuttings. Their technique is modern as compared with that from yesterday, but they are, after all, not quite so new as they look.

Thackeray knew that a hero of romance can be a bother, and that the small everyday events and thoughts of a large number of all sorts and conditions of humanity, if sketched by an artist's hand, are more likely to give a truer, and far more complete picture of society than the most careful descriptions of the deeds and the thoughts of a hero, or of a hero's family.

But if the Moderns—D. H. Lawrence is, by the way, in this particular sense not “modern”, because he allows his realistic imagination free play in the usual form of a novel—believe that they have freed themselves of the historicism and journalism of the “period novel”, and that they have penetrated to the eternal fundamental elements of existence—one certainly does not find it confirmed in their works. As for myself, I consider them to be more typical “journalists” than their predecessors! Even James Joyce, the greatest, most powerful, and most self-willed among the moderns, can only raise himself through his powerful imagination above his literary contemporaries, but not through any power of thought.

OBJECTIVISM

In spite of all modernism, English literature remains as it always has been, one-sided, concrete, and earthly. The new direction brought her an immensely valuable increase of strength, and also, already, mere technically new moods and expression-

possibilities, which will prove a lasting gain, not only for the literary élite, but for the whole of English literature. But it does not get hold of the supernatural. That is no task for the brain only, and certainly no task for the British.

The intellectualism of the moderns can help very little in this direction. Of course, it will also do no harm, because it will again and again find its limitation in the fact that English intellect does not favour the birth of a literature "as such", and certainly far less a literary-artistry like the development of a transcendental art, or even an ideology.

In England, there does not even exist a philosophy in itself. British philosophers do their work as an employed science. They philosophise firstly about the betterment of everyday life, not about the improvement of the scientific theory. For the same reason, there exist very few Englishmen who can, so to say, practise "literary" music. They always wish to express something concrete. The literary style is therefore mostly valued conformably to its ability to serve concrete purposes in an artistic style.

Even English poetry is in this sense concrete, in spite of the richness in moods which it transmits. It remains even concrete and objective in the works of the three Sitwells, of whom especially Edith Sitwell has the merit of having troubled herself to serve as leader of the so-called "Wheel" group, for the futuristic spiritualisation of British poetry.

But an educated Englishman still loves to-day his Masfield and his Yeats, and finds that they give better poetry than the intellectual poets, who must let their works be read by megaphone, so that they may *sound*.

Megaphones, orchids, and faded faces—is it possible that the future belongs to such a tendency? Of course, there is T. S. Eliot, as a poet the darling of the Modernists—but he happens to be an American.

THE END OF THE NOVEL?

All in all, the novel enjoys, as one sees, in England quite a strong life; yet the question has arisen: is it nearing its end? It happened like this. The desire for new forms has been so great since the War, that the question was raised in all seriousness (and it is well known, not in England only) whether the desire for directness and free expression would not put an end to the novel as a work of art. Whether the future would not belong to those works that approach the goal in a shorter way; without any mediums, and without “fiction”, that is to say, without romantic imagination. Does it not fit better into our new matter-of-fact ways, if everyone who has something to say, speaks out clearly and distinctly, without much ado?

There has been a time in England, when anybody who wished to make known an idea, chose, for doing so, the roundabout way of a novel. Even Disraeli wrote novels for that purpose. So did everybody: social reformers, historians, politicians, philosophers. This time is over. Romance became freed from ballast, but it did not lose its right to an existence. Nor is understanding amiss: also in the era of realism and rationalization, the soul will thirst, and the imagination hunger for food! The one concern is, only, whether an author will be able to give to the

people of to-day something worth reading, by power of his artistic imagination; or, whether it would not be more in agreement with his art, and his abilities, if he were to make his critical understanding the channel for his artistic impetus. Truths of life are demanded of both, and results have shown very clearly, especially in England, that no sharp lines can be drawn between fiction, and unfictional work; even between poetry and prose it is often impossible to find the border-line.

The question would never have been put if there did not exist such a terribly large number of bad novels, with boring romance-figures, and if there were not, at the same time, such very good volumes of essays, brilliant biographies, and an excellent criticism of the times to be found, which are not in need of the aid of "fiction". One likes, of course, always to get out of the way of boring people; it is the same in books. But good books never bore, even if no heroes and heroines throw coaxing looks upon the reader. The fact remains that the non-romance literature in England has become much better, far more varied and more interesting, while the novelists have frequently arrived at a dead stop. Many of them became very alarmed when they heard of fresh editions of good non-fictitious literature, which is one of the most important marks of up-to-date literature.

CONTEMPORARIES

STORY-TELLERS AND ENTERTAINERS

Between the great veterans of yesterday, and the modernists of to-day, there exists a small number of novelists who, by their quality, and the large circle of their readers, deserve attention. They do not feverishly try to be "different", but they are strong enough to re-construct the novel for modern demands, without upsetting its original form.

There is above all, E. M. Foster, a gentleman of fifty, who caused a sensation in 1910 with *Howard's End*, and after the War, with *Passage in India*, one of the finest books of modern times. Then there is R. H. Mottram, now in his forties, a former clerk to whom England is justly grateful for a few realistic and interestingly written novels out of the War-time, such as *The Spanish Farm Trilogy*, and *The English Miss*. Then we have Frank Swinnerton, with very worth-reading novels, sketching the lower middle-classes, from which he comes—e.g. *Nocturne*. And, of course, there is Hugh Walpole, who, apart from ever so many other things, has written the most delightful among English School-novels: *Jeremy at Crake*. Further, Mr. Priestly, Compton Mackenzie—there are more, ever so many more.

Let us glide now gradually to the "real" ordinary novels, upon which a Modernist (Author or Critic) looks with disdain; we may lose in intellectual height and moral intention, but we see ourselves all the

same surrounded by many books that nobody repents having read. Also these "entertainers" have become deeper, more insistent, more true to life. They, too, move their greater numbers, in social realities, "without air-cushions between themselves and reality" (to speak with Huxley), and a few shillings in one's pocket are sufficient to enjoy them. Even Michael Arlen is to-day no longer the snob of yesterday. His *Lily Christine* is a real human being, not more sentimental, not more tragic, not more foolish than we all are, Modernists included!

Michael Arlen, still rather young, and a foreigner, has just as little of a social tendency as perhaps W. B. Maxwell, a writer with enormous editions; but the characters which they create are to be found in real life. Arnold Bennett has often proved, recently in *Riceyman Steps* (1923), that splendid results can be obtained without modernism, and without social ambition, by an honest portraying of the social milieu. It is nowise necessary to force conclusions upon the reader. There is no need to say that the world is bad—he notices that without being told!

THE YOUNGEST GENERATION

Of the very youngest generation, so far as it does not belong to the Modernists, Louis Marlow is doubtless the most gifted writer of temporary novels. His second book: *Two Made Their Bed* is a good work, full of lively people, and at the same time a serious social study. G. M. Attenborough is another beginner who feels himself driven to make social ideas a theme for novels. He wrote *The Rich Young Man*.

Stronger in temperament and imagination are the first works of H. A. Manhood and R. Pyke (1928). Both writers seem to lean towards Modernism.

Unfortunately, hopeful beginners are ambushed nowadays by dangers. How Noel Coward disappointed his admirers, when he became an ordinary money grasper, rather than a serious dramatist. Others, as van Druten, and young Sherriff, will have first to prove that a real great future lies before them. *Young Woodley* and *Journey's End* (both have appeared also in novel-form) owe their unusual success to certain special circumstances; van Druten awoke in many hearts a strong resonance because his Public School work alluded to the secret zones of the sexual life of the young; while Sherriff brought a piece of War reality exactly at the right moment upon the English stage. Both speak out of the depth of their own experiences, which says very little about the strength of their artistic imagination, and their ability to work the British problems.

Among those who have already passed their thirtieth year, but who, by form and content, range with the rising younger generation, Liam O'Flaherty is the most important. He carries with him all the advantages of the Irish temperament, and of Irish literary art. He lived through the World-War; he is opposed to Irish Catholicism; and the social conscience is burning in him. In brief: a very modern man, but no snobbish "modernist". His first novel appeared in 1923.

THE WOMEN

Since the War, English literature witnessed an event which is of far greater moment than the passing over to expressionistic technique of the modernists: women made their triumphant entrance into literature—as object as well as subject. Of course, there have always been good women writers, but never so many. Nowadays, where the psychical and psycho-analytic occupies such a large space, the British novel has become a nearly exclusive woman's realm—for the woman, as the master of the Philosophy of the unconscious, and the sub-conscious.

At least a dozen women have made, within a very few years, a literary name for themselves that is of a first-class order. One of them can even be called the very best among them: Virginia Woolf. She is modern, but absolutely correct. She arises (as daughter of Sir Leslie Stephens) out of a *milieu* where one can expect correctness, but not so quickly modernism. Virginia Woolf has very broad aims. She strives for a new expression; she dissects spirit and psyche. She pulls life to pieces, in order to build it anew out of ever so many fragments. The plucking to pieces is, of course, the easier part of the task. Her last novel, *To the Lighthouse*, proves it.

But Virginia Woolf has taste, and is modern, without being obsessed by the sexual complex. This fact, too, is nowadays a phenomenon.

Up to a certain degree, Dorothy Richardson is of importance as a literary experiment. In "Miriam Henderson," she has created for herself a romance

figure whom she follows up gaily and optimistically through life in many volumes. Stella Benson experimented in 1920 with a novel without a hero. Modern and investigating also is Victoria Sackville-West (Mrs. Harold Nicolson), and surely, too "Rebecca West" (a nom de plume for C. T. Fairfield), the most distinguished of female critics. Rose Macaulay has, in *Told by an Idiot*, made for her the *too* keen attempt to bring the whole British development from Victorianism till to-day into the frame of a novel. The much-read Sheila Kaye-Smith walks, without exciting us, in the well-kept ways of Thomas Hardy. Others follow in the wake of others.

HEROES OF ROMANCE

The picture of British life, of British people and their thoughts, which we see before us in the mirror of literature, is, of course, frequently distorted and one-sided. An English novel (even a good one) can lead us just as much astray as, for instance, the book "England" which Dean Inge has written; and just by that which makes such works so attractive—the well-marked individualism of a clever writer. What they do not wish to see—or, as they think, they need not see—they put simply aside. The "national" spirit of the British, which is the secret of their politics, is nearly completely missing in their literature.

As painted in literature, the Englishman is the most regardless individualist, and often a remark-

able "un-English" egoist. This is quite interesting for the reader, but a hindrance for the foreigner, who tries to learn to understand the British from their literature. How absurd it would be to make a picture of the British mind out of a satire by Bernard Shaw—or even out of a social sketch by Noel Coward! How wrong it would be to draw conclusions from the howling of an hysterical modern, upon the present spiritual life of the British nation! How wrong it would be to conclude, from the songs of triumph of sexualism of a D. H. Lawrence, that all England was sexually obsessed, or perverse! How wrong it would be not to remember that John Galsworthy has written no good book since 1922! How wrong it would be to declare the great figure of H. G. Wells as small, because up to the present day no indecent word ever came out of his pen! Three thousand novels appear in England every year—how much trash there must be among them!

THE "FORSYTES" AS INTERPRETERS OF ENGLAND

For some years the foreigner has turned by preference to his Galsworthy, if he wishes to study England, and finds that Galsworthy is not merely an amiable story-teller, but that his Forsyte Saga, together with its continuation, which now appears under the title *A Modern Comedy*, has crossed through all England. But is that really so, and through what sort of an England? Certainly not through modern England!

The principal portion of this Saga, *The Man of Property*, contains the best that has been said

about a certain class within a certain time—but even this best portion gives no more than just a small cutting, only very gradually developed out of an endless row of books.

Galsworthy had not foreseen this. Originally he had given the title "Forsyte Saga" to *The Man of Property*, and as he says himself in his preface of 1922, he does not claim having written a "scientific study of one epoch." Only the critic, and the advertisements, have made out of it a "standard work of British History." By this, the puffing advertisements really condemned Mr. Galsworthy, without noticing it, because there was, during the bloom, and at the end of the Victorian era, something better to be got than "Forsytes", plus family-trash, country-places, and city offices.

Galsworthy describes, and criticizes, the Forsyte world of the well-to-do as brilliantly as one can wish—but he passes by, carelessly, all the vital forces of that period. Not even the religious under-tone, which characterised Victorian life, rings through. This is no reproach against the novel, but an objection against its remodelling into a sociological panacea. The religious undertone ought not to have been passed over in any case, because it formed an enormous moral activum of that high capitalistic period, an impetus which has protected England from suffering the same moral loss, during the development of industrialism, and the rain of gold, of which America is suffering in our days, because there the same blending was missing. Although Puritanism, and its still noticeable remnants, have brought a good deal of hypocrisy to England, it has prevented something far worse.

The more Galsworthy approaches modern times, in his later books, the less does the picture which he shows us portray the true face of England. If the book between the original "Saga" and the "Swan Song", the three volumes of *Modern Comedy*, disappoint, if English life appears hollow, and the British people small and shallow, it is not so much the fault of England as of John Galsworthy. In his Michael Mont, he gave himself an opportunity to describe the inner change of the Nation—nay, even to become her speaker and advocate, but Radicalism is not in Galsworthy's line. Like so many Englishmen, he does not know what to do with the things which have developed between the world of the old Forsytes, and the new socialistic doctrine. The "Saga" ends in platitudes; it contains nothing of the spirit of new England.

BERNARD SHAW

In the most important of their newer works, Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells have set the pure artistic literary far behind their social and pacifistic propaganda. This is a most remarkable phenomenon—the two strongest of contemporary writers of England have placed themselves untiringly into the service of a super-literary idea. They have thus pronounced that the great civilizing tasks of our times must dictate the work of the best of the country, before all cultural contemplation, and far before all egoistic artistry.

Bernard Shaw is thereby so direct that his works will become antiquated comparatively quickly. Shaw

is the cleverest entertainer and the strictest critic of his times; that gives him everlasting valour. But his immortality consists more in his totality, than in his single works. The British got into the habit of not taking Shaw seriously. They see in him an amusing story-teller, a brilliant fun-maker, who is permitted to say just everything. Mr. Shaw has made this easy interpretation of his critics still easier by exaggerating the comical, which forms a part of his conscious characteristics, in his public utterances, but not in his Plays. How pleasant it must be to smile at a man as a good fun-maker, who, through decades, holds the looking-glass, in thousands of meetings and articles, before the guilty face of the capitalists! When all the Moderns will have spent their *esprit*, then this greatest of all literary Socialists will still be found in the history-books as a pioneer of the Labour Movement.

THE HERO IN TRANSFIGURATION

H. G. Wells has left off interpreting England in his books; he wishes to form it anew. His will is so intensive, and his power of communication so great, that the novel can no longer be his means of expression. Novel, romance, is not dead, as we have seen, but it is dead for Mr. Wells. He wishes to sum up the work of his life in three enormous volumes. So far, only the first one, the *History of the World*, has appeared in print.

This restless thinker and worker, who would like to collect the whole spiritual world in his own brain, cannot bear to be tied to any of the usual forms

of art. He writes, and writes, and writes; unbound, un-tied. In the Clissold-Book, he also believes that he has created a new form of novel. In this book is wrapped up the whole creative imagination of a social builder and prophet; not much is left of the novelist. But, for the British, a prophet is not so welcome as a clever, philosophic and humane entertainer, as the Wells of former times had been.

Even the people who inwardly entered the way of Wells ever so long ago, who are ready to walk in it, are not quite prepared for such verbose, and idea-laden literature.

Looked upon merely socially, "William Clissold" is a man who would be able to gather up the Liberal Industrial Report (and all that is good and reasonable upon this world) into a practical working programme, and realize it as a democratic Dictator of England. Such a literary political intention is presumptuous; Mr. Clissold stands outside English reality. There exists in England a very lively Mr. Wells, but a Mr. Clissold does *not* exist; he is "fiction". This romance-hero comes out of the retort; one can neither love him, nor hate him, for he does not live, and the English are glad that this is so, because spiritual revolt is not yet so much developed that one would like to become a "Clissold".

GLOOMY HEROES

Mr. Wells is the only novelist who combines the protest of that which exists, with a positive construction. From the others one can only hear the "No". And what a "No"! Galsworthy, of course,

says (before he puts on his silk stockings and breeches to thank the King for his preferment), with benevolent resignation, that he believes the state of things in England to be "somewhat rotten, and too bankrupt".

This is a comfortable form of criticism, worthy of an aged "man of property". D. H. Lawrence, the wildest among the novel rebels, declares straight away that the world is loathsome, and England a heap of dung. We Germans are quite familiar with the jargon that the spirituals like to use, when they mean to express that they are going to be sea-sick at the mere look of the world.

The case of the people with Court Uniforms is certainly galling; but when the remonstrators with the weak digestion become hysterical, then they give a no less painful impression.

D. H. Lawrence is to-day his own romance-hero. In the same spirit as Wells, but unlike Wells (who is, of course, of an altogether different type), who only in his ripest years, and only when he stood in the zenith of his fame and maturity, placed his own personality as a *milieu* for his works, Lawrence pushes himself, and his philosophy, already into the centre of the world, at a time when he is still unfinished, and poor in those positive accomplishments, by which he might become one day able to raise the people up again, and to lead them to new goals—people whom he now treads so mercilessly under foot. Mr. Lawrence is a gloomy hero; so gloomy, indeed, that he was called "pessimistic" or "fatalistic".

If it were to stop at the fatalistic direction, it would, perhaps, be interesting, as a sign of the times,

but it would be of little relative value. England has been stirred up already during the last twenty years. One cannot keep on shaking things up—the world demands something positive. In former times, the saying went: An Englishman will go to Heaven. He behaved himself accordingly: he allowed Ascension to approach *him*. To-day the slogan is: The way leads straightway to hell-fire.

There are people who are not troubled by this thought, but have the literates no loftier aim? How can one blame the politicians, if they allow things to go an evil way, if the seers, prophets and poets of the nation do not search out new ways, and take the lead? What is the good of refusing H. G. Wells, because it does not belong to the younger generation, so long as these youngsters only pull down, instead of building up, so long as they only destroy Faith, without creating Faith?

THE WAY LAWRENCE WENT

The way that Lawrence followed up so far, is instructive. Lawrence comes out of a miner's cottage. He is a miner's son, born in 1885. His mother "discovered" him early, and induced him to win in his younger days a scholarship for a good school.

When he was sixteen, he did not go down into the mines; he instructed school-children. He continued studying; he taught, he travelled. In 1911, his first novel was published; in 1913, he completed his early great deed: "Sons and Lovers," a tale out of the world of miners; full of warmth, full of poetry; full of earnestness and depth, impressive and true.

Out of the same year came "Love Poems and Others." Then came the War; after it the Flood!

In this mood, Mr. Lawrence swallowed Freud's theories. In 1921, he wrote about "Psycho-analysis of the Unconscious"; and in the same year, the thirty-six year old man emptied his complex-possessed heart into "Women in Love." This became the centre of his scepticism. He who commands all registers, from the voice of angels to devilish curses, poisoned himself totally, and his art became a hymn of hate. If he were to believe all that he wrote, what a man would stand before us!

Surely, he is earnest enough, but this explosive mood has become a mania with the moderns.

"Nearly every young novelist," so wrote Hugh Walpole, "seems directly to hate the characters which he invents. How contemptuously Mr. Lawrence treats his people, no matter whether they love or hate. Each glance which Mr. Huxley throws upon his characters (who are, after all, parts of his own personality) makes him sick; even such a charming novelist as Miss Rose Macaulay seems to feel that it would be better if the people which she has produced had never been born." Hugh Walpole, of course, leans to the other extreme; he is head over ears in love with his "Jeremy," and love, as we know, makes us blind. But what he says in these sentences has a certain justification.

SOARING UPWARDS

"God needs no men," so Lawrence lets one of his heroes say. And in "Pansies" (Thought-fragments

in poetical form, 1929), he cries out in despair: "The noise, the stench, the ugliness and meaninglessness that surround us, make one mad, but we do not know what we shall do." This "rough, demoniacal giant," as Arnold Bennett called him, stands helplessly before us. His only consolation is the presentiment that, in the "terrible pause" in which we live, a creative evolution takes place unnoticed. In this pause, Lawrence writes exquisite books, like: "The Woman Who Rode Away," a collection of crystal-clear small tales. And he finds the English "feminine," because they do not solve their social problem. He himself veils himself in a dark beard, and uses harsh words, but by doing this, his *own* feminism, his lack of concentrating power, has not been overcome.

JAMES JOYCE

James Joyce, the Irishman, is the natural product of an explosive, but spiritually, and, until recently politically tied-up Roman Catholic country. One can only understand him from this political and cultural Irish *milieu*.

In this man, who looks like a small Civil Service employee, and whose eyesight is nearly gone—in this spiritual revolutionary, who, in Paris, whereto he fled, is surrounded by a crowd of admirers, and advertising-apostles or disciples (mostly females); this man, whose mind is living to-day in that unexplorable borderland where genius tries to run away from the control of reason; in him far richer treasures are to be found than are possessed by any of the other

"modernists" who writes in the English language.

He has exercised a very strong influence upon modern English literature. His works have found delighted friends and bitter enemies, among them the Chief of Police; there may be, however, very few people who have read his "Ulysses" to the end. Joyce's former works, the "Dubliners" (1914), and the original, powerful and genuinely artistic: "Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man," which describes the childhood and the awakening of young Stephen Dedalus (one of the figures in "Ulysses"), and the fight of his inclinations against the religious ethics of his Roman Catholic convent education, are not in the ban of censorship, and have made a deep impression in England.

The great characteristic of the "Ulysses," however—especially the thought to give to the figures of this gigantic work a symbolic and ideal importance—was hovering only indistinctly in the mind of the author himself, and is so difficult to seize, that the obvious weaknesses of the book are not counter-balanced by it. One does Joyce wrong, if one tries to understand him from the "idea," and to put upon him Continental measures. He is un-English, yes, but not Continental in the same sense.

Rebecca West, who is aware of all the weaknesses of the Irish race, finds Leopold Bloom (in the "Ulysses") "one of the greatest productions of all times": the personification of the idea that man longs to go back out of his humanity, into the earth again, into the most earthly of the earthly, and she interprets the book as a heart-breaking lamentation over the Lost Paradise. But she does not see that Joyce passes by quite carelessly, the not less

elementary and eternal power: the desire of man to raise himself *above* the tumults of the earth. Thus also Joyce stops at the negative, and we must conclude this contemplation with the acknowledgment that it is not sufficient to be demoniacal. Revolution is no ultimatum.

IN EXPECTATION

Is not the noisy tumult of the literary pessimists like that earlier unripe and wild "socialism," which millions of British working-men threw overboard again, because they found out that hatred against existing things is, as such, quite useless to them?

An Englishman is often rather cynical, but he is an optimist; he wants to live, to make progress. He believes in progress; he does not wish to be robbed of his Faith. The "modernists" will have to discover first their hearts! Is not the strange mixture of exquisite beauty and grotesque ugliness, that unsteady erratic wavering between bodily affirmation and spiritual negation, between mystic purity and unrestrained sexual eruption, which speaks so frequently from the endeavours of the moderns, the very *proof* of the unripeness, instability, and with it, if one may put it thus, *unmanliness* of that whole literary direction?

Do they not simply feel indistinctly certain things for which they have no expression, and for whose fighting down, and clearing up, they were not in possession of sufficient strength? Have they, in the

exultation of realism, not lost the "idea," without which no true accomplishment is possible? Are they not just Bolsheviks of the spirit, volcanoes, whose eruptions lighten up the nocturnal sky of West Europe, while upon the astonished onlookers falls down a terrible rain of lava? Can one be called dull, if one feels the pain stronger than the joy, at such an event? Have these moderns not something of the unripeness of those young men, who believe that they have created a new world if they make wild speeches in Oxford, or at the fire-places of Chelsea or Bloomsbury? Or when the "Bright Young People" expose themselves in public, and with intention?

Everything affected is false, be it a Party-Programme an obscenity, or a novel. Everything not genuine will pass away: in politics, in literature, in social life. The extremes are not typical of the Nation. They only give witness of an inner emotion which they have not yet learnt to master. This is the present state in England, of modern England, of democratic England.

This is the state of things brought about by this very democratizing, this national and spiritual transferring. The Motherland of peaceful rest has been stirred up! But the rebels are like the pearls in a glass of champagne: they spring up, here, there, everywhere; some jump away far over the surface, but they burst into emptiness, into space. The wine remains in the glass, softly stirred by the little pearls, which spring up somewhere from the bottom.

English wine, the post-war growth, is still immature. No connoisseur of wine returns the barrel, because

its content is dull-looking after the shakings of a long journey. But the time will come when we shall ask the British, with greater right than to-day: What have you *done* to cultivate the God-given Wine, so as to make it drinkable for all?

FINIS

